A large amount of uncertainty surrounds the future of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, uncertainty that even led to the high ranking MOD (Mission Operations Directorate) director, Paul Hill, to speak only of his confidence that there will at least be a “follow on program” - whatever that may be - after shuttle is retired, during the end of June All Hands address to MOD staff. (Article to be published Sunday).

However, it is unlikely any fallout from the Augustine Commission - which Mr Hill was referencing - will result in the Ares I-X test flight being cancelled, as the four segment test vehicle attempts to keep to its mid-September launch date.

See all of NASASpaceflight.com’s Constellation related articles:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/news/constellation/

Ares I-X Processing Latest:

Although public schedules continue to class Ares I-X as launching at the end of August, internal manifests show Ares I-X as launching NET (No Earlier Than) September 18, with threats of day-to-day slips based on processing milestones.

“Accomplishments include the transfer of the Aft Skirt to Rotational Processing Surge Facility (RPSF) and the Forward Assembly to the VAB (Vehicle Assembly Building), the completion of the Forward Assembly Review, and the mating of the Aft Skirt to Aft Motor Segment,” noted an 8th Floor (MOD) overview of status (L2).

However, the opening stacking operations on the handed-over Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) - one of the key processing milestones - have been delayed by over a week, due to what appears to be issues repairing a broken crane that is being tasked with transferring the assembled Aft Booster for its stacking in the VAB.

“Ares I-X (VAB HB-3/4) (RPSF) (Pad-B): Aft Booster transfer to pallet on hold for crane repair. Transfer to VAB and stacking moved to next Wednesday, July 8th,” noted the latest daily processing flow information (L2).

Based on the realigned flow timeline, Monday will involve work in High Bay 3, relating to MLP Flame trench closeouts. Over in High Bay 4, the forward assembly will be prepared for 5SS Lift/Mate operations, ahead of Aft Booster stacking on Wednesday.

So far, no alteration to the launch date has been noted on the internal milestones, though it may be expected - due to the tight flow ahead of rollout to Pad 39B, scheduled for just three days ahead of launch.

“AB Camera & Bracket Installations/DFI (Development Flight Instrumentation) Cable Bracket Installation complete-to-date. Remaining work will be completed in the VAB,” added other processing notes.

“VAB HB-4 (High Bay 4): Interstage/Forward Assembly match drilling complete. Stack-1 Modal testing setups are in work. Re-pining pressure transducers in work. US-7 Harness and connector mates continue.

“VAB HB-3: HDP alignment optics in work. Stacking preps continue. No Weekend/Holiday work planned.”

Ares I-X Major Risks:

As noted on the June 22, 09 “Top Risks” review notes, acquired by L2, Ares I-X has four major issues - one of which relates to the continually slipping launch date, and three related to technical issues. Levels of ‘risk’ range from the smallest on the 25 box risk matrix, noted as 1×1 (GREEN), to the highest, seen as 5×5 (RED) - which list the ‘Likelihood’ the issue would occur x severity of ‘Consequence’ such an issue would have on the vehicle.

Interestingly, Thrust Oscillation (TO), even on the Ares I-X four segment - as opposed to the well know issues with the Ares I five segment - first stage dominates Ares I-X’s Top Risks findings.

This is despite warnings from the Ares I-X Chief Engineer over a year ago - as reported by this site - that TO and vibro-acoustic effects on the vehicle’s Flight Termination System (FTS) required mitigation.

“Requirement: FTS Range frequency - using current Air Force waiver. FTS Components environments exceeded at T+110 seconds - end of burn (Thrust Oscillation condition),” wrote the Chief Engineer on his expansive presentation (available on L2) to the Ares I-X System Critical Design Review (CDR) Phase II meeting in June, 2008.

Yet on the June 22, 2009 “Top Risk” review, “Thrust Oscillation and its affects on the Flight Termination System (Range Safety),” is classed as a 4×5 risk, showing it’s actually increased as a concern.

That increase is related to the time of ascent where TO’s effects on the vehicle’s FTS exceeds rated vibrational input levels, now deemed as starting around T+70 seconds - not T+110 seconds - into flight.

This in turn has placed pressure on obtaining the required Air Force waiver for the range, without which, Ares I-X would not be allowed to launch.

Another waiver will be required on the second “Top Risk” - related to Thrust Oscillation effects on the first stage TVC (Thrust Vector Control) electronics, used to gimble the solid rocket motor’s nozzle during steering commands. This risk, which is listed as 3×5, makes its debut on the Top Risk list.

However, a waiver on this issue is understood to be less of a problem to acquire, due to the knowledge of the “stock shuttle legacy SRB TVC system”, which Ares I-X will be using.

The biggest risk, a 5×5 risk, relates to the “vibro-acoustic environment input to Upper Stage Simulator (USS) exceeding structural margins.”

Very little is noted on this problem, although a recommendation that the USS should receive additional bracing to carry the higher than anticipated loads is noted as an avenue of mitigation. It is not known if that work has already been added to Ares I-X’s processing flow, although no reference has been made on the daily processing notes.

Ares I-Y Status Update:

The second test flight for Ares - prior to the ‘full up’ Ares I unmanned test flight in 2014 - remains in flux, as managers discuss either the deletion of Ares I-Y, or changes to the vehicle’s configuration and test requirements.

Ares I-Y’s future is embedded into the drive to solve “schedule disconnect” issues that were raised at the start of this year’s PMR (Program Milestone Review or Program Manager’s Recommend) cycle, which showed threats to the entire Constellation schedule, and the possibility that the gap between shuttle retirement and Orion’s FOC (Full Operational Capability) debut on Orion 4 (ISS crew rotation) could be as large as seven years.

With such a gap deemed as unacceptable by Constellation management, Ares I manager Jeff Hanley built his own point-by-point plan to return the schedule back into the March, 2015 IOC (Initial Operating Capability - or Orion 2) timeframe.

Mr Hanley’s plans included the deletion of the Ares I-Y test flight - which has now slipped to 2014 - to be possibly replaced by an Ares I-X hybrid known as Ares I-X Prime, capable of carrying out high abort testing earlier in the Constellation schedule.

These plans remain under discussion, with the latest information - noted on the latest MOD 8th Floor News - pointing towards evaluations into flying a reconfigured Ares I-Y vehicle, earlier in the schedule. However, as per evaluation notes, advancing this stage of testing may not be possible.

“Ares I-Y flight definition: The Ares Project presented their assessment to determine the earliest possible date to fly I-Y as a powered second stage configuration,” noted the 8th Floor memo (L2).

“The earliest available Upper Stage is June 2014 (3 month slip to current I-Y date), this is driven by facilities. The earliest available J-2X engine is February 2013 for upper stage integration, this does not support Upper Stage need dates or all testing.

“Currently Ares I-Y is scheduled for March 2014 with no powered second stage. Many believe that the program needs to demonstrate two unmanned flights prior to the first manned flight, today’s manifest has only one.

“The board decided not to change the manifest at this time, but a detailed CR (Change Request) with all the proposed changes, including Orion and Ground Operations impacts and test needs, will come to the board in October.”

Ares I itself has three top risks, with First Stage nose first re-entry, now classed as a 4×4 risk and increasing. Range Safety System certification is classed as a 4×5 risk and increasing, while TVC certification is now a noted as a 3×5 risk.

Interestingly, Thrust Oscillation is not listed for Ares I.

Orion Status Update:

Orion is likely to survive any fallout from potential changes to the forward plan for NASA’s return to the moon. However, the manned vehicle is suffering from its own technical challenges, in part due to the continued stripping of its capabilities based on mass growth versus Ares I performance.

Ares I can launch the ISS version of Orion, thanks to a series of mass stripping exercises - notably the ZBV (Zero Based Vehicle) effort. However, the Lunar Orion’s mass properties - again based on Ares I’s performance capability - is a major challenge, seeing its “score card” mass properties between Orion 606-E (December 2008) and Orion 606-G (May 2009) grow into a RED risk for the program.

Solutions will need to be sought throughout all of the major components on Orion; with the LAS (Launch Abort System), CM (Crew Module), SM (Service Module) and Jettisoned Spacecraft Adapter (SAJ) all trending up in mass - which includes the breaching of the “managers reserves”, set aside for mass growth margins.

Orion is also suffering from problems with its electric power generation and storage margins, which is threatening a redesign of the vehicle’s Solar Arrays/Panels.

According to documentation, the required margins on the ability for the solar panels to generate enough power for storage in the vehicle’s batteries - for use during the Lunar Orion’s flight out of sunlight - is short by 22 percent.

The solutions to this problem would require either an increase in the size of Orion’s solar wings and/or additional battery storage capacity - with both options adding yet more mass to the vehicle. The ISS Orion’s electric power generation and storage margins are understood to be within requirements.

Engineering challenges with new flight hardware are commonplace, yet solutions to those problems should also be expected, thanks to the talented engineering workforce Constellation has at its disposal. In Orion’s case, NASA and Lockheed Martin engineers have been meeting at Lockheed’s Denver base to aid that mitigation process.

“Many MOD personnel have been in Denver the last two weeks supporting the Orion Project Subsystem Design Review (SSDR). The purpose of the design review is to resolve issues and close details on the subsystems prior to the Orion Project PDR, which is scheduled for August this year, followed by a software review in November,” noted the 8th Floor.

“MOD folks are heavily engaged at the subsystem level and are providing valuable input to the project. The coordination and integration of the MOD review has been lead by our CEV Operations Manager.”

As previously reported, Orion’s crew capability has been reduced from carrying six crewmembers to four - with the possibility of adding six person crews after Orion’s design has matured. This drive is part of Mr Hanley’s suggestions for finding get-wells in the vehicle’s development cycle by simplifying the “Apollo on Steroids” spacecraft with the aim to increase margin in the overall schedule.

However, Constellation’s management are taking the crew reduction a stage further, by changing Orion’s capability from 0-6 crew (unmanned capability) to 2-4 crew - with a contingency of no less than one crewmember being able to fly the vehicle. Such a change eliminates Orion’s ability to fly unmanned, which could have been utilized in a number of scenarios.

“Orion Crew Size Requirement: There were a couple of key topics of interest to MOD this week at the CxCB (Constellation Control Board),” noted a memo outlining discussions (L2). “First, a change to the requirements for Orion to be capable to fly 0-6 crew to 2-4 crew.

“Four is the requirement for Lunar and flights to ISS do not require 6, thus reducing the maximum crew by 2 will simplify design and build margin in the schedule.”

Orion will be designed with the intent that two crew members will fly the vehicle, but can be operational if only one crew member is available during a contingency event.

“There was a concern raised that unless 1 crew (one person) is specified, the design will not be driven to make it actually operational by 1 crew,” added the CxCB memo.

“The Orion Project interpreted the 1 crew requirement to be only contingency, with the focus being on 1 crew being able to control the vehicle and to ingress and egress (hatch operation).

“The board decision was that the intent is to get one crew back safely, not provide a nominal one crew capability. The design will be for 2-4, with 1 crew contingency. An action given to rewrite the single crew requirement to clearly reflect the intent vs. leaving the contingency words it in the rationale.”

It is not clarified in the CxCB notes as to whether the loss of unmanned capability relates to both ISS and Lunar Orion’s full mission capability, such as Lunar landings - which currently involve Orion being left unmanned on orbit. If that specific capability is lost, only two crewmembers would be able to undock with Altair and land on the lunar surface, while two crewmembers stay with Orion.

Such a loss of capability is unlikely, due to the massive impact such a decision would have on moon missions. Sources also claim an autonomous capability is likely to remain for leaving Orion in a Lunar orbit, and that the change relates to eliminating Orion’s ability to return to Earth without the aid of the crew.

L2 members: Documentation - from which the above article has quoted snippets - is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

Related posts:

1. Orion PDR delay could stretch into 2010 The requirement to carry out an additional Design Analysis Cycle...

Opening Information:

Right now, STS-133 - along with STS-134 - is currently baselined to launch No Earlier Than July 29, 2010 on orbiter Endeavour. However, the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and the International Space Station Program (ISSP) have, for some months now, been discussing the various options available to them as the SSP comes to an end.

As a result, the two programs have tentatively agreed to swap the order of the final two manifested missions - flying STS-134 on Endeavour in July 2010 and slipping STS-133 into mid-September on Discovery.

The first category relates to performance enhancement strategies that should be pursued. These include reducing the STS-133 crew to five people, reducing mission duration to less than 12 days, removing fifth Cryo Tank Set and eliminating ballast, removing 6th GN2 Tank, and deleting ELC-4 LTA cable and associated hardware from the mission’s baselined payload.

The second category, which includes suggestions that “make sense but need more analysis/shelf life considerations,” includes such performance enhancements as reducing rendezvous altitude of Station and Shuttle, removing Aft Radiator Panels from Discovery, and performing a multistage Deorbit Burn at the end of the mission.

Finally, the third category (options that “are not thought to be good candidates for pursuit because of cost, schedule, risk, low return for magnitude of effort/distraction”) include throttling the Space Shuttle Main Engine’s from 104.5 percent to 106 percent during ascent and removing SRB parachutes and cameras.

These options were briefed by the Tiger Team to the Joint Mission Integration Control Board and the SSP Control Board with the knowledge that the Category-1 recommendations are being incorporated into a second CR for STS-133.

Furthermore, the FDRD notes that “CR-2 updates will be familiar to most, but not all reviewers, due to the support that has been provided to the Tiger Team. Therefore an expedited review is being requested for CR-2 in order to facilitate including updates in integration work.”

As of now, the Tiger Team has been tasked with reporting their final assessments of all Category-2 recommendations to the SSP and ISSP no later than mid-July. Any accepted recommendations from that meeting will then be presented to the “STS-133 Flight Integrated Product Team for integration into the STS-133 mission.”

STS-133 - Option 1:

The first option for STS-133 will see Discovery launch with five Cryo Tank sets, six GN2 tanks, and a six person crew on a 12+1 day mission with one baselined EVA (Spacewalk).

Further, Discovery’s primary payload - in addition to the DoD payloads of opportunity - would be a Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) and the Express Logistics Carrier 4 (ELC-4).

For the MPLM, four active longeron latches, one active keel latch with keel camera, and a Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical (ROEU) that will provide 28V heater power and 124V of temperature and pressure checks will be used to install the module into Discovery’s Payload Bay.

Inside the MPLM will be two Utilization racks, three Resupply Stowage Platforms, and two Resupply Stowage Racks.

ELC-4 will have four active longeron latches for the deck assembly and two passive longeron latches and one passive keel latch for the Keel Assembly.

A ROEU will provide 28V heater power to the ELC and a Payload Power Switching Unit (PPSU) will provide additional electrical inhibit capability.

ELC-4 will also require “unique Flight Software for the PPSU’s internal heater on/off telemetry.”

Furthermore, the payload that will be attached to ELC-4 for launch (under option 1) will be the HPGT, a SARJ Race Ring, a spare Express Pallet Controller Assembly, and FRAM based SASA ORU-2, CTC-2, and four empty Passive FRAM sites.

Additionally, Discovery will carry a GLACIER freezer to the ISS and return a used GLACIER to Earth. Also, Discovery will deliver a Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus/National Lab Pathfinder (CGBA/NLP) to ISS.

In all, Discovery’s expected payload weight is ~35,461lbs with an additional 1,326lbs of ballast in the aft. The MPLM is expected to weigh 18,304lbs, ELC-4 9,516lbs, and the middeck payload 7,591lbs. That leaves an overall Ascent Performance Margin of ~800lbs.

Overall, the mission objectives for STS-133 are to “deliver utilization, logistics, and resupply, deliver and install ELC-4 to S3 Lower Inboard, deliver spare HPGT and transfer to ELC-2 for stowage, and install the Functional Cargo Block Power Data Grapple Fixture.”

The preliminary mission timeline for Option 1 shows Discovery docking with the ISS on FD-3 (Flight Day 3), EVA-1 (HPGT transfer and ELC LTA cable activities) occurring on FD-4 along with ELC-4 unberth and installation to ISS, MPLM unberth and installation to ISS on FD-5, Focused Inspection activities and middeck transfer operations on FD-6, rack transfers to and from the MPLM on FDs 7-10 with MPLM rebirth in Discovery’s Payload Bay on FD-10, Undocking and flyaround on FD-11, and landing on FD-13.

Option 2:

In a desire to maximize upmass to the ISS, Option 2 for STS-133 incorporates the Category-1 recommendations of the Tiger Team as presented in June to the SSP Control Board.

To this end, under Option-2, Discovery would launch ELC-4 and a Pressurized Logistics Module (modified MPLM for long-duration on-orbit stay) to the ISS.

Discovery would launch with only four Cryo tank sets and five GN2 tanks for a 10+0 day mission with only five crew members and one contingency/deferrable EVA.

For this option, Discovery’s total payload weight would be 38,193lbs - with the Pressurized Logistics Module weighing 21,502 lbs, ELC-4 weighing 9,680 lbs, and the middeck payload weighing 7,011 lbs.

This would give the mission an approximate Ascent Performance Margin of 839 lbs with only 126 lbs of ballast in the aft.

For this option, the ELC-4’s payload would be an Heat Rejection (Sub) System radiator, CTC-2, and two empty FRAMs only.

The Pressurized Logistics Module - which would remain on the station after Discovery’s departure - would carry two International Standard Payload Racks and a To Be Determined Cargo Rack Equivalent compliment only.

The mission’s objectives would be the delivery and installation of ELC-4 to S3 Lower Inboard, the delivery and installation of the Pressurized Logistics Module to a To Be Determined location, and the capability for one deferrable EVA if a Focused Inspection should be required.

Under this option, Discovery would dock on FD-4, berth the ELC-4 and Pressurized Logistics Module to the ISS on FD-5, activate and ingress the Pressurized Logistics Module as well as conduct middeck transfers on FD-6, perform the only EVA or Focused Inspection on FD-7, Undock on FD-9, and land on FD-11.

L2 members: Documentation - from which the above article has quoted snippets - is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

No related posts.

This mission is Arianespace’s third of seven Ariane 5 flights planned in 2009, marking the 189th flight of an Ariane family vehicle, and the 45th launch for Ariane 5.

Wednesday’s launch follows the year-opening flight on February 12 that orbited Eutelsat’s HOT BIRD 10 and NSS-9 for SES NEW SKIES, along with two Spirale auxiliary passengers for the French military; and the May 14 launch with the European Space Agency’s Herschel and Planck deep space telescopes.

Click here to review previous Ariane 5 launches: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/?s=Ariane

With a lift-off weight of nearly 6,910 kg., TerreStar-1 rode as a single passenger on the dedicated Ariane 5.

Overview:

This Space Systems/Loral-built spacecraft will operate in the 2 GHz spectrum, enabling the American telecommunications operator TerreStar Networks to provide voice, data and video communications to satellite/terrestrial mobile devices the size of a typical smart phone.

The launcher’s attitude and trajectory are totally controlled by the two onboard computers, located in the Ariane 5 vehicle equipment bay (VEB). 7.05 seconds after ignition of the main stage cryogenic engine at T-0, the two solid-propellant boosters are ignited, enabling lift-off.

The launcher first climbs vertically for 6 seconds, then rotates towards the East. It maintains an attitude that ensures the axis of the launcher remains parallel to its velocity vector, in order to minimize aerodynamic loads throughout the entire atmospheric phase, until the solid boosters are jettisoned.

Once this first part of the flight is completed, the onboard computers optimize the trajectory in real time, minimizing propellant consumption to bring the launcher first to the intermediate orbit targeted at the end of the main stage propulsion phase, and then the final orbit at the end of the flight of the cryogenic upper stage.

The main stage falls back off the coast of Africa in the Atlantic Ocean (in the Gulf of Guinea). On orbital injection, the launcher will have attained a velocity of approximately 9563 meters/second, and will be at an altitude of about 417 kilometers.

The fairing protecting the TerreStar-1 spacecraft is jettisoned shortly after the boosters are jettisoned at about T+190 seconds.

Spaecraft separation of the TerreStar-1 satellite will occur just over 26 minutes into flight.

TerreStar-1 is equipped with an 18-meter deployable reflector and powerful S-Band feed array, and will be capable of managing some 500 beams during an in-orbit design lifetime of more than 15 years. Its relay services are tailored to provide critical services for government, emergency responders, rural communities and commercial users throughout the United States and Canada.

Built by Space Systems/Loral using the company’s 1300 satellite platform, TerreStar-1 will operate in the 2 GHz spectrum to provide voice, data and video communications to satellite/terrestrial mobile devices the size of a typical smart phone.

Ahead of the launch, TerreStar President Jeffrey W. Epstein noted: “We are looking forward to a successful launch and the new, game-changing mobile satellite services TerreStar-1 will allow us to deliver.”

The spacecraft will be operated by Reston, Virginia-based TerreStar Networks, which plans to offer next-generation mobile communications through a network of partners and service providers for users who need “anywhere” coverage throughout the United States and Canada.

Related posts:

1. Ariane 5 ECA launches HOT BIRD 9 and W2M An Arianespace Ariane 5 ECA launch vehicle has launched for...
2. Ariane 5 ECA launches with Herschel and Planck observatories Arianespace’s Ariane 5 ECA launch vehicle has lifted off to place...

STS-127/ET-131 Latest:

Engineers were ready for the tanking test, despite the late retraction of the Rotating Service Structure (RSS), impacted by poor weather in the local area earlier in the flow.

“GUCP Troubleshooting: Ambient leak check of the vent line, shroud closeouts final purge were completed. Vent line flange bolt retorque was successfully performed, ” outlined processing information on L2.

“LOX and LH2 preps and checkout of the GUCP were completed on Monday. GUCP interface electrical retests were completed with nominal results.

“Final measurements and data collection of the plate position in flight configuration was completed. ET/IT GSE (Ground Support Equipment) door removal, closeout inspections and flight door installation complete. Strain gauge removal has been performed.”

For all 18 NASASpaceflight.com articles on the GUCP, click here: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/gucp/

The bad weather over the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) also produced two lightning strikes to Pad 39A, which resulted in an Engineering Review Board (ERB) evaluation of Endeavour’s electrical systems - which were found to be unaffected.

“S0018 Adverse Weather Update: Just prior to S0037 CTS (Call To Stations) a very active weather system rolled through the LC39 area,” added processing information.

“Pad-A experienced a lightning strike to the Catenary Wire system just under 0.1 nautical miles from Pad Center and another at 0.37 nautical miles from Pad Center.

“Appropriate operations in S0018 (were) kicked off to begin investigation and data gathering.

“Walk-downs needed to be competed ASAP due to pad clears for PRSD (Power Reactant Storage and Distributation) Load. An ERB for data review has (been conducted).

At one point earlier this week it was deemed likely the tanking test would be moved to Thursday. However, engineers managed to complete all the required tasks on time.

Following no leaks during the tanking test, confidence has been restored for ET-131, with the processing flow now moving towards a launch attempt of STS-127 on July 11.

Pre-tanking Notes:

“At Pad A, over the weekend continued with work on the ET GUCP. On Friday, the redesign of the fitted feet was worked. Over the weekend, got them fabricated and installed early Monday morning,” added KSC Integration and Engineering notes on the latest Shuttle Standup/Integration report (L2). “That took a little longer than the original plan.

“Once completed, got the vent line reconnected and got the 3/8” QDs installed. Running down to the plan that they went into the weekend with. Will press on with that plan and the tanking test Wednesday at 07:00. It is running a little tight but think have some room to get there.

“Really pleased to see everything come together with feet alignment. The team has been working really hard over the weekend. Looks like we will be ready for Wednesday.

“In support of the tanking test, if we are on for Wednesday, will have a tanking weather telecon at 06:30 before the tanking at 07:00. That will be a quick meeting, with no donuts or coffee. L-1 is planned at 09:00 a.m. on July 10.”

Making Wednesday for the tanking test wasn’t critical to the target of a July 11 NET (No Earlier Than) launch date for STS-127, with Mr Shannon noting some margin exists in the flow between the two dates - although engineers will be required to work through the upcoming holiday period.

“John Shannon confirmed there is some margin between Wednesday and making the July 11 attempt. They would just have to work over the holidays,” added the Standup report.

“Mr. Shannon added there was nothing magical about Wednesday. If the weather doesn’t work out, or if we run into any problems, we are not going to push it, we will just do it at the right time.”

Should all proceed to plan with the tanking test, the results are likely to be discussed at Thursday’s Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) meeting, which is usual for major troubleshooting efforts - previously seen with the Flow Control Valves (FCVs) which called for a “Special” PRCB review.

“The GUCP Steering Committee will meet and nail down all the forward actions they have,” added the forward plan. “If they do go to a tanking test on Wednesday, will probably try to report out at PRCB on Thursday.”

Interestingly, the tank may still leak. That in itself would not be a major setback, given the two-seal design that is now installed on ET-131 has leaked previously. The difference being such a leak is characterized as a “burp” and can be controlled even without cycling the valves.

“Mr. Shannon clarified that we have loaded tanks with this two-part seal twice before, and one time we had a leak but we could cycle the vent valve and control it, and the other time it didn’t leak,” added the Standup. So, if it leaks it won’t be a big surprise.

“It was clarified that the tank “burped”, which was within requirements, and the vent valve did not need to be cycled.”

However, should the tank leak in the same manner as seen twice with ET-131, and once on ET-127 (STS-119’s first launch attempt), it may result in the STS-127 stack being rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) for a tank swap.

This article will be updated during the tanking test - see live update pages for up-to-the-second live coverage.

L2 members: Documentation - from which the above article has quoted snippets - is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

No related posts.

The launch is utilized a 5-burn Breeze M mission design. The first three stages of the Proton used a standard ascent profile to place the ascent unit (Breeze M upper stage and the SIRIUS FM-5 satellite) into a sub-orbital trajectory.

Built by the Khrunichev State Research and Production Center, 8K82KM Proton-M is the largest Russian launch vehicle in operational service. The rocket launches all Russian geostationary and interplanetary missions under Khrunichev, establishing it as the principal workhorse of the Russian space program.

The Proton booster is 4.1 m (13.5 ft) in diameter along its second and third stages, with a first stage diameter of 7.3 m (24.0 ft). Overall height of the three stages of the Proton booster is 42.3 m (138.8 ft).

The first stage consists of a central tank containing the oxidizer surrounded by six outboard fuel tanks. Each fuel tank also carries one of the six RD-275 engines that provide first stage power. Total first stage sea-level thrust is approximately 9.6 MN (2,158,000 lbf) with a vacuum-rated level thrust of 10.5 MN (2,360,000 lbf).

The second stage is powered by three RD-0210 engines plus one RD-0211 engine and develops a vacuum thrust of 2.3 MN (517,000 lbf).

The third stage is powered by one RD-0213 engine, this stage develops thrust of 583 kN (131,000 lbf), and a four-nozzle vernier engine that produces thrust of 31 kN (7,000 lbf).

The Breeze M is powered by one pump fed gimbaled main engine that develops thrust of 19.6 kN (4,400 lbf). The Breeze-M is composed of a central core and a jettisonable additional propellant tank. Inert mass of the stage at lift-off is approximately 2,370 kg (5,225 lb).

The quantity of propellant carried is dependent on specific mission requirements and is varied to maximize mission performance. The Breeze M is controlled by a closed loop, triple-redundant guidance system.

From this point in the mission, the Breeze M will perform planned mission maneuvers to advance the ascent unit first to a circular parking orbit, then to an intermediate orbit, followed by a transfer orbit and finally to a geo-transfer orbit. Separation of the SIRIUS FM-5 satellite is scheduled to occur approximately 9 hours, 14 minutes after lift-off.

Today’s launch is the fifth Proton Launch of 2009 and the third ILS Proton of the year. Overall, this marks the 52nd Proton Launch for ILS, the fourth SIRIUS XM Satellite launched on a Proton, and the 11th Space Systems/Loral Satellite launched on a Proton.

The satellite is based on the LS-1300 platform, and will have a separated mass of 5820 kg.

The SIRIUS FM-5 satellite will supplement the existing fleet of SIRIUS satellites with a high-power geostationary satellite that enhances their service. The satellite features 1 X-Band Receive Payload, 1 S-Band Transmit Payload, and will be located at an orbital location of 96 degrees West Longitude, for an anticipated service life of 15 years.

Related posts:

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2. Progress M-66 launches, heads for the International Space Station The Russian cargo ship Progress M-66/32P has launched from the...

Atlantis’ Window Latest:

Engineers had an array of options to remove the knob, with a plan to use the least intrusive - and subsequently less damaging to the window pane - methods, in the hope of avoiding a requirement to replace the pressure pane, which would result in a standdown of the orbiter for up to six months.

Click here to read the article first revealing the news last week:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/06/window-damage-on-atlantis-threatens-six-month-delay-to-sts-129/

Late on Monday, a technician, an engineer, and a SpaceCraft Operator (SCO) entered Atlantis, ahead of a slight pressurization of the orbiter.

It was hoped that the slight expansion of the flight deck under pressurization will help free the knob. However, Atlantis can only be pressurized to a maximum of 3 psid, compared to the 14.7 psid on orbit. Dry ice was again used to try and shrink the knob to aid it’s removal, although an opening attempt using this method failed.

“Plans for Window 5 have been developed, to remove the knob that is wedged between the panes. The crew module will be pressurized during second-shift (ends midnight) on Monday, in an attempt to dislodge the knob,” noted processing information on L2.

“Preps to configure the crew module for pressurization are expected to be completed 1st shift today with testing to begin on 2nd shift.

The successful removal of the knob late on Monday night has been confirmed, although several opening attempts failed to liberate it.

“The pressurization of the vehicle and cooling did not remove the knob. The vehicle was pressurized 3.7 psi above ambient to 17.87 psi. The knob was cooled with slugs to -9 deg F. Other options will be discussed to remove the knob,” noted an opening log report last night on L2, prior to success being noted at the end of the second shift.

“The go ahead was given to use hand pressure to manipulate it loose. The knob is out of the ship. First shift needs to add disposition to take molds of the window.”

“Crew module pressurization testing was successfully completed last night. The knob that had been wedged between the pressure plate and dash structure was liberated at 2247EDT,” confirmed Tuesday morning processing information on L2. ”Window will be inspected for damage using borescope.”

Evaluations into whether Atlantis will require the replacement of the pressure pane are now taking place, with proposals of new inspection methods - and a special inspection tool - under development this week.

Small areas of damage have already been observed where the edges of the knob are embedded into the pane, although engineers are hoping the borescope images are showing mainly cosmetic damage, as opposed to a breach of the pane’s safety criteria.

“Discussions were held with OPO on how best to remove the knob from Window 5. Borescope inspection reveals that the knob is wedged between the panes and may have already done damage,” the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) noted ahead of rhe removal on the Shuttle Standup/Integration report (L2).

“After the knob is removed, in-depth inspection must be performed to determine the extent of damage to the window. If the window must be R&R’d, it will result in a very long downtime (worst case estimates range as far as six months).

“Multiple techniques are being investigated on how best to remove the knob. As the pressure in the crew module decreased from a high of 14.7 psi, the item became stuck. It is hoped that this can be reversed by pressurizing the cabin again. The team will do everything possible to safely remove the knob and salvage the window.”

It has been confirmed by shuttle management that a spare pressure pane for window 5 is in stock, while long lead items such as associated seals are being looked into.

Manifest Impact In Event Of Replacement:

Should evaluations call for the replacement of the pane, Atlantis is likely to be removed from STS-129 duty due to the length of her standdown. Contingency planning is already taking place into handing the flight to Discovery.

Although a stretching of the manifest is unavoidable, the main area of discussion relates to Discovery breaching her eight flight OMDP (Orbiter Maintenance Down Period) limit.

This limit is based on a timeline that was extended in 2007 to allow the fleet to fly out the remaining missions on the manifest, without the one year standdown for their scheduled OMMs (Orbiter Major Modification) periods.

Back in mid-2007, engineers devised a priority list of work that was required on Atlantis, creating ‘mini-OMDP’ processing which could be conducted inside the OPF during regular post and pre-flight flows.

Atlantis originally had no choice but to retire in 2008, given she was due for her overhaul in that year, which would have been deemed pointless as she would be returning to flight status near the end of the shuttle program. The original plan back in 2007 was to retire Atlantis into a spare parts donor to her sisters after arriving back from STS-125.

However, engineers designed the ‘3 year / 8 Flight OMRSD (Operations Maintenance Requirements Specifications Document) Review’, which created the option to extend orbiter’s flight status in-between OMDPs to eight flights and five and a half years - instead of the previous three years. Only Endeavour was able to fly until 2010 under the previous definitions.

Following PRCB (Program Requirements Control Board) approval, the FAWG (Flight Assignment Working Group) handed two “extra” missions to Atlantis, thus reducing the burden on Endeavour and Discovery.

The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) also successfully argued the importance of flying out the schedule with three orbiters, so as to ensure an on time transition of shuttle resources to Constellation, ultimately resulting in NASA approval of the plan.

However, the incident with Atlantis has now switched focus back to Discovery, with the addition of STS-129 - should Atlantis’ pressure pane require replacement - breaching those refined OMRSD rules.

“If a ninth flight is required for OV-103 (Discovery) to complete the manifest, we run into issues with the mandatory OMM scheduled after its eighth flight,” added the Orbiter Project, via the Standup (L2).

“The current manifest does not afford room for an OMM. Initial work is in progress to determine what items can be waived or pushed off to a later date and what work will have to be slotted into the flows as time allows.

“The OMDP requirements (roughly 830) are being scrutinized in case a ninth flight is required on OV-103. Good rationale exists for about 380 of these requirements and the remaining 450 are being investigated. In the past, the OMM has been extended past eight flights, based on appropriate flight rationale. This is being researched.”

Longeron Cart Accident:

Evaluations are taking place on several items of payload equipment that fell of a truck that was transporting the hardware to Atlantis’ OPF last week. The cart contained several structural beams - known as longerons - that are installed between bays for supporting payloads.

“During transport of the longerons for OV-104 (Atlantis), the work cart holding the equipment fell off of the truck. The Accident Investigation Team reported immediately to the scene. Payload Engineering also responded to monitor lifting and securing the cart,” noted processing information on L2 late last week.

“The equipment was moved back to the Flight Kit Facility processing area to be secured. Evaluation and unpackaging of the container has begun. The hardware consisted of three longeron latch assembly build-ups (Bay 6 Starboard, Bay 10 Starboard, and Bay 10 Port). These three assemblies consist of roughly 150 unique piece-parts.”

It is hoped most of the hardware is still acceptable for flight, and subsequently will not become a schedule impact to STS-129 - regardless of the evaluations into Atlantis’ Window 5 pressure pane.

“Initial evaluation to the manifest impact shows two of three longerons available (missing the Bay 10 Starboard), and one of three latches are available (missing the Bay 6 Starboard and Bay 10 Port),” added the report. “The Bay 10 latch is a standard weight latch, but there is a middleweight latch available.

“The Bay 6 latch is a lightweight item, but there is a middleweight latch available. This issue will be worked with the Engineering Community to see if these are acceptable. Worst case outcome at this time is for the Bay 10 Starboard longeron.

“The investigation into the root cause of this accident is ongoing, and a safety stand-down of all three shifts of transportation drivers was held. All packaging and transportation procedures were revisited before they were released to do more work.”

The incident is understood to have occurred when the truck turned a corner just outside the OPF buildings. The cart wheel’s locking system is believed to have failed.

L2 members: Documentation - from which the above article has quoted snippets - is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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Opening Assessments:

Assuming no major shake-ups to the flight manifest - and the approval of the expected CR - STS-134 will be the 133rd flight of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and the 25th and final voyage of the orbiter Endeavour, which began service in May 1992 on STS-49.

Carrying an ISS mission designation of ULF-6 (Utilization and Logistics Flight 6), STS-134 was officially baselined into the Flight Definition and Requirements Document (FDRD) on June 25 - initiating production of flight processes to support a No Earlier Than launch date of July 29, 2010. (STS-133 and STS-134 baseline presentations available on L2).

However, should the CR be denied, STS-134 would then be flown by orbiter Discovery in mid-September 2010 and subsequently become the final flight of the Space Shuttle Program. If this were to happen, Endeavour would be given the STS-133/ULF-5 flight to deliver, among other things, a Pressurize Logistic Module to the ISS in the July 2010 launch window.

In all, the official approval of the CR needs to come prior to October 5, 2009 in order to prevent flight production and training requirements confliction for STS-134 and STS-133. However, the CR is expected to be approved long before that date based on ISS requirements and a desire to maximize up-mass on the final Shuttle flights to the orbiting research laboratory.

For STS-134 (launching in July 2010), orbiter Endeavour will use External Tank-137, SRB BI-144, and Reusable Solid Rocket Motor set 112.

The mission, which will also serve as the rescue flight for STS-132 (which, at this time, is scheduled to use orbiter Atlantis with a targeted launch date in May 2010), will be a 12+1+2 day flight with 3+1 EVAs (Spacewalks), with a total of six crewmembers.

Among the multitude of payloads Endeavour will carry to orbit with her are the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer 2 (AMS-02), Express Logistics Carrier 3 (ELC-3), Materials on International Space Station Experiment 8 (MISSE 8), an Orion Rendezvous Detailed Test Objective (DTO) kit, and a GLACIER freezer module for one of the Station’s science laboratories.

Endeavour will also return the MISSE 7a and 7b experiments to Earth as well as perform four Department of Defense payloads of opportunity: MAUI, SEITI, RAMBO-2, and SIMPLEX.

Also, Endeavour’s crew will leave the OBSS (Orbiter Boom Sensor System) on the ISS to allow the following Shuttle crew to use the inspection boom once they reach the Station, as previously revealed by this site.

The desire to leave the OBSS on the ISS for the STS-133 crew (and future ISS expeditions) relates to the desire to gain as much up-mass potential as possible for the final scheduled Shuttle flight.

Also, leaving the OBSS behind after the completion of the Shuttle program will provide a work tool or platform for future ISS expeditions should a repair of one of the Station’s solar arrays (or similar issue) require the use of a platform to extend the working capability/reach of the Station crew.

Payload Overview:

Given the rather large payload up-mass for Endeavour’s mission - totaling 36,740lbs of payload (including middeck payload and crew equipment weight) - the FDRD baseline of the STS-134 mission details several specific notes about each of the mission’s primary payloads.

For AMS-02 - weighing 15,300lbs - the mission planning document notes that this payload will have four longeron payload latches and one active keel latch for its attachment to the payload bay sidewalls of Endeavour.

Additionally, once on orbit, Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilicals (ROEU) will provide AMS-02 with 124V of power for its heaters and avionics. Prior to liftoff, this power will be provided via the T0 umbilicals on the launch pad.

These T0 umbilicals will also allow launch personnel to monitor the health of AMS-02 prior to liftoff and make sure that Launch Commit Criteria for the AMS-02 are not breached.

The AMS-02 unit, which up until about a year ago was without a ride to orbit until the United States Congress mandated its addition to the Shuttle manifest, will be attached to the Starboard 3 Upper Inboard Command Attach System (CAS) on the ISS.

According to the baseline document, the AMS-02 unit is a “particle physics detector” which contains a large, cryogenic super-fluid helium superconducting magnet. The AMS-02 unit is designed to “search for antimatter and the origin and structure of dark matter.”

Furthermore, the baseline notes that AMS-02 is a complex payload that will require significant testing and payload processing before liftoff.

The payload will also require significant “power usage and data downloads after launch until deployment from the Payload Bay,” notes the baseline document - available for download on L2.

The second primary payload (ELC-3) will also have four active longeron latches as well as two passive longeron latches and one passive keel latch.

A ROEU will also provide ELC-3 will 28V of electricity for its heaters. A Payload Power Switching Unit will provide additional electricity and inhibit ability as needed for ELC-3.

Additionally, ELC-3 will be attached to the Port 3 Upper Outer CAS on ISS. With ELC-3, NASA will continue its effort to bring as many spare components to the ISS as possible before the retirement of the Shuttle fleet.

Attached to ELC-3 will be an Ammonia Tank Assembly, a Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator Arm with Orbital Replacement Unit change-out mechanism, a spare ELC pallet controller avionics box, S-Band Antenna Sub-System #2 & 3, High Pressure Gas Tanks, and Space Test Program Houston 3 Department of Defense payload.

In addition to this manifested and baselined payload on ELC-3, the ISS program is looking at an additional 1,481lbs of payload that they would like on ELC-3 - payloads that are currently not listed on the mission baseline or accounted for in the mission’s up-mass weight.

The Baseline further notes that the deployment and attachment of ELC-3 must be accomplished prior to any activities with AMS-02 since “Orbiter is not protecting for the worst-case forward ballast scenario which would result in a contingency undocking and landing.”

Finally, the Orion Rel-Nav Sensor (DTO 703) will be mounted on the Orbiter Docking System (ODS) in Trajectory Control Sensor slot 1 and on an Adaptive Payload Carrier in bay 3 port of the Payload Bay.

“28 VCD for heaters and operation, GMT timing signal, Ethernet and RS-422 for command and telemetry via Payload General Support Computer” will be provided for this DTO.

For the Orion Rel-Nav Sensor DTO, Endeavour will fly a nominal Orbiter trajectory to and from ISS Pressurized Mating Adaptor-2.

The docking target on the ISS will be enhanced with reflectors to allow for the characterization of the Orion Rel-Nav sensors’ performance during rendezvous and proximity operations with the ISS.

These proximity operations will be tested during approach and docking, undocking, flyaround (time-permitting), and fly-out from the ISS.

In all, with all payload weight accounted for in the baseline and the time of year STS-134 is scheduled to launch in, Endeavour will have an Ascent Performance Margin of just 800lbs. Of course, this number will change as refinements to the mission and its payload are made in the coming months.

Additional Mission Objectives:

Once docked at the ISS, Endeavour’s crew will be tasked with the transfer of several hundred pounds of equipment from the Shuttle’s middeck to the ISS, and visa versa.

The primary middeck payload that will be hauled over to the ISS is the General Laboratory Active Cryogenic on ISS Experiment Refrigeration (GLACIER) unit.

Endeavour will carry one new GLACIER unit up to the ISS and return two GLACIER units to Earth.

Furthermore, in addition to installing AMS and ELC-3 to the external structure of the ISS, Endeavour’s crewmembers will be tasked with several other operations during the mission’s three baselined EVAs.

These EVA activities include cleaning and lubricating both the port and starboard Solar Alpha Rotary Joints (SARJs), transferring MISSE 7a and 7b (located in their Passive Experiment Container) from ELC-2 to Endeavour’s Payload Bay, and attaching MISSE 8 and a Power Data Grapple Fixture (PDGF) to the ISS.

Tasks will also include installing the OBSS onto the S1 Truss On-Orbit Support Equipment stanchions - a piece of equipment that was previously used to house the OBSS on the station in between the STS-123 and 124 missions in 2008.

Because the OBSS will be left on the ISS, the STS-134 crew will have to perform the customary late-inspection of Endeavour’s RCC Wing Leading Edge panels and Nose Cap before undocking from the Station.

This operation has been performed before on STS-123 before that crew also left the OBSS on the Station.

Following undocking, Endeavour’s crew may perform several payloads of opportunity — the aforementioned MAUI, SEITI, SIMPLEX, and RAMBO-2.

Preliminary Flight Plan:

Launching on Flight Day 1 (FD-1), Endeavour’s crew will spend FD-2 performing the now-standard post-launch inspection of Endeavour for any damage the vehicle’s TPS (Thermal Protection System) might have incurred during liftoff.

After docking with the ISS on FD-3, Endeavour’s crew will remove the ELC-3 from the payload and berth it to the ISS while also conducting transfer operations from Endeavour’s middeck to the ISS.

FD-4 will see the deployment of AMS-02 from Endeavour and installation to the ISS.

EVA-1 will be performed on FD-5 - a spacewalk that will see the transfer of MISSE 8 to the ISS and the return of MISSE 7a and 7b from ELC-2 to Endeavour.

FD-6 will see any Focused Inspection work deemed necessary by imagery analysts on the ground as well as a Water Dump from Endeavour. This will be followed on FD-7 by EVA-2 - the cleaning and lubrication of the Port and Starboard SARJs.

FD-8 will see the crew perform the docked late-inspection of Endeavour with the OBSS before transferring the boom to the S1 truss of the ISS the following day during EVA-3. EVA-3 will also see a pair of spacewalkers install the PDGF to the ISS.

FD-10 will be an off-duty day for the crew as well as the stowage of the two GLACIER units for return to Earth. Also, at the end of FD-10, the hatches between Endeavour and the ISS will be closed for the final time.

Endeavour and her crew will undock on FD-11, perform the standard pre-landing checkouts of the Flight Control System and Reaction Control System for a landing at the Kennedy Space Center on FD-13.

L2 members: Documentation - from which the above article has quoted snippets - is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

No related posts.

Launch Preview:

GOES-O is the second of three GOES-N class satellites, which were constructed by Boeing, based on the BSS-601 bus. The first, GOES 13, was launched in May 2006, whilst the last is currently scheduled to fly in April 2010. All three satellites were ordered under a “delivery on orbit” contract, meaning that Boeing is responsible for arranging the launch of the satellites.

Initially the Delta III was chosen to launch the three satellites, with launches moving to the Delta IV after the Delta III’s cancellation. The launch is being conducted under a commercial licence from the US Federal Aviation Administration.

NOAA’s Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite programme started in 1975, with the launch of GOES 1 on a Delta 2914. Since the start of the programme, fifteen satellites have been launched, of which fourteen successfully reached orbit.

Four GOES satellites are currently active, of which two are operational; GOES 11 is currently serving as GOES-WEST at 135 degrees west longitude, whilst GOES 12 is operating as GOES-EAST at 75 degrees west.

The Delta IV was built as part of the US Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle programme, and first flew in 2002. It will lift off from Launch Complex 37B at Cape Canaveral, a complex which was originally built as a backup launch complex for the Saturn I and IB rockets in the 1960s.

It was mothballed following the launch of Apollo 5, and subsequently demolished in the early 1970s. In the late 1990s, it was rebuilt for use by the Delta IV, and supports all Delta IV launches from the east coast of the United States. It was last used for the launch of USA-202, formerly NRO L-26, in January.

The first stage of the Delta IV is the Common Booster Core, a cryogenically fuelled stage powered by a single RS-68 engine. At launch this will be augmented by the two GEM-60 solid rocket motors. The RS-68 will ignite five and a half seconds before launch, followed by the GEMs at T-0.

About sixty-one seconds after launch, the rocket will pass through MaxQ, the area of maximum dynamic pressure. The solid rocket motors will burn out around ninety-four seconds into the flight, before being jettisoned six seconds later.

Two hundred and ten seconds after launch, the RS-68 will throttle down to maintain a constant level of acceleration in order to limit loads on the vehicle. About fifty seven seconds later it will shut down.

The first stage will separate from the second about six seconds after burnout. The second stage is powered by an RL10B engine, also fuelled by cryogenic propellent, which will perform three burns. On this flight, a four-metre diameter stage is being used.

Immediately after separation, the RL10’s extendible nozzle will deploy, with the stage igniting fourteen and a half seconds after stage separation. Ten seconds later, the payload fairing will be jettisoned, exposing the GOES-O satellite to space for the first time.

The first burn will last for nine minutes and 24 seconds, which will be followed by a short coast phase, lasting ten and a half minutes, before the RL10 restarts for the second burn, which will last four minutes. After the second burn is complete, the upper stage and spacecraft will coast to apogee, which will take about three hours and forty minutes.

The third burn will occur at apogee, and will last 56 seconds, raising the orbit’s perigee and reducing its inclination. Six minutes and twenty seconds later, the rocket will begin a spin-up manoeuvre in preparation for spacecraft separation.

GOES-O will separate from the second stage about four hours, twenty one minutes and twenty seven seconds after launch.

GOES-O will be deployed into a geosynchronous transfer orbit with an apogee of 35,173 kilometres, a perigee of 6,569 kilometres, and 12.1 degrees of inclination. It has an expected lifespan of ten years, however it carries enough propellent to operate for up to fourteen years.

Assuming the launch is successful, it will be redesignated GOES 14 upon reaching orbit. The satellite will raise itself to geostationary orbit by means of an onboard engine, before beginning on-orbit testing. Once this is complete, it will be placed into storage until one of the operational GOES satellites requires replacement.

The next flight of the Delta IV is currently scheduled for 30 September, and will carry the WGS-3 military communications satellite for the US Air Force. ULA’s next scheduled launch is of an Atlas V, carrying the heavily classified PAN satellite for an undisclosed department of the US Government.

Related posts:

1. Delta IV Heavy finally launches with NRO L-26 After three years of delays, United Launch Alliance have launched...

ET-131 Latest:

Engineers have been carrying out a complex procedure to replace the flight seal, compared to the first scrub turnaround of STS-127, in an attempt to prove - and subsequently mitigate - the root cause of the leaks suffered by ET-131’s two tankings.

“Planning continues to progress for a tanking test (S0037), targeted for next week, to assess the effectiveness of the GUCP troubleshooting effort,” outlined confirmation the current plan is on track, via processing latest (L2).

“Pending successful installation of the new seal (complete) and QD (in work), the call to stations is currently scheduled for 20:30 EDT, Monday, 29 June 2009. Filling of the External Tank should begin at 0700 EDT on Wednesday, 01 July 2009.”

It’s been a busy couple of days at Pad 39A, with engineers working through the three shifts on a dual approach of replacing the GUCP hardware, whilst taking numerous measurements of the system, in order to build the database of information for engineers working on the mitigation plan.

“Numerous measurements and observations were made on the hardware during disassembly and that data is being compiled and evaluated by the respective teams,” added information via L2.

“The development of a concentricity tool is complete and the offline process development test in the VAB (Vehicle Assembly Building) with the GSE (Ground Support Equipment) test panel and two part seal was successfully performed.

Following the removal of the GUCP QD this week, strain gauges were installed on to the hardware - which in turn will provide data during Wednesday’s tanking test. Also, several elements of the removed GUCP hardware are being examined, such as the pyro bolt - now enroute to the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC).

“The ordnance (pyro) bolt R&R was completed and the bolt is expected to arrive at MSFC for NDE (Non Destructive Evaluation) testing on Saturday,” added Friday processing information.

With data comparisons between the first and second scrubs now fully evaluated, confidence is high that the previously noted misalignment issue - related to the External Tank Carrier Assembly (ETCA) mounts, or feet - was the cause of both scrubs.

However, there appears to be a lack of reference to the root cause of ET-127’s scrub during STS-119, other than Flight Readiness Review (FRR) documentation noting alignment issues during the GUCP’s installation inside the VAB on both STS-119 and STS-127’s tanks. For the interim, engineering notes only refer to Endeavour’s ET-131.

“The engineering teams, after much analysis of the measurement data between the 2nd scrub disassembly and the 1st scrub disassembly have high confidence that misalignment is the issue,” added engineering notes (L2).

“The carrier plate was realigned using the high fidelity 0.515” alignment pins and a check of the pivot assembly feet indicated that an interference condition exists between the feet and the pivot support brackets.

“Faro Arm optics measurements were performed Thursday night on the gap between the pivot support bracket and the bracket feet with the feet placed in the nominal centered position on the pivot pins.

“These gap measurements were then used to develop a CAD drawing that will used to machine new feet specifically tailored for ET-131. In addition, concentricity measurements were also performed to verify that the plate, once aligned, will indeed result in acceptable alignment of the flight seal and QD bellows probe when the QD is reinstalled.”

With the alignment issues understood, a new flight seal (a new two-part flight seal) installed, and an array of instrumentation available to monitor the GUCP hardware during tanking, engineers are confident the tanking test will prove to be successful - allowing STS-127 to realign for a July 11 launch to the International Space Station.

Engineers will continue to work out at the pad over the weekend, installing the GUCP QD and remating the vent line - prior to conducting leak checks, measurements, and inspections on the tank.

For all 17 NASASpaceflight.com articles on the GUCP, click here: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/gucp/

ET-131’s PRCB Note Of Interest:

ET-131’s GUCP hardware also gained a section of the “Quarterly Process Escape Summary, 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 2009 (Reporting Period: January through March 2009)” presentation to the all-powerful Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) meeting on Thursday. (Presentation available on L2).

The “Incorrect Washer Stack Between GUCA Foot and Leg Assembly” report is not understood to be related to the root cause of the tank’s scrubs, despite the that specific area of the tank being of interest during the investigation.

“Process Escape Description: Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP) pivot assemblies were incorrectly assembled with one washer, instead of three washers as required by the drawing, in each pivot assembly bolt stack,” outlined the presentation, dated June 25.

“Proximate Cause: In February 2005, the GUCP post-launch refurbishment procedure was updated to reflect the complete design modification of the GUCP Leg assemblies. Part of the design change included the use of three (3) washers versus one (1) washer to reduce thread protrusion due to the lengthening of the bolts.

“The change to the number of washers was inadvertently omitted from the procedure update. Subsequent review in place at that time failed to identify the omission.”

Despite the issue being classed only as a “green” risk, NASA managers take all design issues - even a few missing washers - very seriously.

However, an interesting reference is made to modifications that have been carried out on the Ground Umbilical Carrier Assembly (GUCA) - central to the recent leaks and scrubs - and the approval of flight rationale from ET-127, the tank that leaked on STS-119’s first attempt.

“It should be noted that this change was implemented with a full compliment of other modifications done to the GUCA’s which included multiple changes to the drawing. All other drawing changes were successfully implemented, however the washer additions were inadvertently missed,” added the presentation.

“Rationale for Flight: Approval was obtained for ET-127 since vent line was in flight configuration and access was limited. The GUCPs for External Tanks (ET-130, ET-131 and ET-132) in process since discovery of this condition were corrected to reflect proper drawing configuration. The GUCA, GUCP, and legs are cleaned, processed, and refurbished after each flight.

“Lessons Learned: When major design modifications are incorporated into work instructions, attention to detail is required to ensure all changes are included. Controls that rely on human behavior require constant monitoring through measurement, reporting and investigation of any errors to understand possible improvement opportunities to the process.”

Given no reference is made to the leak issues with either ET-127 or ET-131, the incorrect hardware configuration is likely to be coincidental, as opposed to linked to the recent scrubs.

L2 members: Documentation - from which the above article has quoted snippets - is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

No related posts.

STS-129/Atlantis Processing Latest:

Recently returned to the home comforts of her Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF 1) after the successful STS-125 mission, Atlantis is being processed for the November 12 NET (No Earlier Than) launch date for STS-129.

The final mission of 2009 will see Atlantis deliver the Express Logistics Carriers 1 & 2 (ELC-1 and ELC -2), along with SASA and MISSE (Materials on International Space Station Experiment) 7A and 7B, to the Space Station.

Processing is proceeding to plan, with functional testing and post flight deservicing and troubleshooting currently taking place.

“The Aft Propulsion System (APS) pod functional checkout continues through next week,” noted Wednesday processing information on L2.

“Waste Management System post flight servicing is complete less post ops. The Star Tracker Lightshade inspection was rescheduled from yesterday to today. S-band trouble shooting (IPR-0014) begins today.”

Engineers are also working one issue noted with the orbiter cooling system, specifically the Freon Coolant Loop (FCL) 1 Radiator Flow Control Assembly (RFCA), which “failed to get into radiator flow on orbit.” However, engineers have been unable to recreate the issue inside the OPF.

“Functional testing resulted in nominal operations,” added the processing update. “The RFCA was cycled eight times without an anomaly. Data will be reviewed with JSC (Johnson Space Center) and the vendor.”

As per normal in an orbiter’s flow, all of the vehicle’s windows are being inspected for potential damage to the thermal pane - the outward facing pane - due to the usual occurrence of small MMOD impacts. These panes can be replaced reasonably easily.

“Window 1 Loctite application began yesterday and is scheduled to complete today,” added Wednesday’s update, following last week’s installation of a replacement thermal pane on that window.

However, it was during those inspections where potential damage to the inward facing pressure pane was observed on Window 5.

Window 5 Evaluations:

“Quick shoe mount knob from a crew work lamp was found wedged between pressure pane 5 and dashboard panel. Knob must be removed to evaluate pane condition before flight,” noted one of two expansive presentations, dated June 24, and created for high level managerial overviews - both presentations are available on L2.

Several attempts have already been made to remove the knob by applying dry ice in the hope the knob would shrink, thus allowing for it’s removal without causing additional damage to the pane. However, those attempts have been unsuccessful.

“The Shuttle expands when on orbit. While on orbit, a knob got stuck between the window and the frame on Window 5 (Pilot window),” added another memo on Wednesday (L2). “They have tried a number of tricks to remove it with no joy so far.

“If they have to remove the window, there is a schedule hit. Initial estimates are long, but initial estimates always are long before they sharpen their pencils.”

Those estimates speak of up to and over six months being added to the processing flow of Atlantis, which would have a major impact to the overall manifest that already has a full five flight schedule in 2010.

Even if Atlantis was retired as a result of a half year-plus processing hit - one absolute worst case scenario noted by one engineer on Wednesday - two orbiters could complete the manifest. However, due to LON (Launch On Need) requirements, a manifest stretch deep into 2011 would be the fallout.

Such discussions will not take place unless unacceptable damage is found on the pane after the knob is finally removed.

Inspections of knob have been carried out via borescope inspections. Photography shows the mounting plate appears to be dug into close-out panel. Further inspections will be required ahead of potential plans to remove the knob without causing additional damage.

Unique engineering plans would have to be drawn up in the event of unacceptable damage being found on the window, given a pressure pane has never been replaced at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) over the history of the shuttle program, and ferrying Atlantis to Palmdale is obviously no longer an option - after the Orbiter Major Modification (OMM) facility at Plant 42 was shut down over six years ago.

The bottom line is Atlantis would not be allowed to fly - in the event of the pane breaching unacceptable damage criteria - due to the risk of the window failing during her next mission, which would result in a LOV/C (Loss of Vehicle and Crew) event.

“Knob wedged between pressure W5 and dashboard could have caused damage to pane and its currently loading the pane at two points. Removal of knob is required to evaluate condition of pane for flight,” added one presentation.

“‘Fly as is’ is not an option, unknown damage and loads to the glass could result in failure during the flight, with no redundancy; dynamic failure could result in redundant pane failure.

“Induced damage of the knob being wedged between the glass and the dashboard closeout panel structure, or from removal of the knob could result in unacceptable damage.

“Consequences of unacceptable damage to the glass pane: Replacing the pressure pane would result in a significant impact to ground schedule (potential 6+ month impact). Requires de-configuring dashboard structure and instrumentation to remove window assembly for refurbishment. Windshield pressure pane removal has never been performed at KSC.

“Knob removal must be performed carefully; exhausting all risk free options first, then attempting more intrusive (higher risk) options, if others fail.”

Damage to the pane is confirmed in the main overview presentation. Although the full extent won’t be known until the knob has been removed.

“Photos show evidence of existing damage to the pane. Cannot be assessed until knob removal. Glass is an aluminosilicate tempered pane (t=0.65). Tempered layer 21 percent of thickness or around 0.13 inch. Tempered glass has a built in residual stress, tempered layer penetration will result in failure.”

As far as unacceptable window damage criteria, ding depth greater than 0.0015” and/or coating scratches with a width greater or equal to 0.050” are listed, along with “no acceptable criteria for bruises or chatter checks.”

The redundant pane - which is located between the thermal and pressure pane - is also considered an inadequate redundancy for pressure pane failure.

“Analysis shows up to 70 percent negative margin of safety on redundant panes as a result of a dynamic failure at cabin pressure. Energy from pressure pane failure may be enough to break redundant pane Constitutes a catastrophic failure for the mission as thermal pane is not certified to hold cabin pressure.”

As to how the knob managed to find its way into the area between the dashboard closeout panel - which is the extension of the glare shield - and the window pane, changes in pressure for pre-launch to orbit operations, leading to the expansion of the orbiter’s skin, is once again deemed as the root cause.

“Crew module skin expands while in orbit due to 14.7 psi internal pressure; flight deck floor deflection may also contribute to the relative movement between the console’s dash and the CM window area,” added one presentation.

“Gap between the dashboard closeout panel and the window may have opened wider while in orbit (to accommodate the knob). Additional 7 psid and vibration from ferry flight might have wedged knob further. Gap reduced when CM (Crew Module) internal pressure reduced (descending). Knob is exerting a preload on pressure pane and closeout panel.”

An array of techniques have been listed as potential methods for removing the embedded knob from between the window pane and the console dashboard, although most are classed as holding risk of causing additional damage to the window - and are thus classed as last resorts.

“Pressurize Crew Module and use dry ice on knob: DeltaP from pressurization would be much less than seen on orbit (~3 psid instead of 14.7 psid). De-configure dashboard/console and instrumentation to free up knob. Use an air bladder between window and dash,” the presentation added.

“Cut knob enough to yield part. Cut out part of dash where knob is wedged: Would damage dash likely requiring repair. Cutting vibration could induce further damage to window. Use pry bar to deflect dash down: Viewed as the riskiest removal method for all hardware involved.

“Further damage could increase the potential for unacceptable damage, resulting in significant schedule impacts.”

The options relating to the application of dry ice to shrink the knob have already been attempted, and failed. However, the same method, along with a pressurization of the Crew Module, may be enough to free the knob from its lodged position.

The only problem is the amount of pressurization that can be conducted in the OPF is far less than the pressure that played a part in allowing the knob to become embedded in the first place.

“Pressurize crew module and dry ice on knob to TBD (To Be Determined) pressure. Pro’s: Could allow for uniform structural deflection to increase gap between pressure pane and dashboard; enough to free up the knob non-destructively. Less potential for inducing further damage to the pane.

**UPDATE: The above option was selected on Thursday as the opening process for an attempt to remove the knob. The cabin will be pressurized to 3 psid, before an engineer will apply dry ice to the knob. This option is not deemed to be a likely solution, but more so the opening option that avoids additional damage to the window.**

New article, click here:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/06/atlantis-window-pane-begins-longerons-damaged-accident/

“Con’s: Maximum allowable pressure might be limited by crew module equipment and systems May not be able to exceed 3 psid; as compared to 14.7 psid nominal (orbit). May not be enough pressure to dislodge the knob.”

Removing dashboard and console components to free the knob from below the window is another option, but would lead to a large schedule impact for Atlantis’ OPF flow.

“Pro’s: Less potential for inducing further damage to the pane. If damage is found to be unacceptable, console is partially de-configured to continue with window assembly removal.

“Con’s: De-configuring console and instrumentation could represent a significant schedule impact. Influence of panel removal on the knob are not known at this time.”

A pressurized air bag method - involving one (or several) air bladders between window and the dashboard closeout panel adjacent to knob - could be used to apply pressure to deflect the dashboard enough to free knob.

However, without knowing allowable local pressure that can be applied, this technique could also result in additional damage to the window.

“Con’s: Risk of inducing additional window damage (TBD by Stress Group), not quantifiable. Current load on glass is unknown, additional load from air bladder may result in additional stresses to the glass.

“Not enough open surface adjacent to the knob for bag contact. Pressure may not be enough to deflect hardware and release the knob. Possible to inflict permanent deformation to dash secondary structure.”

A visit by the Dentist may prove to be a solution for Atlantis, via cutting the knob with a high rpm/low amplitude dental drill, just enough to allow for the knob to be freed from its current location. However, the vibrations from the drill may transfer to the window pane and again increase sustained damage.

“Pro’s: Method can be accomplished quickly. Does not involve manipulating window or dash hardware.

“Con’s: Potential for tool vibration to be transferred through knob into window induce additional window damage. Debris release from cutting. Knob would only be cut enough for tech to yield the piece.”

Vibration concerns are also cited for another option relating to cutting out part of dashboard structure where knob is wedged, while another option of using a pry bar to deflect dashboard structure down; enough to release the load imparted by the knob on the glass, again threatens further damage to the window pane.

Once the knob is finally removed - which has to be carried out - engineers will use their predefined criteria to hopefully clear the window for flight.

“After knob removal, will assess/evaluate window damage. Inspectors will inspect window per MT0501-514 requirements. Mold impressions, visual examination, etc.

“Stress evaluation will be required if surface damage reported is beyond the acceptable criteria 0.0015” for tempered panes or if bruising of glass has occurred. Unacceptable damage will require a window assembly R&R, significantly affecting the flow schedule. Bruised pressure pane will result in an automatic scrap.

“NOTE: Damage is in an area difficult to reach; if window inspectors are unable to assess the flaw, engineering is not able to perform an evaluation. Access to the lower region of the pane is limited and removal of crew module dashboard and panel structure may be required for proper assessment.”

For the interim, engineers will continue to meet, in order to discuss the best forward plan on removing the knob, before moving forward with the option that holds the least amount of risk of causing additional damage to the window.

“Removal of the knob is necessary in order to evaluate the condition of the glass for flight. Some of the options being considered involve risk to the hardware,” concluding the main overview presentation.

“Knob removal attempts should be performed by exhausting least risk options first. More evaluation is required.

“Forward Plan of Action: Will continue to evaluate and further develop these options and other feasible options in order to remove the knob with the least amount of impact to the hardware.”

L2 members: Documentation - from which the above article has quoted snippets - is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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