Constellation PDR:

The entire Constellation Program remains in limbo, as the FY2011 budget proposal undergoes a Congressional battle to – at the very least – refine specific goals and timelines.

The Ares vehicles are highly unlikely to return as per the POR (Program Of Record) via any refined plan, with lawmakers currently focusing on a shuttle extension, tied in with a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLV) – as outlined in the “Human Space Flight Capability Assurance and Enhancement Act of 2010″ Bill.

However, until the FY2011 proposal is approved by Congress, elements of Constellation remains alive, as seen with the completion of the PDR process this month.

“After a week of pre-boards and boards, the CxP PDR was successfully completed,” noted MOD’s 8th Floor News address (L2). “All board members including independent review teams, voted to continue to the CDR (Critical Design Review).”

Interestingly, the PDR wasn’t as “complete” as previously planned, with the omission of several major Orion and Ares elements from the review.

“There were some areas of the design that we noted as still not at a PDR level of design. Those areas were Software, CPAS (CEV Parachute Assembly System), and Upper Plane Isolator/LOX Damper designs (to mitigate Thrust Oscillation),” added the 8th Floor.

“The Board concurred that there are acceptable plans in place for FY10 to mature these specific designs.

“Additionally, the Ares Upper Stage/First Stage Separation Implementation will have a further assessment of zero fault tolerant versus one fault tolerant design.”

Also of interest were notes about the infamous Loss Of Crew (LOC) and Loss Of Mission (LOM) numbers, which have often been cited against the Commercial Crew options, and even Shuttle, during claims about astronaut safety. No specifics on the issues with the numbers are noted in the memo, other than “poke-outs” require further work.

“Another concern is the LOC/LOM requirements are not met for ISS (International Space Station) missions. The current estimates for LOC/LOM are within the error band of analysis, but additional work on specific LOC/LOM poke-outs will be analyzed.”

Furthermore, two of the largest issues found with the Constellation Program – as per the Augustine Committee’s review into Human Space Flight – were also omitted from the review, based on the proposed forward plan to cancel the Constellation Program.

“It was also noted that (requirements) require the cost and schedule criteria be met. Due to the new direction, cost and schedule were not included in this review,” added the 8th Floor. “Cost and schedule will be addressed at a future key decision point.”

Despite these omissions from the PDR – any one of which may have resulted in an unsuccessful review – managers noted their pleasure in completing the process, noting the PDR was a “home run” for the Constellation Program.

“The final results showed that we have a sound design, and it is overall at a PDR level of maturity. We understand our risks and have good resolution plans for any open technical issues,” noted one Engineering manager in a memo (L2) to Ares manager Jeff Hanley and his team.

“The board was unanimous in concurring that we are ready to proceed towards CDR. In short, the team hit a home run!”

However, it was admitted that the future is uncertain, with Orion no longer in NASA’s hands, along with the challenges of a FY2010 operating plan which is currently the final year for CxP.

“I know that many of you are wondering what comes next. We have been directed to continue implementing the FY2010 operating plan. You also all know that we have challenges in FY2010 due to losing the Orion cost share, etc. Of course, there are multiple ways to attack the problem, and in order to be effective the program needs to do it in an integrated manner. More to come.”

For the interim, the forward path continues to point towards at least one more drop test – the “Drogue Chute Test 3″ in April, a PDR for the Constellation Training Facility (CxTF) and the aforementioned CDR.

“CxTF PDR Kick-Off (started) March 9, the Constellation Training Facility started its PDR cycle,” added the 8th Floor. “The CxTF team will show the entrance criteria and conduct tours of the facility. The PDR will conclude in mid June.

“CxTF is the last level 4 PDR leading up to the MOD PDR scheduled for July. The Mission Control Center System (MCCS) recently finished PDR and the Mission Operation RECON System (MORS) team is currently in their PDR cycle.”

Commercial Crew Requirements:

As has been stressed before and after President Obama’s forward plan for NASA was revealed, handing over crew transportation duties to the commercial sector must follow strict NASA guidelines on crew safety.

Although the likes of the United Launch Alliance (ULA) have been claiming for some time that they are more than capable of fulfilling such requirements, issues such as abort-related “Black Zones” have often been cited by detractors within NASA, despite ULA’s documented evidence that such issues have already been addressed.

However, now the FY2011 proposal orders NASA to leave the business of human transport to LEO (Low Earth Orbit), NASA managers are closing in on a documented list of requirements, which commercial crew suitors will be tasked with showing their compliance.

“There was a meeting of the Human Rating Requirements Steering Team. This is a NASA-wide team to tailor the NASA Human Rating Requirements for commercial space systems,” as listed in a recent Shuttle Standup/Integration Report note (L2). “The steering team will mandate standards and processes to ensure the safety of crew members.”

Work should be completed on the document in the Spring, leading to a Request For Information (RFI) being sent out for feedback. Currently, the document cites 31 “high-level” requirements that a commercial carrier must adhere to.

“A draft document of these requirements will be released within the next two months, with an RFI to the aerospace industry for feedback. There are 31 high-level requirements,” added the Standup note. “These will be solidified at an Agency DPMC (Directorate Program Management Council).”

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Processing and Troubleshooting Latest:

While the RRCS issue is being discussed, engineers will continue with the pad flow for STS-131, pushing forward with the realigned schedule that will see Discovery’s payload arriving at 39A on Friday (delayed again). The Agency level Flight Readiness Review (FRR) remains on track for March 26.

“OV-103 / ET-135 / SRB BI-142 / RSRM 110 (Pad A): S0024 Hypergolic Propellant Servicing was completed less APS (Aft Propulsion System) QD (Quick Disconnect) de-mates (IPR-0033),” noted the NASA Test Director (NTD) on Monday processing information (L2).

IPR (Interim Problem Report) 33 is the latest issue to be charged against Discovery’s OMS/RCS system during hypergolic loading - although all were resolved, bar the decrease (leak) in the helium tank pressure on the RRCS, in unison with the RRCS fuel propellant tank when the tank was vented.

“New IPR 0033 to OMS/RCS: While performing the Aft RCS fuel tank vents, the RRCS Fuel He tank pressure dropped, indicating a leak through the He Isolation Valves. All attempts to resolve this issue were unsuccessful. The test team decision was to continue with hypergolic fuel load with this IPR condition.”

Via an overview presentation provided to the ERB on Monday (and acquired by L2), the real time findings on Friday evening were expanded on – along with the listing of the five troubleshooting attempts that have taken place so far to resolve the leak, all of which were unsuccessful.

“IPR 131V-0033: RRCS Fuel GHe Tank pressure decreased during fuel propellant tank venting (indicating excessive Helium Isolation Valve leakage). Troubleshooting was performed to attempt to establish a measurable leak rate, seat valve(s), and again try to establish a measureable leak rate. Currently the flow through the closed valves has been limited to the controlled vent of the propellant tank (~ 5 million scch),” noted the presentation.

“Troubleshooting Performed to date: 1) Pressurize helium tank and monitor for a pressure increase upstream of the GHe iso – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank pressurized at the same rate, pressure subsequently vented. 2) Cycle LV301, GHe Iso ‘B’ valve OPEN then CLOSE. Pressurize helium tank and monitor for a pressure increase upstream of the GHe isolation valves – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank pressurized at the same rate.

“3) Cycle LV303, GHe Iso ‘A’ valve OPEN then CLOSE. Pressurize helium tank and monitor for a pressure increase upstream of the GHe isolation valves – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank pressurized at the same rate. 4) Pressurize helium tank (and prop tank) to above reg lock up. Vent propellant tank in an attempt to seat the GHe isolation valves – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank vent at the same rate.

“5) Pressurize helium tank (and prop tank) to above reg lock up. While venting through propellant tank cycle GHe isolation valve(s) in an attempt to seat the valves: a) Cycle LV303, GHe Iso ‘A’ valve OPEN then CLOSE – performed under flow a total of times, b) Cycle LV301, GHe Iso ‘B’ valve OPEN then CLOSE – performed under flow a total of 3 times – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank vent at the same rate.”

Discovery’s Right OMS Pod – and associated hardware such as the RRCS – is known as RP03 (RP=Right Pod). Historical documentation shows this hardware has performed without a major problem since debuting on STS-96.

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

“RP03 Past Performance: (He Isos) Checked out in OPF at start of flow. Leakage was well in-spec (51 scch). Historically have been good since at least STS-96,” the presentation noted, before showing the historical performance of the associated valves.

“Series regulators: Primary stages. Response testing performed, results in spec. Leak testing was not performed. Since STS-116, one of primary regs creeps after press to flight although did not repeat on STS-128. Secondary stage 252 & 329 scch in the OPF this flow. RV last tested 7/2008, results in spec.”

Options:

Three clear options are available to managers. Firstly, engineers will attempt to troubleshoot the issue at the Pad, with the results passing through to the potential creation of a waiver in the Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) – likely to be discussed for approval at the Agency FRR – to allow Discovery to fly “as-is” via flight rationale. Should those options become unacceptable, a repair would be undertaken.

A repair cannot be carried out at the pad, and would result in rollback to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), demating of Discovery from the External Tank/SRB stack, rollback to her Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), demate Discovery’s right OMS Pod for repairs in the Hypergolic Maintenance Facility (HMF), whilst Endeavour’s Right OMS is donated to Discovery. An expected three month delay would result in the launch schedule.

“Options: Fly as is – activate system for flight and monitor reg health. Troubleshoot at the pad. Repair – cannot be performed at the pad. Swap pod with OV-105 (Endeavour) RP04 (‘quickest’ option),” the presentation added. “HMF Repair, Three weeks required after pod removal, (donated to Endeavour).”

Additional troubleshooting at the pad is likely to be the first option to be evaluated, with three clear options already outlined – although each path holds no guarantee of success.

“Troubleshooting Ideas: Could cycle valves from cockpit. Each valve cycled nine times via LPS (Launch Processing System) already. No different performance expected, same circuitry used by LPS or cockpit switch,” noted options presented to the ERB.

“Run regulator flow tests. Portable reg panel needs to be reactivated. Panel ready to support – TBD (To Be Determined, around one week). 700 psia inlet pressures (1500 in OPF). Panel designed to test reg response only. Any other test capability, e.g. reg & iso leak rates TBD.

“Try ‘baking’ valve by extended powering of valve Soften Teflon of main seat to improve sealing. May not help if the pilot is leaking. Connection demate in doghouse door required along with subsequent SCAN retest.”

Flight rationale is by no means out of the question, but will be subject to the condition and performance of the related redundancy in the system.

With the current indications pointing to at least one of the two parallel helium isolation valves as leaking, two helium system regulators – a primary and a secondary – will be tested to verify they are functioning correctly.

These two regulators are downstream of the isolation valves, and are used to maintain helium pressure to the fuel tank. If there are problems found with one or both regulators – during testing this week – flight rationale will be very hard to approve.

“Each He iso valve is one of three series valves: He Iso, Primary Reg Stage, Secondary Reg Stage. If all three leak a Burst Disk/Pressure Relief valve protects downstream components from over pressurization,” explained the ERB presentation.

“Depending on leak rate, could use thruster firings to help control tank pressures. Thruster firings limited while docked to ISS (International Space Station).”

Once test equipment has been stationed at the pad, the helium system will be brought to flight pressure and engineers will monitor the panels to ascertain whether the regulators function properly. Even if both regulators are deemed to be in a good condition, a flight rationale debate will still be required.

More information and articles will follow, as information is collated into L2.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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Enterprise’s History:

Despite never flying in space, Enterprise  – otherwise known as OV-101 – had a major role to play for her offspring, and remains a vehicle of interest, even playing a role in the investigation into the Columbia accident.

Enterprise was constructed at Rockwell’s Air Force Plant 42 assembly facility in Palmdale, California – rolling out on January 31, 1977, for the 36 mile overland journey to NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRC) at Edwards Air Force Base for the approach and landing test (ALT) program.

Originally to be named Constitution, before a letter writing campaign by Star Trek fans resulted in her being christened Enterprise, she was used to demonstrate that the orbiter could fly in the atmosphere and land like an airplane.

The ALT program involved ground and flight tests, with Fred Haise and Gordon Fullerton, Joe Engle and Dick Truly all involved in testing Enterprise during approach and landing.

Five captive flights of the Enterprise mounted atop the SCA with the vehicle unmanned and her systems inert were conducted to assess the structural integrity and performance handling qualities of the mated craft.

Three manned captive flights that followed, including an astronaut crew aboard the orbiter operating flight control systems while the orbiter remained perched atop the SCA. In the five free flights the astronaut crew separated the spacecraft from the SCA and maneuvered to a landing at Edwards Air Force Base.

In the first four flights the landing was on a dry lake bed; in the fifth, the landing was on Edwards’ main concrete runway under conditions simulating a return from space. The last two free flights were made without the tail cone, the spacecraft’s configuration during an actual landing from orbit.

The final phase of the ALT program prepared the spacecraft for four ferry flights, after which Enterprise was returned to the NASA hangar at the DFRC and modified for vertical ground vibration tests in 1978 at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), where she was mated with an External Tank, Solid Rocket Boosters – to be subjected to a series of vertical ground vibration tests.

In 1979, Enterprise was ferried once again on the SCA, this time to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), mated with an ET and SRBs, before being transported via a Mobile Launch Platform to Pad 39A. Enterprise served as a practice and launch complex fit-check verification tool representing the flight vehicles.

After several additional ferry flights around the country for orbiter testing, Enterprise went on a tour in 1983, taking in the Paris Air Show, a stop at Stansted Airport in England, trips to Germany, Italy and Canada, before returning to the DFRC.

Enterprise was then ferried to Vandenberg Air Force Base in California for fit checks at SLC-6 (Shuttle Launch Complex) and on to Mobile, Alabama, before being taken by barge to New Orleans for the United States 1984 World’s Fair. In 1985, Enterprise was ferried from KSC to Dulles Airport, Washington, DC, and became the property of the Smithsonian Institution.

Ferry Evaluations:

Notes that a team of engineers had been sent to check Enterprise’s conditions first appeared on Shuttle Standup/Integration reports (L2). These evaluations were based on pre-emptive options for moving Enterprise to another venue, should the NASM win one of the current orbiters after retirement.

“Have a team going up to inspect Enterprise at the National Aeronautics Space Museum (Udvar-Hazy Center) to determine if it is in a ferry-able condition,” noted the first mention of the team being sent to check Enterprise. “There may be some desire to ferry it somewhere else after the Program and trade it out for one of our orbiters.”

Daily status reports on Enterprise’s evaluations and general condition (all available on L2) then followed this month, showing a great level of detail was being undertaken to check to see if the vehicle was in an acceptable condition to be flow on the SCA. The work was carried out while visitors were still able to view the test vehicle.

“Aft detailed inspection complete. Vertical penetration assessment complete. Body flap cove access established. NDE (Non Destructive Evaluations – dye penetrant) inspection of aft SCA attach points complete. No discrepancies noted,” noted one example of a status report. “NDE (eddy current) inspection of aft hoist points complete. No discrepancies noted.

“Internal borescope inspection of LH inboard and outboard elevons complete, they are in excellent condition. No discrepancies noted. PLBD (Payload Bay Door) external hinge inspection complete. Minor hardware discrepancies noted. LH main landing gear detailed inspection complete. Minor hardware discrepancies noted. Lower surface foam repair in work (required post pull tests). Patch material in cure. High crew access established in midbody for PLBD centerline mechanism inspection.”

The biggest problem found was on the SCA attach point on the orbiter – known as the arrowhead fitting – which was corroded and in need of a repair.

“Cleanup of arrowhead fitting (fwd SCA attach point) continues. Substantial corrosion present. This is the worst we have seen so far. NDE will follow cleanup. LH elevon cove detailed inspection in work. Multiple fasteners had to be drilled out of outboard flipper door. Rework will be required,” added the status update, followed by an update in the Standup report.

“On the OV-101 inspection, the team is making good progress. Most of the vehicle looks to be in good shape. Did find substantial corrosion around the arrowhead fitting that will have to be reworked. Also, there is an area in the LH elevon where it will need some new work.”

As all the other areas of the vehicle were checked – mainly showing the craft was in a reasonably good condition considering her age, bar some minor corrosion – engineers worked on a procedure to repair the arrowhead fitting.

“NDE of arrowhead fitting complete. We were unable to perform eddy current inspection of barrel nut holes (4 locations). Barrel nut holes on OV101 are smaller than on the rest of the fleet. We will require a custom probe to perform this inspection. We will have to evaluate as part of phase II work.

“Continue to clean arrowhead corrosion. Dental molds of pitting to follow, ahead of entire area being chemfilmed to prevent further corrosion.”

A final sweep of the remaining areas of the vehicle then followed, as some of the hardware was removed for repair at the Kennedy Space Center, while the areas of greatest concern were checked via borescope inspections.

“Borsescope inspection of fwd fuselage under crew module complete. Substantial corrosion in this area,” engineers noted on the greatest area of concern. “RH wing leading edge inspection complete. Minor hardware discrepancies noted. Corrosion documented in 1996 was revisited and shows no signs of change.

“LH leading edge hardware discrepancies corrected and carrier panels reinstalled. Consider this area closed out. Corrosion protection of aft, wings, and body flap cove complete. All foam repairs complete. Repainted main landing gear struts (areas stripped for suspect weld investigation). Repainted Smithsonian jacks (areas stripped for critical weld inspection). Removed jacks from under Orbiter.

“LH wing/glove closed out. RH glove closed out. Unable to close out RH wing due to lack of fasteners. Temporarily installed elevon flipper doors, body flap panels, 50-X doors, 44 door, and 27 doors. Doors temporarily installed as areas will have to be accessed for future work.

“Additional borescope inspections performed under crew module through various access points. Worst care corrosion was that found Tuesday. External penetration assessment complete. Multiple panel installations will have to be reworked as part of future work.”

Final evaluation work last week related to the landing gear, which may be required for the towing of the vehicle out of the exhibition to a waiting transport to where the SCA would be waiting to ferry her to another location – although the forward plan has not yet been finalized.

“Cursory rigging checks of landing gear completed. All three gear uplocks were manually cycled and all hardstop contacts were verified. Several measurements were taken and will be checked against like measurements on flight vehicles as a sanity check,” added the report.

“RMG (Right Main Gear) uplock was ’stiff’ and there appeared to be some misalignment in the up position hardstop. This will require further evaluation. The RMG fwd door hook was also installed backwards. We corrected this problem. NLG (Nose Landing Gear) door booster bungee will required further evaluation as well. It is designed differently than flight orbiters and did not function as expected.”

With the engineers completing their work – and due to arrive back at the Kennedy Space Center this week – the final note pointed towards Enterprise having no show stoppers for a ferry flight, should that option be taken.

“All of our inspection objectives were met. Overall, the vehicle is in good condition,” noted the team leader. “I want to make sure everyone understands when we have used the words ’substantial corrosion’ that this means we suspect some form of corrective action will be required. The detected areas of “substantial corrosion” were few.

“My personal opinion is that they will not be show stoppers.”

==

Photos taken from hi-res collection in L2 Historical (over 900gbs of photos, presentations and videos from 1950s onwards), additional NASM photos and videos of Enterprise’s evaluations thanks to Ron Smith.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Processing:

Discovery was enjoying a relatively uneventful processing flow at the pad, as she continued to track a record low amount of Interim Problem Reports (IPRs). However, some issues started to appear during hypergolic loading operations (S0024).

“OV-103 / ET-135 / SRB BI-142 / RSRM 110 (Pad A): S0024 Hypergolic Propellant Servicing is in-work. SRB (Solid Rocket Booster) HPU (Hydraulic Power Unit) hydrazine rock system was loaded,” noted end of week processing information from the NASA Test Director (NTD), via L2.

“Severe weather inhibited loading the tilt systems. Finish loading the tilt system in parallel with orbiter APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) load.

“New IPR 0030: Visible hydrazine leak detected on a boss fitting associated with the GSE (Ground Support Equipment) side of the ‘orange’ fill QD (Quick Disconnect) feeding the RH (Right Hand) rock side. The system was vented and test team concurrence was given to re-torque the fitting.

“The torque of the fitting was successful and the SRB HPU Rock Fuel Service Modules were loaded with hydrazine.”

Two additional issues were noted on the Friday report, listing a number of OMS/RCS related problems – and solutions – as engineers worked on the QDs after troubleshooting the connections.

“New IPR 0031 to OMS/RCS: (QD) does not mate. This problem was resolved. All QDs were matted and leak checked on third shift,” added the report, before noting one QD was found to be leaking. This required the replacement of a leaking flex hose to resolve.

“New IPR 0032 to OMS/RCS: QD ‘MD-326′ failed leak check (all others passed). Troubleshooting found a leaking flex hose which must be replaced. OMS/RCS oxidizer servicing pending IPR 32 resolution. Weekend work: Complete hypergolic propellant loading.”

It has not yet been confirmed if the above issue has contributed to what was listed as IPR 0033 “Leak: RCS Helium Iso Valve on the right pod for the fuel system” – meaning the valve is stuck in the open position.

The correct flow of helium is essential for providing the proper flow path of oxidizer from the propellant tanks into the combustion chamber of the thrusters, allowing them to carry out their function of aiding the orbiter’s maneuvering on orbit.

This issue – observed on Friday evening – is serious, due to the potential requirement to remove the RH OMS Pod from Discovery to access and repair the valve, a procedure that can’t be carried out at the pad.

Should managers decide to repair the valve, Discovery would be rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), demated from her External Tank (ET-135), returned to her Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), where engineers would demate and remove the entire OMS Pod.

However, such a decision, which would delay STS-131 – and Discovery’s follow-on mission, STS-133 – by several months, won’t be taken until next week at the earliest, as managers evaluate their forward options.

The first relates to troubleshooting via what is known as a “blowdown” procedure, which would be used to flow helium through the system for a period of time and cycle the Helium valves to purge any contaminants that may be causing the valve to remain in the open position.

This procedure is available for related issues on orbit, and sources note a similar ground procedure exists for the purpose of troubleshooting.

The second option available is to fly “as is” via flight rationale. This is a possibility due to redundancy in the system, although a waiver would be required to allow for the MEL (Minimum Equipment List) portion of the LCC (Launch Commit Criteria).

According to the complete STS-1 to STS-130 In Flight Anomaly list presentations (L2) – an issue with one of the two valves in this system has only occurred three times on orbit, none of which have been in recent years.

“IFA STS-30-V-09: Right Reaction Control Subsystem Oxidizer Helium Isolation Valve A Failed Open. IFA STS-51A-V-08: Left Orbital Maneuvering System Helium Isolation Valve Leak. IFA STS-89-V-05: Right RCS Fuel Helium Isolation Valve B Failed To Open.”

On each occasion, the redundancy in the system allowed the orbiter to complete a nominal mission.

With managers set to begin meetings on Monday on the forward path, pad processing is continuing for the interim – although at least a one day delay has been called for on the milestone of payload delivery to the pad.

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

Currently, troubleshooting operations have delayed RSS retract to NET (No Earlier Than) Tuesday, delaying STS-131’s payload delivery to 39A until NET Wednesday.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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Mission-Specific Updates:

In all, STS-133 is baselined as a 8+1+2 day mission with 0 (zero) primary EVAs (spacewalks), one (1) ISS-based contingency EVA, and two (2) Shuttle-based contingency EVAs (in case the ET umbilical doors fail to close after ET/Orbiter separation and/or in case the payload bay doors cannot be closed by computer command and require manual closure at the end of the mission). It is also highly likely the mission will be reduced to four crew members.

For STS-133, Discovery will fly with 4 Cryo tank sets and 5 GN2 (gaseous nitrogen) tanks - as noted in the 92 page baseline presentation, available to download on L2.

In terms of STS-133 turnaround and preparation efforts, Discovery is scheduled to land at the Kennedy Space Center at the completion of the STS-131 mission on the night of April 15.

Should Discovery’s 131 mission actually land at the Kennedy Space Center, the vehicle will be towed off the SLF (Shuttle Landing Facility) about 4-hours after landing and into OPF-3 (Orbiter Processing Facility Bay 3) for immediate post-flight deservicing ahead of flow turnaround operations for STS-133.

Should landing occur at the contingency landing site in California, Discovery will be towed off the runway to the Mate/Demate Device (MDD) where post-flight deservicing and ferry flight preparations would occur.

After approximately one week of servicing and preparations, Discovery (with aerodynamic tailcone assembly attached) will be hoisted atop one of two Shuttle Carrier Aircrafts (SCAs) and ferried back to the Kennedy Space Center for flow turnaround operations.

Under nominal conditions (i.e. a KSC landing for STS-131 and no change to the STS-133 baselined launch date), Discovery will spend 104 days inside her OPF undergoing final inspections, modifications, and calibrations for the STS-133 flight.

SRB (Solid Rocket Booster) stacking will then begin on June 9 on MLP-2 after the scheduled launch of Atlantis/STS-132 from that MLP in mid-May.

In all, SRB stacking is baselined for 23-days with 16-days worth of contingency. This rather large contingency margin could go some way toward alleviating potential schedule concerns with any slip to the STS-132 launch date as NASA managers are currently evaluating the potential need to slip the 132 launch date into June due to possible delays to that mission’s LON flight: STS-134 with AMS.

In addition to SRB stacking operations, Discovery’s External Tank (ET-138) will arrive On Dock at the Kennedy Space Center on July 5 ahead of a July 20 or 22 mating to the SRB stack.

Following the completion of SRB closeout and ET/SRB mating operations, Discovery will rollover to the VAB for mating with her ET/SRB stack on August 9 for her 39th and final flight.

After a week of mating and interface checkouts, Discovery and the STS-133 stack will rollout to Launch Pad 39A on August 16 for 22+9-contingency+1-holiday days worth of pad processing.

If all goes to plan, the STS-133/ULF-6 (Utilization and Logistics Flight 6) flight will liftoff on the 134th and final Space Shuttle mission on September 16, 2010 at ~11:57a.m. EDT, with a nominal End of Mission landing on September 24.

According to the LSFR document, Discovery’s End of Mission (EOM) landing is planned for the Kennedy Space Center, FL – apparently confirming that, as for now, Discovery’s landing will not take place in California with a follow-up cross-country farewell tour of various NASA centers during a ferry flight back to KSC.

Discovery Vehicle Modifications for STS-131:

For STS-133, several modifications will be made to Discovery as part of a weight savings and increased safety effort to allow for maximum payload upmass on the ELC-4 and PMM payloads.

Among these modifications will be the removal of a 5th PRSD (Power Reactant Storage Distribution) tank set, the completion of all “red” OMDP (Orbiter Maintenance Down Period) requirements, and five modifications.

The first of these modifications pertains to the re-flight of the Boundary Layer Transition (BLT) DTO (Detail/Dedicated Test Objective).

“Re-flight of protuberance tile and associated thermocouple instrumentation” from STS-131 will be undertaken on STS-133.

There is the potential to increase the height of the protuberance instead of simply re-flying the same protuberance, but a frim decision has yet to be made.

“Potential for protuberance height increase from the 0.35″ height being flown on STS-131 – pending evaluation and analysis of STS-131 performance flight data.”

The second modification mentioned in the LSFR document for STS-133 also relates to the Boundary Layer Transition DTO, this time in terms of a catalytic coating applied to the surface of one downstream DTO tile.

“Re-flight of catalytic coating applied to one tile in BLT DTO region of influence would require shelf life extension of existing lot of catalytic coating material or production of new lot of catalytic coating (age life limited) and reapplication to selected tile,” notes the LSFR presentation.

Additional modifications for Discovery include the completion of Wing Leading Edge Spar “Sneak Flow” protection.

Designed to “limit allowable plume flow to 50 percent across the flow restrictor,” the Wing Leading Edge (WLE) Spar “Sneak Flow” Protection modification would increase the overall WLE panel damage tolerance by “adding a flow restrictor.”

Currently, all WLE panels on Discovery, less Left Hand panels 2-4, have been modified to date.

Completion of the modification would allow Left Hand WLE panels 2-4 to fly with the same damage resistance as the other WLE panels on Discovery; however, completion of the modification would take up valuable time in Discovery’s already short OPF flow toward STS-133 and would thus have to be balanced accordingly to prevent the OPF turnaround flow from impacting the mating and pad flow cycle as currently planned.

Similarly, the fourth modification also deals with the WLE panels, specifically Left Hand panels 2-4. For this modification, the lower Wing Leading Edge Carrier Panel Horse Collar Gap Filler was redesigned to an “enhanced design with additional sleeving.”

To date, this modification has already been carried out on all WLE panels except Left Hand panels 2-4. Completion of the mod would bring Left Hand WLE panels 2-4 into alignment with the remaining 41 WLE panels.

The final, baselined modification for Discovery relates to a connector saver redesign for the Left OMS Pod and Ku Band antenna.

“Connector Saver mod provides proper interfacial seal and wavy washer engagement retention force to reduce risk of inadvertent demate during use,” states the LSFR presentation.

This modification has already been carried out on other systems onboard Discovery, with only the Left Hand OMS Pod and Ku Band antenna remaining.

In addition to these baselined mods, one potential modification also exists for Discovery. This modification pertains to the Main Engine Ignition (MEI) Acoustic sensors.

“MEI Acoustic Sensor Filter Mod. Completion of MADS low pass in-line filter installation for MEI acoustic sensors (microphones) in the Left Hand OMS pod stinger,” notes the LSFR document.

This modification consists of “re-routing existing coax cable from the acoustic sensor to the new in-line filter mounted with a saddle clamp, and routing a new cable from the filter to the micro-WIS box.” The existing coax route is to the filter, not the micro-WIS.

In all, the LSFR notes that portions of this modification could be complete prior to STS-131. As such, all work regarding this modification that will be performed during the flow toward STS-133 will be documented at the Delta LSFR.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Processing Latest:

Hypergolic loading into various systems – such as the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) and Reaction Control Systems (RCS) – is a key moment in the pad flow, involving strict safety measures, due to the extremely hazardous nature of the chemicals.

Engineers at the pad don SCAPE (Self-Contained Atmospheric Protection Ensemble) suits to protect themselves from the deadly hydrazine, which when mixed with oxidizer in the RCS thrusters, causes a reaction that allows the orbiter to maneuver on orbit.

“OV-103 / ET-135 / SRB BI-142 / RSRM 110 (Pad A): Blank off plate removals were completed. GUCP (Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate) QD (Quick Disconnect) – on the External Tank leak – checks were completed,” noted the NASA Test Director (NTD) on L2-acquired processing information, which noted an issue with one of the right hand (RH) RCS QDs.

“S0024 Hypergolic Propellant Servicing is in-work. Hypergolic loading: RJD (Reaction Jet Driver) driver test is complete. SRB HPU (Hydraulic Power Unit) hydrazine loading is in work.

“RH RCS QD 322 issue: Bore Scope inspection of the QD was inconclusive. After HPU servicing, all QDs on the RH OMS Pod will be de-matted, the QD rack will be adjusted, QDs re-matted and leak checked in an attempt to resolve this issue. OMS (Orbital Maneuvering System)/RCS oxidizer servicing in work.”

STS-131 SSP FRR:

The Shuttle Program Flight Readiness Review was held on Wednesday – and as per STS-130, managers only required one day of evaluations to move the process forward. Usually, SSP FRRs take up to two days to conclude at the Johnson Space Center.

The next meeting is scheduled to be the JSC Center Director Pre-FRR, which will be on March 23rd, followed by the Agency FRR on March 26th – which will set the launch date, currently tracking April 5.

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

As expected, the observation of intertank foam liberations during a number of recent ascents provided the main talking point at the SSP FRR – although it should be stressed none of the losses have resulted in damage to the orbiter’s TPS (Thermal Protection System).

Regardless, SSP managers take all foam loss events extremely seriously, to the point predictions are made to pre-empt the threat level, should a liberation impact the orbiter.

“There was significant discussion on the intertank foam losses experienced on STS-130. It is still believed that contamination prior to TPS application is causing poor adhesion and in-flight foam losses,” noted one of the main post-FRR overview memos (L2).

“Flight rationale is based on expected conservatism in mass estimates (wind tunnel tests and imagery suggest debris will break-up upon release), stress analysis indicates losses in critical areas less likely, damage model assumes worst case orientations for debris impactors, and there have been no debris observed coincident with bond adhesion test locations.”

It is hoped that a change of cleaning procedures at the tank’s manufacturing base – the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) – may have resolved the issue of contamination remaining on the tank’s structure prior to foam application, resulting in stronger adhesive properties between the intertank stringer foam and structure.

“ET-135 (STS-131) had additional cleaning/inspections due to spray abort of initial TPS application (~lower half of intertank). Qualitatively, the likelihood of catastrophic damage is probably remote but due to uncertainties SE&I (Systems Engineering and Integration) continues to carry it as infrequent catastrophic hazard,” the memo continued.

As noted ahead of the SSP FRR, engineers have been working on Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) on the threat levels associated with intertank foam losses, although this is a routine process and mainly carried out from a documentation standpoint to ensure flight rationale remains in place by the time the Agency FRR meets.

As with all risk assessments, the numbers generated are mainly based on flight history. However, due to only a few flights suffering from the intertank liberations, not enough data is at hand to create an accurate PRA number.

This in turn led to some debate on the strength of the flight rationale – although the post-Columbia inspection techniques and Launch On Need (LON) ability automatically means the crew would not be in any danger, even in the highly unlikely scenario of serious damage to the TPS via a foam liberation from this area of the tank.

“There was a lot of discussion on whether there should be a quantitative PRA to characterize the risk. SE&I says they do not have enough confidence in the absolute number that would come out of a PRA and didn’t see it as value added to determine whether we should fly.

“The value of the PRA was to identify the highest contributors to risk and then go after those areas in terms of making changes or performing tests on the hardware. There was general agreement that with or without the PRA, the foam losses are of concern but a better understanding of the problem likely won’t be gained until we fly and collect more data.

“Some considered the flight rationale as weak without inspection and repair/LON capability but all agreed because we have those real-time mitigations in case we are wrong about the risk assessment, it is acceptable to fly.”

Four other issues – relating to IPRs (Interim Problem Reports) during Discovery’s STS-131 flow – were also discussed, such as the recent General Purpose Computer (GPC) issue.

All were cleared as no issue for gaining flight rationale, although it was noted the GPC Input/Output (I/O) issue may require the removal and replacement of a PCMMU (Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit) or an MDM (Multiplexer Demultiplexer) at the pad – pending the results of troubleshooting.

“The GPC I/O error that occurred last week was a correct response to annunciated BITE errors on PCMMU 1, MDM OF2, OF3, and OA1,” added the notes. All affected LRUs are on the OI data bus and the problem appears to be associated with data bus or a discrepant MIA.

“The plan is to install break out boxes on the OI data buses and go back to PCMMU1 to collect further data for troubleshooting.”

As seen with the intertank foam liberation discussions, IFAs (In Flight Anomalies) from previous flights make up a large part of the next mission’s FRR process. Although it wasn’t technically an IFA from STS-130, engineers discussed the protruding ceramic window insert that had been observed on orbit by the DAT (Damage Assessment Team).

Again, the level of evaluation that goes into even the smallest issue was exemplified by follow-on notes relating to Discovery’s inserts – even though Endeavour’s protrusion remained in place throughout entry and landing on STS-130.

“Due to the protruding ceramic insert on STS-130, the ceramic inserts on OV-103 (Discovery) with potential debris transport were visually inspected and replaced as required prior to OPF (Orbiter Processing Facility) rollout,” the FRR overview noted.

Thanks to the due diligence of not only evaluating potential issues relating to the insert on orbit during STS-130, but also via the inspections on the fleet, a problem was found with the inserts, which may result in a late change of plug on Discovery.

“A subsequent problem was identified during the OV-105 (Endeavour)/STS-130 post-flight inspections, which revealed an interference condition between the plug and the fastener head,” the notes continued. “The concern is that this interference could produce a load resulting in debris liberation.

“A design tolerance stack-up was performed for select locations and some were found to have negative clearance. The plan is for potential negative clearance locations, to perform direct clearance measurements and replace with a shorter plug if necessary.”

Only two other items of interest made the overview summary, one in reference to EVA support during the mission, and another noting a potential change to the mission’s landing opportunities.

“The EVA team is still working the Metox regenerator error. A combination of LiOH and available Metox will support the planned EVAs and Shuttle contingency EVAs but not a docked contingency EVA. They are looking at options such as flying additional LiOH, exercise prebreathe protocol, and R&Ring the Metox regenerator (spare onboard). Recommendation is expected in next few days,” added the summary.

“Discussion on changing to descending landing opportunities, cryo offload, and possible use or deletion of one of the +2 days (recall STS-131 is 13+2+2 to cover DDO (Dual Docked Operations) which is no longer a requirement) will be discussed (end of week).”

A second post-FRR overview memo – which will be summarized into upcoming articles, along with notes from the FRR’s 31 presentations (available on L2) – also noted that Discovery will be precluded from launching in-plane on the 9th and 11th, based on current state vector.

Between now and the Agency FRR, managers will also work on several items of open work, although none hold a threat to the launch date target at this time.

“Significant Open work: Descending landing opportunity/mission duration discussion. Metox regenerator recommendations. RSRM (Reusable Solid Rocket Motor) Random vibration exceedances. SRB RGA failure analysis. PCMMU BITE bit 10 errors. Ceramic insert inspection and corrective action for carrier panel fastener interference. STS-130 nozzle leak check.”

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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Orion, Dragon and PDRing into Transition:

The surprise loss in the Constellation cull was Orion, when it was hoped the vehicle would survive the expected death of the Ares Program by transferring its role to another launch vehicle, such as an EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle).

There remains some hope that lead contractor – Lockheed Martin – may yet be able to modify the work already conducted on Orion into a vehicle of a smaller – taxi-like only – design, one which could become a viable crew transport of choice for a commercial carrier to the International Space Station (ISS).

That “optimization” design option for Orion was confirmed via managerial notes, acquired by L2, as was the departure of NASA’s role in the vehicle – via the removal of support and funding.

“Orion optimization plan review was conducted with CxP. Lockheed-Martin looking at optimized design. Pulled all Orion support out of JSC (Johnson Space Center) and put it all back in Denver (Lockheed Martin HQ),” noted the DA Notes roundup.

“Cx funding is being pulled back that was going to JSC engineering and being sent to Denver to support LM similar facilities/services.”

Although Lockheed Martin – via their partnership with Boeing as the United Launch Alliance (ULA) – should be pleased with the commercially-orientated future that has been proposed for NASA, the company has been lobbying ’strongly’ due the loss of Orion in the FY2011 proposal, to the extent they have backed the Senate Bill “Human Space Flight Capability Assurance and Enhancement Act of 2010″.

NASA managers had also positioned themselves firmly behind Orion in their internal Flexible Path presentation, which was created prior to President Obama’s FY2011 proposal’s publication.

“We accept Orion as the basis for American mission-crew access to LEO, and with block upgrades for orbital lifetime and increased entry energy, for return to Earth from deep-space missions,” NASA managers wrote in the 65 page presentation (available on L2).

See also NASASpaceflight.com’s Flexible Path Review:
Part 1: Battle of the Heavy Lift Launchers – Monster 200mt vehicle noted
Part 2: Manned mission to construct huge GEO and deep space telescopes proposed
Part 3: NASA Flexible Path Evaluation of 2025 human mission to visit an asteriod
Part 4: Taking Aim on Phobos – NASA outline Flexible Path precursor to Man on Mars

Ironically, NASA involvement is continuing on another vehicle, SpaceX’s Dragon capsule, as engineers check the progress of the transport’s Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM) testing and EVA (Spacewalk) capability.

“Engineering is at SpaceX for some CBM tests. Per SpaceX request, (engineers) went to SpaceX to assess Dragon EVA compatibility,” added the notes. “Boeing is seeking support for arc-jet facility for CC Dev (Commercial Crew Space Transportation Development).”

Although NASA managers aren’t technically allowed to stop work on Constellation, at least until the FY2011 budget is approved by lawmakers, the program ‘feels dead’ according to sources within CxP, with hardly any work being conducted, other than closeout PDR (Preliminary Design Review) work.

“Obviously, the cancellation of the Constellation Program was disappointing news to us all. I have added some additional information on some of those activities and some new direction,” noted one CxP manager, during an address to his department’s team members.

That work involves estimating “excessing property we were keeping for Cx. May delay on-site review so may have some time to do property re-assessment,” and a general slowdown of the development schedule.

“Many of you were putting in a lot of extra hours to meet the many demands on your time. Given that we are no longer racing to meet a development schedule (i.e.; metal cutting and code slinging), we can throttle that work to a more reasonable level. The Ares II-X and III-X activity is stood down by direction of the program.

“As always, Shuttle and ISS plan/train/fly work is the number one priority. Beyond that, support the PDR activities where you think you can provide the most value to close out the design and to possible future use of the design. Consult your supervisor when making that trade.”

The PDR process, which is understood to have been all-but completed from a vehicle standpoint, understandably changed its focus from evaluating an architecture that is no longer going to fly, to one where it may provide some value for the proposed forward plan.

“Although we are still formulating a long-term strategy, it is smart at this point to look at how we can best capitalize on our Cx work to meet NASA’s new goals of commercial space access, robotic precursors, heavy lift launcher development, and technology development,” added the memo.

“To that end, we want the PDRs to focus on opening up the design to support these goals. More specifically, that means changing the requirements to create a more flexible and generic capability.”

MOD – Value for Commercial Role:

Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) director Paul Hill has been enduring one of the most undesirable tasks faced by NASA managers of late, that of informing an already upset workforce about the reality of the huge job losses at departments which are heavily involved with human space flight.

Mr Hill has conducted a series of All Hands events at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) – videos available on L2 – which have been based on both the reality of the proposal to end shuttle this year and cancel the follow-on program of Constellation, along with the rallying call to focus on the job at hand with the remaining shuttle missions.

The main problem remains, however, that no one actually knows what the forward plan specifically involves, at least from a milestone standpoint, which in turn has increased the uncertainty and anxiety throughout the workforce.

While much has been said about the additional funds proposed in the FY2011 budget, the focus on reducing costs has been central to managerial thinking at departments such as MOD – even before the proposed culling of funding for human space flight operations by NASA, handing it instead to commercial companies who are also under no obligation to hire the services of MOD staff.

The work in carrying out the ‘reduction in operating cost’ was used by Mr Hill in a letter to General Bolden this week, prefaced as a reaction to indirect comments from the NASA administrator.

“With the things that filter down to the center, and based on some things I’ve either heard you say or that have been attributed to you, I felt compelled to send this to you to ensure you have a good idea of where MOD is today. Consider this the elevator speech I’ll not likely have an opportunity to give you,” Mr Hill wrote in the letter, which was sent to numerous high level managers and acquired by L2.

“The days of hundreds, not thousands, of people in the MCC (Mission Control Center) staffing a flight control team are long gone.

“Today, we operate ISS almost exclusively with a front room team of ~13, and that goes down to ~5 while the crew sleeps and on weekends. During some active phases (rendezvous, EVA, etc) and with folks getting some on-the-job training, we may bump the ISS team up to ~30. By 2013, the full time ISS team will be down to 5-10 regardless of the time frame.

“Shuttle flight control teams run ~30 during more quiescent orbit operations including the back rooms, and around 70-80 during more active phases (ascent, entry, rendezvous, EVA, etc). Early Cx operations for mission-ISS were expected to be staffed by teams in the 30-70 range until docking, with an expectation to make similar reductions after some vehicle flight experience.

“While docked to ISS, we did not plan to have a full time operator dedicated to Orion monitoring. Overall, we have been targeting delivering Cx operations for half the equivalent SSP (Space Shuttle Program) operations.

“In both long duration and short duration flight control, recall that we support 24/7, not just until orbit insertion like many expendable launch teams. When comparing Shuttle operations teams to expendables, like SeaLaunch/Zenit, it is really only comparable if you include the upper stage and spacecraft teams, and extend that to the lengthy on-orbit checkout before a spacecraft is handed over to the normal operations team.”

The letter continued in the same manner, illuminating examples of how streamlined MOD had already become, even prior to the change of direction proposed in the FY2011 budget.

“MOD’s Shuttle efforts (is) at under six percent of today’s total SSP budget. In fact, the MOD portfolio is dominated not by the size of the flight control team, but by mission planning, training and facility support,” Mr Hill continued, citing from an associated presentation sent with the letter.

“As an example, MOD typically has five Shuttle crews and 12 ISS expeditions (14 US, 14 Russian, five other IPs) in flight specific training, and another 14 Ascans in generic training leading up to flight specific training.

“As the last page of the attached file shows, MOD today is already 30 percent smaller supporting both programs than we were in 1991 supporting only Shuttle. In September of this year, we will be down another ~600 (26 percent), meaning this year MOD will be half of our size in 1991, and that presumes we stayed on track for Cx.”

These comments mirrored notes Mr Hill provided during his All Hands meetings, as did the main point of his letter, as he stressed the need for NASA to advertise the value of MOD “outside of the agency” – specifically to the commercial companies set to take over NASA’s role in human space flight.

“As you may recall, there is a definite operations culture associated with MOD that is different than sustaining engineering or other program support functions. Ascent, entry and short-duration operations are even more focused cultures, and that is seen in all aspects of planning, training and flying those phases of flight when compared to the equivalent communities supporting ISS (long duration) operations,” Mr Hill continued.

“In addition to the enormous shifts MOD has already made to how we do this job, our goal is to ensure the agency understands the significant and unique capability represented by that operations culture and the mission assurance value it brings to ascent, entry and short-duration human spaceflight.

“With that, particularly if these operations will now reside exclusively outside of the NASA domain, a strong case could be made that the agency is well served by investing MOD support to the commercial providers as both a way provide real mission assurance and to send that serious message outside the agency.

“That discussion must start with an understanding of today’s MOD, in terms of resources, the operations and continuous improvement cultures and the unique skill base MOD stewards for human spaceflight.”

Unfortunately, General Bolden has already noted that the commercial carriers are under no contractual obligation to hire NASA or MOD contractors – and that he can only “ask” them to look into taking the cream of the current stable of engineers and controllers.

Although it is likely a commercial company would aim to tap into the experience base at MOD, the amount of hirings – especially within a cost-conscious company that prides itself on carrying out operations with only a handful of controllers – is an unknown factor that is unlikely to be clarified until after many of the workforce have already been let go.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

Related posts:

1. Orion PDR delay could stretch into 2010 The requirement to carry out an additional Design Analysis Cycle...

STS-131 Latest:

Discovery hasn’t suffered from any notable issues since arriving at Pad 39A, as she patiently awaits the loading of hypergolics during the second half of this week.

“Last week, completed the TCDT (Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test); it went well. Had the FRT (Flight Readiness Test) on Saturday. This week, will be working hyper-load preps. Will begin hyper-load Thursday and Friday,” noted Ground Operations via the Shuttle Standup/Integration report (L2).

This was expanded on via the NASA Test Director (NTD) report, which has so far only listed an extremely low count of 29 Interim Problem Reports (IPRs) for Discovery since she returned from STS-128 – the latest relating to an unexplained error on a General Purpose Computer (GPC). Otherwise, all is well with the pad flow.

“OV-103 / ET-135 / SRB BI-142 / RSRM 110 (Pad A): Helium Signature Test and Ball Seal Leak checks were successfully completed Monday. GH2/GO2 blank off plate removals are planned through to Wednesday. S0009: First motion checks and ET camera functional were completed.

“V1149 Orbiter/ET cavity purge verification and T-0 QD (Quick Disconnect) leak checks are planned, (leading into) S0024 Hypergolic servicing preps (which) continue through Wednesday. CTS (Call to Stations) for S0024 servicing is scheduled for 2200 EST Wednesday night.”

Wednesday marks another milestone for STS-131, as managers meet at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) for the SSP (Space Shuttle Program) FRR (Flight Readiness Review). The SSP FRR is usually conducted over two days.

“Have a good week of work ahead of us. The progress towards STS-131 appears good. Folks are doing a great job, and vehicle processing is going well, as well as it is for the other vehicles. We are in great shape,” noted manager LeRoy Cain – co-chair of the Mission Management Team (MMT).

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

No major items of interest have been flagged ahead of the FRR, although some data points will be deferred through to the Agency level FRR – which sets the launch date – later this month.

“Had TIM (Technical Interchange Meeting) at MAF (Michoud Assembly Facility) last Thursday on Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) for intertank foam,” noted comments on the Standup report. “Came to conclusion that could do credible PRA for RCC (Reinforced Carbon Carbon) and special tile, but did not have models to do tile shear-out or tile.

“For the FRR on Thursday, will not have any PRA numbers, but for the Agency FRR, will have RCC and special tile PRAs and will have flight rationale.”

This reference again notes the continuing evaluations into the intertank foam losses observed on recent flights. This is not likely to be a concern for managers at the FRR, as noted in the STS-130 IFA (In Flight Anomaly) review of External Tank (ET-134).

“Summary: Preliminary assessment of ET flight performance on STS-130 complete. 21 total losses observed on intertank acreage evaluated. The performance of the intertank is not meeting the design intent, but is within our expectations considering the issue we believe we have,” noted one of 15 STS-130 IFA presentations available on L2.

“To support integrated flight rationale to be provided by SE&I (Systems Engineering and Integration), additional bond adhesion tests were approved and successfully performed in debris critical locations as defined by SE&I. All other systems performed nominally.”

With only three IFAs in total for STS-130, STS-131’s FRR process will have little to discuss by way of previous flight items of interest. As such, STS-131 is continuing to track an April 5 launch date target.

“STS-131 is on track for April 5th launch. There are no anticipated range conflicts up to the beta cutout (launch beta cutout 4/15-4/29),” noted a Tuesday memo outlining the status of the near and long term manifest. “Even though SpaceX has the range on 4/12, they won’t be a conflict for subsequent launch attempts because they are using our SRB recovery ships. So if we incrementally slip through the April window, they slip.”

Manifest Evaluations:

Centered around the test problems with AMS, the final scheduled trio of shuttle flights are somewhat at the mercy of an April data point relating to STS-134, when engineers in Holland will overview what will have been the conclusion of highly complex testing.

“STS-132 mission, Atlantis: Pad turnaround from STS-131 will support 5/14 launch date with a few days of margin. There are some range conflicts to work but we expect to have the range for the 14th, 15th, and maybe the 16th. Assuming (Soyuz TMA) 21S undock on 6/2 (current plan), we have launch opportunities through 5/21 before we enter a ‘Dual Docked Ops cutout’,” added the schedule overview memo.

“If AMS slips out past 133 and we launch 131 in May, they will either use 133 ‘fly the next flight’ for LON (Launch On Need) – CSCS (Crew Shuttle Contingency Support) duration is adequate depending on the assumptions made – or fly 134 with AMS regardless of the thermal test results and round trip it if necessary. This means we no longer need to evaluate flying an empty cargo bay for the LON.”

The fine balance of finding acceptable launch slots for the shuttle missions – when playing musical chairs with other visiting vehicles, beta angle cutouts and range availability – had led to evaluations into slipping STS-132 into June or July. However, STS-132 remains on track for May, and that is likely to remain the case for the coming weeks at least.

“There has been some discussion of moving STS-132 to June or even July if AMS slips out past 133 to more evenly space out the flights and avoid a large gap between 132 and 133,” added the memo.

“There is a launch beta cutout from 6/12 to 7/1. If we launched between 6/8 and the beta cutout on 6/12, we would be in a dual docked ops scenario with 23S docking, which is still an option.

“Launching STS-132 in July is bad from ISSP’s (International Space Station Program) perspective because after (Russian Progress) 38P arrives on 6/30, all the RS (Russian Segment) ports are utilized and there would be no place to install MRM1.

“Although (ISS Manager) Mike Suffering said he could work with the Russians to support STS-132 in July, there was general agreement that we would not plan to fly STS-132 in July.”

As noted previously by NASASpaceflight.com, decisions on the final three flights will be made next month, based on the full AMS test results.

“The decision on whether to slip STS-132 from 5/14 into June will be made in mid-April after STS-131 is off the pad and after AMS has insight into the thermal test results,” the memo continued.

“The decision will be made before 4/13 since this is when Atlantis is rolled to the VAB (Vehicle Assembly Building) and SSP would prefer to stay in the OPF (Orbiter Processing Facility) if launch is going to be delayed to June. I expect that we’ll stay with the May 14th launch date assuming everything goes well with STS-131.”

Full specifics on the exact problem with AMS are yet to be noted on SSP documentation, although the scheduling memo did note a “thermal leak” is key to the concerns the mission may be delayed.

Should that become the case, STS-133 will fly before AMS, although this mission cannot be brought forward on the schedule due to the processing timeline of the Permanent Logistics Module (PLM), set to remain docked to the ISS as an additional module.

“STS-133 mission, Discovery: The station processing mission manager reported that the PLM will be at least two weeks late to the pad. They are modifying the MPLM flown on STS-131/19A (Leonardo) to become the PMM and the schedule is very tight. The two week delay does not account for an Edwards landing so it gets worse if STS-131 doesn’t land at KSC.

“However, Mr Suffredini made it clear that the PLM will be ready on time. He mentioned they are looking at using a different MPLM (Multi-Purpose Logistics Module) (probably Raffaello) but regardless they’ll be ready when SSP needs them to be ready. No further work required to evaluate accelerating STS-133.”

STS-133 is also highly likely to be reduced to a four person crew over the coming mission evaluation cycles.

Further information is expected on the status of AMS ahead of the April decision point, although the over-riding focus remains on successfully carrying out STS-131 prior to any decisions on the downstream manifest.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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AMS-02 Potential Delays:

As reported by NASASpaceflight.com, an unknown issue related to AMS’ testing is threatening a delay to STS-134’s slot in the manifest, to the point it may slip behind STS-133, or even as far as 2011 in a worst case scenario. However, memos on Monday noted that no decision will be made on the schedule until after additional testing results and the launch of STS-131 in April.

“STS-131 is on track for 4/5. Pad turn around supports 5/14 for STS-132. If AMS slips past STS-133, talked about moving STS-132 to June or July but docking ports will all be taken up for July so that would leave June,” Monday’s DA managerial notes (available on L2) confirmed.

“STS-132 rolls to VAB on 4/13, would rather keep orbiter in OPF (Orbiter Processing Facility) if going to delay,” the notes continued. “Want to get STS-131 off the Pad before discussions plus AMS testing is in April. Keep pressing with dates we have, will have decision mid-April.”

STS-134 Mission Planning Updates:

The mission, currently scheduled to be the penultimate flight of the Space Shuttle Program and the 25th and final flight of orbiter Endeavour, is already well into processing activities at the Kennedy Space Center.

Nonetheless, the brunt of processing operations are set the begin in earnest next month following the launch of the STS-131 off of MLP-3, the MLP on which the STS-134 stack will be erected.

Under the current processing schedule, MLP-3 (Mobile Launch Platform 3) will be moved into VAB High Bay 3 in early/mid April ahead of SRB stacking operations — which are currently baselined to occur in a 20+10 days contingency timeframe beginning in mid- to late-April.

Following completion of SRB stacking and closeout operations, SRB/ET mate operations would pick up on May 27 – 16-days after the Tank’s arrival at the Kennedy Space Center.

Orbiter Endeavour would then rollover from her OPF on June 17 after 108-days of OPF processing for mating with her External Tank.

Following a week of mating, integration, and vehicle checkouts, Endeavour and the STS-134 stack would then be moved to Launch Pad 39A on June 24 for 30+5 contingency days worth of pad processing for a July 29th launch.

According to the 93 page Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR) document – available for download on L2 – the current baselined (as of January 19, 2010) Ascent Performance Margin for Endeavour and STS-134 is 577lbs.

Additionally, Endeavour’s total weight (with payload and onboard propellant) meets all emergency abort and landing constraints expect for one, the Contingency Return case which would occur after the deployment of ELC-3 to the ISS but before deployment of AMS-02 and any middeck transfers.

For this case, Endeavour’s weight (with a Forward Center of Gravity case) would be 233,473lbs — 473lbs over the 233,000lbs contingency return weight limit.

The LSFR document further notes that, in the event of a RTLS (Return to Launch Site) abort, a 185-second ARCS (Aft Reaction Control System) and 25-second FRCS (Forward Reaction Control System) propellant dump would be required to meet RTLS landing CG and weight requirements.

Similarly, a 120-second ARCS and 65-second FRCS dump would be required for a TAL (Trans-oceanic Abort Landing) abort to meet landing CG and weight requirements.

In all, Endeavour will carry nine primary payloads during the 12+1+2 day mission.

These payloads include the AMS-02, the ExPRESS Logistics Carrier 3 (with numerous payloads attached), and a new MISSE (Materials on International Space Station) experiment in Endeavour’s payload bay.

Riding up on Endeavour’s middeck will be a new GLACIER (General Laboratory Active Cryogenic on ISS Experiment Refrigeration) and CGBA (Commercial General Bioprocessing Apparatus) payload.

Additionally, Endeavour will carry the now-standard MAUI (Analysis of Upper Atmosphere Injections), RAMBO-2 (RAM Burn Observations-2), SEITE (Shuttle Exhaust Ion Turbulence Experiment), and SIMPLEX (Shuttle Ionspheric Modification with Pulsed Local Exhaust) Payloads of Opportunity which, as the name suggests, will only be performed is conditions and mission timelines allow.

Furthermore, Endeavour and her six person crew will also be tasked with two Development Test Objectives — or DTOs.

These include DTO 805, Crosswind Landing Performance, and DTO 703, Sensor Test for Orion Relative-Navigation Risk Mitigation (STORRM).

For Endeavour’s 25th and final scheduled flight, the orbiter will utilize LP03 (Left Pod 03) and RP04 (Right Pod 04) for her two Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pods, External Tank 137 (which is currently expected to arrive at the Kennedy Space Center on May 11), SRB BI set 144 and RSRM-112 (Reusable Solid Rocket Motor stack 112), and Operational Increment software OI-34.

LSFR Baseline Modification for Endeavour:

As with all Space Shuttle missions, Endeavour will undergo a series of evaluations and modifications before her STS-134 mission.

For this flight, technicians in OPF-2 (Orbiter Processing Facility bay 2) will undertake one final modification to NASA’s youngest orbiter, as well as three (possibly four) Mission Kit modifications.

For the only Orbiter modification, a “dedicated power feed to the Fuel Cell H2 (hydrogen) flowmeter [that is] separate from the Cell Performance Monitor (CPM)” will be installed to ensure the protection of power to the CPM during flight.

This modification adjusts MPCAs 1 and 3 (Mid Power Cell Assemblies 1 and 3) to “utilize spare MPCA pin locations and 1-amp fuses to provide a dedicated power feed to the Fuel Cell H2 flowmeter separate from the CPM to protect against power loss of the CPM,” notes the STS-134 LSFR presentation.

The existing design feeds power to the Fuel Cell H2 flowmeter and CPM from the same 1-amp fused circuit.

“Separation of H2 flowmeter and CPM power feed would eliminate impact to CPM.”

A loss of power to a CPM during a countdown would result in an automatic launch scrub; likewise, a loss of power to a CPM during flight would “[result] in crew impact for alternate data collection to verify Fuel Cell health.”

Technicians have been tracking this problem through all three orbiters via inconsistent flowmeter behavior.

The worst of these behaviors came during the STS-124 flight of orbiter Discovery when a blown out fuse caused a loss of power to a CPM.

A temporary fix was devised in the form of flying the #1 and #3 H2 flowmeters in a powered down pattern after de-pinning them — a modification that was flown twice, once each of Discovery (STS-128) and Endeavour (STS-127).

LSFR STS-134 Mission Kits Modification Baseline Overview:

In all, three Mission Kit modifications are planned, with the possibility of one additional mission kit modification pending.

The first modification relates to a change in the IBA boom configuration.

For STS-134, the IBA (Inspection Boom Assembly) would be modified to “reflect new boom and sensor pack 1 installation changes as well as Orbiter return without Boom,” notes the LSFR presentation.

Since the OBSS (Orbiter Boom Sensor System) will be transferred to the ISS at the end for Endeavour’s docked mission, the IBA will be modified during this flight to an EIBA (Enhanced Inspection Boom Assembly) that is “more compatible” with the SSRMS (Space Station Remote Manipulator System).

The EIBA will have a modified grapple fixture interface and numerous, minor hardware modifications to better support long-term on-orbit stay.

For part of this modification, two crewmembers during one of the three STS-134 EVAs (spacewalks) will replace the standard Shuttle EFGF (Electrical Flight Grapple Fixture) from the grapple end of the OBSS with a standard ISS PDGF (Power Data Grapple Fixture).

The second baselined Mission Kit mod is for the STORRM (Sensor Test for the Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation).

This DTO is designed to “test the Vision Navigation Sensor (VNS) and Docking Camera planned for Orion” and will be tested during Endeavour’s docking and undocking to/from the ISS.

The modification here provides for a revision to the “order blanket installation and MECSLSI (Mission Equipment Cargo Support Launch Site Installation) plan.”

Finally, the last baselined Mission Kit modification relates to the Payload Cable Harness.

“Payload Cable Harness modification for ROEU (Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical) and AMS-02 updates MECSLSI to include two longer ELC-3 ROEU Power/Control cables to allow the ELC Sill Latch cables to be mated further forward on the starboard sill,” notes the LSFR presentation.

In this manner, STS-134 is a unique flight in that all 12 Payload Retention starboard sill location connections are required for the mission. Also, this is the first flight in which 2 ROEUs are required on the same side of the payload bay since both ELC-3 and AMS-02 require 2 starboard latch connection locations.

Each ROEU power/control requires “6 cables for 3 Sill connector locations and ELC3 ROEU power/control cable lengths are short for 2 available starboard sill connector locations.”

In short, this modification will lengthen the ELC-3 ROEU power/control cables and will “mate the ELC-3 Sill Latch cables further fwd to allow for the ELC ROEU Pwr/Control cable connections on the starboard sill.”

Finally, the yet-to-be-baselined modification pertains to the IBA.

“Port LWTSA (Light Weight Tool Stowage Assembly) Cushion modification” will modify the port LWTSA to accommodated the return of the OBSS’s EFGF — which will be removed as part of the EIBA (Enhanced Inspection Boom Assembly) modification.

Fit checks were planned for January 2010.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Pad Flow Latest:

With the Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test (TCDT) – a two day dress rehearsal that mimics the final stages of the countdown, along with crew safety procedures – completed on Friday, work over the weekend will focus on Discovery’s Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and preparations for hypergolic loading.

“In work with Pad validation activities, those are proceeding well. IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) calibration completed second shift on Friday,” noted NASA Test Director (NTD) processing information on L2.

“HPU (Hydraulic Power Unit) carts were transferred from the Hyper Fuel Farm and lifted to the zero-level of the MLP (Mobile Launch Platform) on 3rd shift Friday morning. Due to conflicting resources, the Pad-A GH2 recharge is now rescheduled for next Wednesday, March 10th.

“Weekend Work: SSME Frequency Response Test and Helium Signature Test. S0024 Hypergolic servicing preps.”

With departmental FRRs already concluding, the results will make up what is usually a two day SSP FRR at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston – although STS-130’s SSP FRR only took up a day, thanks to a lack of issues from the previous flight, STS-129.

A similar situation for STS-131’s SSP FRR appears likely, with STS-130’s IFA (In Flight Anomaly) review at the PRCB (Program Requirements Control Board) on Thursday showing only three IFAs for the entire mission – with no issues of note for Endeavour herself.

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

“The STS-131 SSP FRR is March 10 and 11. Charts are due Monday. Special topics are due by (Friday). The STS-130 MMT (Mission Management Team) Debrief will be scheduled toward the end of the month,” noted the latest Shuttle Standup/Integration report on L2.

“Inputs for the debrief are due by Friday to see if a stand alone debrief is needed; otherwise it will be combined with a pre-brief for STS-131. Had a successful pre-FRR. Had three integrated IFAs that will be bringing forward to be dispositioned.”

The large Orbiter Project Office (OPO) only found one item of interest during their departmental FRR for STS-131, relating to inspections that are to be carried out on Discovery at the pad – following the STS-130 observation of Endeavour’s left hand outboard elevon flipper door sliding seal protrusion, and the protruding window insert.

“Had FRR with OPO. Have a little bit of open work left on OV-103 (Discovery) out at the Pad,” added OPO via the Standup report. “Still a little more to do with flipper door inspection with regards to the seal that came up during the last flight, and also a little more ceramic insert inspection to be done. Will have Chits in the system to do both of these.”

Other items that will highlight the FRR will be the External Tank, specific to the foam liberations from the intertank region.

STS-132 Processing Latest:

Atlantis’ final “scheduled’ mission – STS-132 – continues to work towards a May 14 launch date, with evaluations on ET-136’s intertank foam also set to take place shortly in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) High Bay 2 (HB-2) via plug/pull tests.

“In the VAB, got ET-136 offloaded and put into the HB-2 checkout cell. Will pick up with test and checkout activities,” noted processing information. “ET-136 (VAB HB-2 East) Shakedown/Receiving inspections continue. GUCP (Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate) and LO2/LH2 checkout preps continue.

“Will talk the ET-136 intertank foam bond adhesion testing (plug/pull tests) that needs to be done. Will discuss options. SSP (Space Shuttle Program Manager) Mr. (John) Shannon added that since going away from platforms to a cherry picker cleaning, it must be decided whether the same plug pattern is appropriate.”

The change from platforms to mechanical lifters relates to the process of cleaning the intertank structure during processing towards foam application at the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF). It is believed that the root cause for the liberations during ascent is caused by dust contamination, with the old platforms obstructing the proper removal of the offending dust.

A lack of intertank foam loss during ET-136’s ascent will confirm the root cause and the aforementioned solution.

The primary payload for STS-132 is the Russian Mini-Research Module 1 (MRM-1) and Integrated Cargo Carrier – Vertical Lightweight Deployable (ICC-VLD) pallet, with baseline evaluations continuing as per normal. Already noted is a Change Request (CR) relating to the mission duration.

“Processed the STS-132 CR for mission duration to 12+0 (days); went outside the board,” noted Flight Operations and Integration on the Standup report.

Processing of Atlantis continues to go well, following the installation of her three SSMEs and the start of booster stacking operations inside the VAB.

“OV-104 (STS-132) Got the clearance to start engine leak checks. Working base heat shield installation. Continuing installation of lower LESS carrier panels above the right and left wings,” noted Ground Operations. “In HB-1, will be picking up with SRB stacking, with the left aft booster going up.

“Orbiter: OV-104 (OPF Bay 1): Orbiter closeouts for rollout to VAB will be started Friday. Weekend Work: ECLSS (Environmental Control and Life Support System) GN2 servicing, SSME and TPS (Thermal Protection System) work.

“BI-143 / RSRM 111 (VAB HB-1): Left Aft Booster stacking is complete. Right Aft Booster stacking is scheduled for Friday.”

STS-134 Processing Latest:

From a processing standpoint, all is proceeding to plan with Endeavour, following her return from STS-130. Preparations for STS-134 are taking place, as engineers work towards the removal of her three SSMEs – which will begin on Monday.

“Thermography on the WLE (Wing Leading Edge) has been completed, and is in data review. Working engine removal preps. Picked up with checkout of the FRCS (Forward Reaction Control System). Continuing with post-flight window inspections,” outlined an overview from Ground Operations.

“Working on OV-105 (Endeavour) post-flight STS-130,” added SSME contractor Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, via the Standup report. “Will be working Saturday on engine removal preps, so that engine removal can start first thing Monday morning.

“It takes around three shifts to get those engines back in the Engine Shop. The first activity in the Engine Shop will be running the normal nozzle tube leak checks.”

One issue – or Interim Problem Report (IPR) – is continuing to be worked during nominal flow operations, relating to a payload bay door centerline latch limit switch noted as off when should be on.

“IPR-03 troubleshooting continues; the team performed bore scope inspection on the LH and RH (Left and Right Hand) PLBD (Payload Bay Door) shear pins,” the NTD reported. “Troubleshooting results are under engineering evaluation.

“RCC (Reinforced Carbon Carbon) Thermography completed Friday. FRCS functional checkout is complete. OBSS (Orbiter Boom Sensor System) removal Friday. Weekend Work: SSME removal preps. Fuel cells 1, 2 & 3 work.”

Potentially Large STS-134 Delay:

STS-134 currently has a launch date of July 29. However, memos started to circulate earlier this week requesting inputs from team leaders on the potential impacts of swapping the mission order, by allowing STS-133 to launch ahead of Endeavour’s mission.

Further memos on Friday informed managers to attend a program level meeting next Monday, due to the potential of a “significant” delay to STS-134, relating to problems during the testing of Endeavour’s payload – the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS).

“Conducting a quick look assessment of the impacts of flying STS-133/ULF5 prior to 134/ULF6. This option is being looked at due to problems that have been encountered with the AMS payload during testing (planned to fly on ULF6),” noted one of several memos that are being collated in L2 ahead of Monday’s meeting.

“It is not clear at this point how significant a delay will result from these AMS problems, but the Program wants to look at our options before too much time passes and it becomes too late to consider a swap.”

A full review of the situation will be published after Monday’s meeting in order to gain full details of the problem, and the potential length of the delay – although one memo intimated a slip of several months, while some sources claim it could be as serious as slipping well into 2011. NASA managers do hold flexibility in the schedule to move a flight into the first quarter of 2011 – if required.

Ironically, the potential slip to STS-134 comes at a time when lawmakers are pushing for a large extension to the shuttle’s operational lifetime, a drive which was acknowledged – at least by way of asking his teams to remained focus on the job in hand – by Mr Shannon.

“There are many stories in the news, as there always are. This time it seems they are more focused on our team (SSP). The best thing we can do is to continue to operate excellently as we have been, keep putting together outstanding vehicles with no problems in flight, and keep hitting our launch windows,” Mr Shannon added to the Standup report.

“The team has been doing a wonderful job of that. We just need to keep it up, and keep our heads down, and we will see where the country wants this team to go.”

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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