Soyuz TMA-18 Return:

The Soyuz Vehicle consists of three modules: the Orbital Module, the Descent Module (DM), and the Instrumentation/Propulsion Module (IPM). All three modules nominally separate simultaneously, shortly after the deorbit burn is completed – at around 140 km altitude.

The two ‘off nominal’ re-entries in 2007 and 2008 were the cause of separation failures on the modules, thus initiating the ballistic return for their three person crews.

However, no issues have been suffered with the vehicle since an investigation found that the most likely cause of the previous failures related to an open the latch located at ‘Plane I’ interface.

“This was a failure of the 8 X 55 explosive bolt, caused by combined long-term exposure, under space flight conditions, to electrical discharges resulting from the difference in potential between the station hull and the surrounding plasma, which increased in magnitude after the electrical power capacity of the ISS was augmented,” noted the Russian investigation presentation, avaiable on L2.

The findings relating to the long-term exposure to electromagnetic emissions on-orbit, and their potential to cause issues with the pyro bolts, came after an extensive investigation that included the removal and return of one pyro bolt from Soyuz TMA-12.

Williams and Suraev bid their final farewells Wednesday at 3:40am GMT, and climbed aboard their Soyuz TMA-16 spacecraft before closing the hatches. Undocking took place at 8:03am GMT.

Very cold weather and gusty winds met Williams and Suraev at the landing site, while Russian and NASA personnel stayed overnight in nearby Arkalyk to assure a swift recovery of the crew. Weather permitting, four additional helicopters will depart from Kustanai Thursday and refuel in Arkalyk en route to the landing site to assist with the recovery.

FRR and SSPCB status on Soyuz and ISS:

Ahead of the duo’s return, NASA and Russian engineers held a Flight Readiness Review (FRR), which also included the April launch of Expedition 23 crewmembers.

“FRR for 20S Return/22S Launch and Docking/Increment 22: The FRR Board has given the go for Flight 20S Return/22S Launch and Docking/Increment 22 (Stages 21S-23),” noted Space Station Program Control Board (SSPCB) notes on L2.

“On board ISS, Williams and Suraev prepare for their departure, working on the standard end-of-increment cleanup preparatory to their return to Earth on 3/18. The Expedition-23 crew of Alexander Skvortsov, Mikhail Kornienko, and Tracy Caldwell-Dyson prepare for their Launch to ISS on or around April 2, 2010.”

As part of the FRR, managers also discussed the cause of several false fire alarms on the ISS – citing dust contamination as the likely cause.

“MOD presented our readiness. MOD is go for launch and the increment with the following issues noted: False dP/dt alarm from MRM-2 was reviewed: when ventilation is interrupted, the smoke detectors cannot perform,” added the notes. “Dust contamination (dust bunny) in a smoke detector was the likely cause of the smoke detectors sensing a false fire.

“Without ventilation, these false indications will not clear, so in the event of a false dP/dt alarm, smoke detectors will be inhibited until ventilation is restored. This will be reviewed and will occur as a normal ISS software upgrade.

The SSPCB also approved updates to the Emergency Procedures Book relating to “US SD Response to MRM-2 Annunciations”.

Other items of interest discussed by the SSPCB included the vital need for utilizing downmass capability from the shuttle before the fleet is retired. While this loss of capability will seriously hinder science on the ISS, the board was referencing the issue of not having enough space in the ISS for stowage.

“Other significant Mission Overview Questions/Issues: Violation-Risk ‘On Orbit stowage Short Fall’: Stowage will begin to intrude into restricted and habitable volumes. Mitigation is to maximize return on the upcoming (shuttle) flights. Expect stowage to be a discussion point on all future FRRs to update mitigation efforts,” added the SSPCB.

“Cupola and RWS (Robotic Work Station) interference-panel needs to be modified or airflow behind RWS will be short circuited. A new panel will be built on the ground; therefore the Cupola will not be available for RWS use on the next flight.”

Also reviewed was the status of the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS), such as the Urine Processing Assembly (UPA) – which has been troublesome since arriving on the Station. Also noted was the status of the 2A Solar Array, which has registered some loading issues and a longeron shadowing event.

“T-valve poppet missing retaining ring was cause of urine loss (five percent) due to back flow into system. Will fly a new retaining ring and engineering working long-term fix,” the notes continued. “2A Solar Arrays: No gross damage noted in photo survey. Forward work to determine if there is some damage to a joint area that is causing issues with loading, or clear array structurally.”

STS-133’s Addition of the PMM Review:

With Discovery set to fly the final shuttle mission of the “current” manifest, ISS managers have been discussing the arrival of STS-133’s main payload, the PMM (Permanent Multi-purpose Module) – which is already seeing a level of strain on its readiness schedule.

“Significant SSPCB Issues: The major issue that occupied most of the SSPCB was the overall technical and schedule issues to prepare the Permanent Logistics Module (PMM) for launch and integration as an additional ISS module to be used primarily for stowage,” managers noted.

“PMM continues to move forward toward flight on ISS. On-orbit orientation for PMM is the same as MPLM-no orientation changes. Removed 178 lb of equipment from PMM for permanent installation on ISS.”

As previously noted, should issues with STS-134’s AMS payload result in a large slip, STS-133 will be unable to move forward due to the critical path for the conversion of the MPLM into a PMM.

“KSC internal integration modifying the insides of the MPLM to turn it into the PMM is the critical path to make STS-133/ULF5 for 9/16 launch. Right now, there are just three days to modify the PMM interior. Schedule is still under negotiation with SSP (Space Shuttle Program).

“Fit checks will be tough to do with the tight integration schedule. Engineers will have to get with the PMM team to look at identifying which fit checks will be high priority (access, spare availability, frequency, etc). Flight Module2 could be used for some fit checks for access if we cannot get into the PMM during the tight integration schedule.”

The conversion also holds impacts for the module’s Caution and Warning (C&W) system, which may require a confidence test ahead of installation into Discovery’s Payload Bay.

“MOD have an action to assess the impacts to override the C&W messages for the case of the hardware being removed – MOD is aware and assessing. There is a plan in place to perform a confidence test if the s/w is modified,” added the notes.

“Since there will be equipment removed from the PMM, the software will need to be modified to prevent error messages from being generated. C&W messages from the PMM can be inhibited if the software will not be modified. KSC hardware/software testing would be serial; to make ULF5 this would be too optimistic.

“The Program gave an action to do KSC software testing on the ground possibly using Flight Module2 with modifications – and then potentially upload after PMM is on-orbit if there is not enough time for full KSC integration. MOD will participate in the resolution of this action.

“Assess the operational inhibits needed on the PMM in the event the software modification is not made. PMM does not have capability to annunciate C&W alarms-an exception will be applied since PMM only used for storage with hatch open with smaller exposure to crew in module.”

Other items of interest related to the MLI insulation and the potential need for a future EVA via the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) to resolve a heat transfer path issue.

“MLI will not be pre-integrated to exterior trunion scuff plates on PMM-leaving a heat transfer path. If condensate builds up on the interior, the Program will consider a future SSRMS-based EVA or put additional ventilation into the PMM.

“Note-there are no EVA handrails for external access to add MLI; an EVA will have to be SSRMS-based. Quick release pip pins are to be added prior to flight to the structural rods holding the +/-Y and –Z panels. This will help with maintenance.”

Such an EVA would not become part of STS-133, as managers close in on officially reducing the crew size to four – in order to create as much upmass potential for the mission.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Processing and Troubleshooting Latest:

While the RRCS issue is being discussed, engineers will continue with the pad flow for STS-131, pushing forward with the realigned schedule that will see Discovery’s payload arriving at 39A on Friday (delayed again). The Agency level Flight Readiness Review (FRR) remains on track for March 26.

“OV-103 / ET-135 / SRB BI-142 / RSRM 110 (Pad A): S0024 Hypergolic Propellant Servicing was completed less APS (Aft Propulsion System) QD (Quick Disconnect) de-mates (IPR-0033),” noted the NASA Test Director (NTD) on Monday processing information (L2).

IPR (Interim Problem Report) 33 is the latest issue to be charged against Discovery’s OMS/RCS system during hypergolic loading - although all were resolved, bar the decrease (leak) in the helium tank pressure on the RRCS, in unison with the RRCS fuel propellant tank when the tank was vented.

“New IPR 0033 to OMS/RCS: While performing the Aft RCS fuel tank vents, the RRCS Fuel He tank pressure dropped, indicating a leak through the He Isolation Valves. All attempts to resolve this issue were unsuccessful. The test team decision was to continue with hypergolic fuel load with this IPR condition.”

Via an overview presentation provided to the ERB on Monday (and acquired by L2), the real time findings on Friday evening were expanded on – along with the listing of the five troubleshooting attempts that have taken place so far to resolve the leak, all of which were unsuccessful.

“IPR 131V-0033: RRCS Fuel GHe Tank pressure decreased during fuel propellant tank venting (indicating excessive Helium Isolation Valve leakage). Troubleshooting was performed to attempt to establish a measurable leak rate, seat valve(s), and again try to establish a measureable leak rate. Currently the flow through the closed valves has been limited to the controlled vent of the propellant tank (~ 5 million scch),” noted the presentation.

“Troubleshooting Performed to date: 1) Pressurize helium tank and monitor for a pressure increase upstream of the GHe iso – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank pressurized at the same rate, pressure subsequently vented. 2) Cycle LV301, GHe Iso ‘B’ valve OPEN then CLOSE. Pressurize helium tank and monitor for a pressure increase upstream of the GHe isolation valves – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank pressurized at the same rate.

“3) Cycle LV303, GHe Iso ‘A’ valve OPEN then CLOSE. Pressurize helium tank and monitor for a pressure increase upstream of the GHe isolation valves – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank pressurized at the same rate. 4) Pressurize helium tank (and prop tank) to above reg lock up. Vent propellant tank in an attempt to seat the GHe isolation valves – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank vent at the same rate.

“5) Pressurize helium tank (and prop tank) to above reg lock up. While venting through propellant tank cycle GHe isolation valve(s) in an attempt to seat the valves: a) Cycle LV303, GHe Iso ‘A’ valve OPEN then CLOSE – performed under flow a total of times, b) Cycle LV301, GHe Iso ‘B’ valve OPEN then CLOSE – performed under flow a total of 3 times – No Joy: Helium tank and propellant tank vent at the same rate.”

Discovery’s Right OMS Pod – and associated hardware such as the RRCS – is known as RP03 (RP=Right Pod). Historical documentation shows this hardware has performed without a major problem since debuting on STS-96.

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

“RP03 Past Performance: (He Isos) Checked out in OPF at start of flow. Leakage was well in-spec (51 scch). Historically have been good since at least STS-96,” the presentation noted, before showing the historical performance of the associated valves.

“Series regulators: Primary stages. Response testing performed, results in spec. Leak testing was not performed. Since STS-116, one of primary regs creeps after press to flight although did not repeat on STS-128. Secondary stage 252 & 329 scch in the OPF this flow. RV last tested 7/2008, results in spec.”

Options:

Three clear options are available to managers. Firstly, engineers will attempt to troubleshoot the issue at the Pad, with the results passing through to the potential creation of a waiver in the Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) – likely to be discussed for approval at the Agency FRR – to allow Discovery to fly “as-is” via flight rationale. Should those options become unacceptable, a repair would be undertaken.

A repair cannot be carried out at the pad, and would result in rollback to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), demating of Discovery from the External Tank/SRB stack, rollback to her Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), demate Discovery’s right OMS Pod for repairs in the Hypergolic Maintenance Facility (HMF), whilst Endeavour’s Right OMS is donated to Discovery. An expected three month delay would result in the launch schedule.

“Options: Fly as is – activate system for flight and monitor reg health. Troubleshoot at the pad. Repair – cannot be performed at the pad. Swap pod with OV-105 (Endeavour) RP04 (‘quickest’ option),” the presentation added. “HMF Repair, Three weeks required after pod removal, (donated to Endeavour).”

Additional troubleshooting at the pad is likely to be the first option to be evaluated, with three clear options already outlined – although each path holds no guarantee of success.

“Troubleshooting Ideas: Could cycle valves from cockpit. Each valve cycled nine times via LPS (Launch Processing System) already. No different performance expected, same circuitry used by LPS or cockpit switch,” noted options presented to the ERB.

“Run regulator flow tests. Portable reg panel needs to be reactivated. Panel ready to support – TBD (To Be Determined, around one week). 700 psia inlet pressures (1500 in OPF). Panel designed to test reg response only. Any other test capability, e.g. reg & iso leak rates TBD.

“Try ‘baking’ valve by extended powering of valve Soften Teflon of main seat to improve sealing. May not help if the pilot is leaking. Connection demate in doghouse door required along with subsequent SCAN retest.”

Flight rationale is by no means out of the question, but will be subject to the condition and performance of the related redundancy in the system.

With the current indications pointing to at least one of the two parallel helium isolation valves as leaking, two helium system regulators – a primary and a secondary – will be tested to verify they are functioning correctly.

These two regulators are downstream of the isolation valves, and are used to maintain helium pressure to the fuel tank. If there are problems found with one or both regulators – during testing this week – flight rationale will be very hard to approve.

“Each He iso valve is one of three series valves: He Iso, Primary Reg Stage, Secondary Reg Stage. If all three leak a Burst Disk/Pressure Relief valve protects downstream components from over pressurization,” explained the ERB presentation.

“Depending on leak rate, could use thruster firings to help control tank pressures. Thruster firings limited while docked to ISS (International Space Station).”

Once test equipment has been stationed at the pad, the helium system will be brought to flight pressure and engineers will monitor the panels to ascertain whether the regulators function properly. Even if both regulators are deemed to be in a good condition, a flight rationale debate will still be required.

More information and articles will follow, as information is collated into L2.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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Enterprise’s History:

Despite never flying in space, Enterprise  – otherwise known as OV-101 – had a major role to play for her offspring, and remains a vehicle of interest, even playing a role in the investigation into the Columbia accident.

Enterprise was constructed at Rockwell’s Air Force Plant 42 assembly facility in Palmdale, California – rolling out on January 31, 1977, for the 36 mile overland journey to NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRC) at Edwards Air Force Base for the approach and landing test (ALT) program.

Originally to be named Constitution, before a letter writing campaign by Star Trek fans resulted in her being christened Enterprise, she was used to demonstrate that the orbiter could fly in the atmosphere and land like an airplane.

The ALT program involved ground and flight tests, with Fred Haise and Gordon Fullerton, Joe Engle and Dick Truly all involved in testing Enterprise during approach and landing.

Five captive flights of the Enterprise mounted atop the SCA with the vehicle unmanned and her systems inert were conducted to assess the structural integrity and performance handling qualities of the mated craft.

Three manned captive flights that followed, including an astronaut crew aboard the orbiter operating flight control systems while the orbiter remained perched atop the SCA. In the five free flights the astronaut crew separated the spacecraft from the SCA and maneuvered to a landing at Edwards Air Force Base.

In the first four flights the landing was on a dry lake bed; in the fifth, the landing was on Edwards’ main concrete runway under conditions simulating a return from space. The last two free flights were made without the tail cone, the spacecraft’s configuration during an actual landing from orbit.

The final phase of the ALT program prepared the spacecraft for four ferry flights, after which Enterprise was returned to the NASA hangar at the DFRC and modified for vertical ground vibration tests in 1978 at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), where she was mated with an External Tank, Solid Rocket Boosters – to be subjected to a series of vertical ground vibration tests.

In 1979, Enterprise was ferried once again on the SCA, this time to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), mated with an ET and SRBs, before being transported via a Mobile Launch Platform to Pad 39A. Enterprise served as a practice and launch complex fit-check verification tool representing the flight vehicles.

After several additional ferry flights around the country for orbiter testing, Enterprise went on a tour in 1983, taking in the Paris Air Show, a stop at Stansted Airport in England, trips to Germany, Italy and Canada, before returning to the DFRC.

Enterprise was then ferried to Vandenberg Air Force Base in California for fit checks at SLC-6 (Shuttle Launch Complex) and on to Mobile, Alabama, before being taken by barge to New Orleans for the United States 1984 World’s Fair. In 1985, Enterprise was ferried from KSC to Dulles Airport, Washington, DC, and became the property of the Smithsonian Institution.

Ferry Evaluations:

Notes that a team of engineers had been sent to check Enterprise’s conditions first appeared on Shuttle Standup/Integration reports (L2). These evaluations were based on pre-emptive options for moving Enterprise to another venue, should the NASM win one of the current orbiters after retirement.

“Have a team going up to inspect Enterprise at the National Aeronautics Space Museum (Udvar-Hazy Center) to determine if it is in a ferry-able condition,” noted the first mention of the team being sent to check Enterprise. “There may be some desire to ferry it somewhere else after the Program and trade it out for one of our orbiters.”

Daily status reports on Enterprise’s evaluations and general condition (all available on L2) then followed this month, showing a great level of detail was being undertaken to check to see if the vehicle was in an acceptable condition to be flow on the SCA. The work was carried out while visitors were still able to view the test vehicle.

“Aft detailed inspection complete. Vertical penetration assessment complete. Body flap cove access established. NDE (Non Destructive Evaluations – dye penetrant) inspection of aft SCA attach points complete. No discrepancies noted,” noted one example of a status report. “NDE (eddy current) inspection of aft hoist points complete. No discrepancies noted.

“Internal borescope inspection of LH inboard and outboard elevons complete, they are in excellent condition. No discrepancies noted. PLBD (Payload Bay Door) external hinge inspection complete. Minor hardware discrepancies noted. LH main landing gear detailed inspection complete. Minor hardware discrepancies noted. Lower surface foam repair in work (required post pull tests). Patch material in cure. High crew access established in midbody for PLBD centerline mechanism inspection.”

The biggest problem found was on the SCA attach point on the orbiter – known as the arrowhead fitting – which was corroded and in need of a repair.

“Cleanup of arrowhead fitting (fwd SCA attach point) continues. Substantial corrosion present. This is the worst we have seen so far. NDE will follow cleanup. LH elevon cove detailed inspection in work. Multiple fasteners had to be drilled out of outboard flipper door. Rework will be required,” added the status update, followed by an update in the Standup report.

“On the OV-101 inspection, the team is making good progress. Most of the vehicle looks to be in good shape. Did find substantial corrosion around the arrowhead fitting that will have to be reworked. Also, there is an area in the LH elevon where it will need some new work.”

As all the other areas of the vehicle were checked – mainly showing the craft was in a reasonably good condition considering her age, bar some minor corrosion – engineers worked on a procedure to repair the arrowhead fitting.

“NDE of arrowhead fitting complete. We were unable to perform eddy current inspection of barrel nut holes (4 locations). Barrel nut holes on OV101 are smaller than on the rest of the fleet. We will require a custom probe to perform this inspection. We will have to evaluate as part of phase II work.

“Continue to clean arrowhead corrosion. Dental molds of pitting to follow, ahead of entire area being chemfilmed to prevent further corrosion.”

A final sweep of the remaining areas of the vehicle then followed, as some of the hardware was removed for repair at the Kennedy Space Center, while the areas of greatest concern were checked via borescope inspections.

“Borsescope inspection of fwd fuselage under crew module complete. Substantial corrosion in this area,” engineers noted on the greatest area of concern. “RH wing leading edge inspection complete. Minor hardware discrepancies noted. Corrosion documented in 1996 was revisited and shows no signs of change.

“LH leading edge hardware discrepancies corrected and carrier panels reinstalled. Consider this area closed out. Corrosion protection of aft, wings, and body flap cove complete. All foam repairs complete. Repainted main landing gear struts (areas stripped for suspect weld investigation). Repainted Smithsonian jacks (areas stripped for critical weld inspection). Removed jacks from under Orbiter.

“LH wing/glove closed out. RH glove closed out. Unable to close out RH wing due to lack of fasteners. Temporarily installed elevon flipper doors, body flap panels, 50-X doors, 44 door, and 27 doors. Doors temporarily installed as areas will have to be accessed for future work.

“Additional borescope inspections performed under crew module through various access points. Worst care corrosion was that found Tuesday. External penetration assessment complete. Multiple panel installations will have to be reworked as part of future work.”

Final evaluation work last week related to the landing gear, which may be required for the towing of the vehicle out of the exhibition to a waiting transport to where the SCA would be waiting to ferry her to another location – although the forward plan has not yet been finalized.

“Cursory rigging checks of landing gear completed. All three gear uplocks were manually cycled and all hardstop contacts were verified. Several measurements were taken and will be checked against like measurements on flight vehicles as a sanity check,” added the report.

“RMG (Right Main Gear) uplock was ’stiff’ and there appeared to be some misalignment in the up position hardstop. This will require further evaluation. The RMG fwd door hook was also installed backwards. We corrected this problem. NLG (Nose Landing Gear) door booster bungee will required further evaluation as well. It is designed differently than flight orbiters and did not function as expected.”

With the engineers completing their work – and due to arrive back at the Kennedy Space Center this week – the final note pointed towards Enterprise having no show stoppers for a ferry flight, should that option be taken.

“All of our inspection objectives were met. Overall, the vehicle is in good condition,” noted the team leader. “I want to make sure everyone understands when we have used the words ’substantial corrosion’ that this means we suspect some form of corrective action will be required. The detected areas of “substantial corrosion” were few.

“My personal opinion is that they will not be show stoppers.”

==

Photos taken from hi-res collection in L2 Historical (over 900gbs of photos, presentations and videos from 1950s onwards), additional NASM photos and videos of Enterprise’s evaluations thanks to Ron Smith.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Processing:

Discovery was enjoying a relatively uneventful processing flow at the pad, as she continued to track a record low amount of Interim Problem Reports (IPRs). However, some issues started to appear during hypergolic loading operations (S0024).

“OV-103 / ET-135 / SRB BI-142 / RSRM 110 (Pad A): S0024 Hypergolic Propellant Servicing is in-work. SRB (Solid Rocket Booster) HPU (Hydraulic Power Unit) hydrazine rock system was loaded,” noted end of week processing information from the NASA Test Director (NTD), via L2.

“Severe weather inhibited loading the tilt systems. Finish loading the tilt system in parallel with orbiter APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) load.

“New IPR 0030: Visible hydrazine leak detected on a boss fitting associated with the GSE (Ground Support Equipment) side of the ‘orange’ fill QD (Quick Disconnect) feeding the RH (Right Hand) rock side. The system was vented and test team concurrence was given to re-torque the fitting.

“The torque of the fitting was successful and the SRB HPU Rock Fuel Service Modules were loaded with hydrazine.”

Two additional issues were noted on the Friday report, listing a number of OMS/RCS related problems – and solutions – as engineers worked on the QDs after troubleshooting the connections.

“New IPR 0031 to OMS/RCS: (QD) does not mate. This problem was resolved. All QDs were matted and leak checked on third shift,” added the report, before noting one QD was found to be leaking. This required the replacement of a leaking flex hose to resolve.

“New IPR 0032 to OMS/RCS: QD ‘MD-326′ failed leak check (all others passed). Troubleshooting found a leaking flex hose which must be replaced. OMS/RCS oxidizer servicing pending IPR 32 resolution. Weekend work: Complete hypergolic propellant loading.”

It has not yet been confirmed if the above issue has contributed to what was listed as IPR 0033 “Leak: RCS Helium Iso Valve on the right pod for the fuel system” – meaning the valve is stuck in the open position.

The correct flow of helium is essential for providing the proper flow path of oxidizer from the propellant tanks into the combustion chamber of the thrusters, allowing them to carry out their function of aiding the orbiter’s maneuvering on orbit.

This issue – observed on Friday evening – is serious, due to the potential requirement to remove the RH OMS Pod from Discovery to access and repair the valve, a procedure that can’t be carried out at the pad.

Should managers decide to repair the valve, Discovery would be rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), demated from her External Tank (ET-135), returned to her Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), where engineers would demate and remove the entire OMS Pod.

However, such a decision, which would delay STS-131 – and Discovery’s follow-on mission, STS-133 – by several months, won’t be taken until next week at the earliest, as managers evaluate their forward options.

The first relates to troubleshooting via what is known as a “blowdown” procedure, which would be used to flow helium through the system for a period of time and cycle the Helium valves to purge any contaminants that may be causing the valve to remain in the open position.

This procedure is available for related issues on orbit, and sources note a similar ground procedure exists for the purpose of troubleshooting.

The second option available is to fly “as is” via flight rationale. This is a possibility due to redundancy in the system, although a waiver would be required to allow for the MEL (Minimum Equipment List) portion of the LCC (Launch Commit Criteria).

According to the complete STS-1 to STS-130 In Flight Anomaly list presentations (L2) – an issue with one of the two valves in this system has only occurred three times on orbit, none of which have been in recent years.

“IFA STS-30-V-09: Right Reaction Control Subsystem Oxidizer Helium Isolation Valve A Failed Open. IFA STS-51A-V-08: Left Orbital Maneuvering System Helium Isolation Valve Leak. IFA STS-89-V-05: Right RCS Fuel Helium Isolation Valve B Failed To Open.”

On each occasion, the redundancy in the system allowed the orbiter to complete a nominal mission.

With managers set to begin meetings on Monday on the forward path, pad processing is continuing for the interim – although at least a one day delay has been called for on the milestone of payload delivery to the pad.

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

Currently, troubleshooting operations have delayed RSS retract to NET (No Earlier Than) Tuesday, delaying STS-131’s payload delivery to 39A until NET Wednesday.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

No related posts.

Mission-Specific Updates:

In all, STS-133 is baselined as a 8+1+2 day mission with 0 (zero) primary EVAs (spacewalks), one (1) ISS-based contingency EVA, and two (2) Shuttle-based contingency EVAs (in case the ET umbilical doors fail to close after ET/Orbiter separation and/or in case the payload bay doors cannot be closed by computer command and require manual closure at the end of the mission). It is also highly likely the mission will be reduced to four crew members.

For STS-133, Discovery will fly with 4 Cryo tank sets and 5 GN2 (gaseous nitrogen) tanks - as noted in the 92 page baseline presentation, available to download on L2.

In terms of STS-133 turnaround and preparation efforts, Discovery is scheduled to land at the Kennedy Space Center at the completion of the STS-131 mission on the night of April 15.

Should Discovery’s 131 mission actually land at the Kennedy Space Center, the vehicle will be towed off the SLF (Shuttle Landing Facility) about 4-hours after landing and into OPF-3 (Orbiter Processing Facility Bay 3) for immediate post-flight deservicing ahead of flow turnaround operations for STS-133.

Should landing occur at the contingency landing site in California, Discovery will be towed off the runway to the Mate/Demate Device (MDD) where post-flight deservicing and ferry flight preparations would occur.

After approximately one week of servicing and preparations, Discovery (with aerodynamic tailcone assembly attached) will be hoisted atop one of two Shuttle Carrier Aircrafts (SCAs) and ferried back to the Kennedy Space Center for flow turnaround operations.

Under nominal conditions (i.e. a KSC landing for STS-131 and no change to the STS-133 baselined launch date), Discovery will spend 104 days inside her OPF undergoing final inspections, modifications, and calibrations for the STS-133 flight.

SRB (Solid Rocket Booster) stacking will then begin on June 9 on MLP-2 after the scheduled launch of Atlantis/STS-132 from that MLP in mid-May.

In all, SRB stacking is baselined for 23-days with 16-days worth of contingency. This rather large contingency margin could go some way toward alleviating potential schedule concerns with any slip to the STS-132 launch date as NASA managers are currently evaluating the potential need to slip the 132 launch date into June due to possible delays to that mission’s LON flight: STS-134 with AMS.

In addition to SRB stacking operations, Discovery’s External Tank (ET-138) will arrive On Dock at the Kennedy Space Center on July 5 ahead of a July 20 or 22 mating to the SRB stack.

Following the completion of SRB closeout and ET/SRB mating operations, Discovery will rollover to the VAB for mating with her ET/SRB stack on August 9 for her 39th and final flight.

After a week of mating and interface checkouts, Discovery and the STS-133 stack will rollout to Launch Pad 39A on August 16 for 22+9-contingency+1-holiday days worth of pad processing.

If all goes to plan, the STS-133/ULF-6 (Utilization and Logistics Flight 6) flight will liftoff on the 134th and final Space Shuttle mission on September 16, 2010 at ~11:57a.m. EDT, with a nominal End of Mission landing on September 24.

According to the LSFR document, Discovery’s End of Mission (EOM) landing is planned for the Kennedy Space Center, FL – apparently confirming that, as for now, Discovery’s landing will not take place in California with a follow-up cross-country farewell tour of various NASA centers during a ferry flight back to KSC.

Discovery Vehicle Modifications for STS-131:

For STS-133, several modifications will be made to Discovery as part of a weight savings and increased safety effort to allow for maximum payload upmass on the ELC-4 and PMM payloads.

Among these modifications will be the removal of a 5th PRSD (Power Reactant Storage Distribution) tank set, the completion of all “red” OMDP (Orbiter Maintenance Down Period) requirements, and five modifications.

The first of these modifications pertains to the re-flight of the Boundary Layer Transition (BLT) DTO (Detail/Dedicated Test Objective).

“Re-flight of protuberance tile and associated thermocouple instrumentation” from STS-131 will be undertaken on STS-133.

There is the potential to increase the height of the protuberance instead of simply re-flying the same protuberance, but a frim decision has yet to be made.

“Potential for protuberance height increase from the 0.35″ height being flown on STS-131 – pending evaluation and analysis of STS-131 performance flight data.”

The second modification mentioned in the LSFR document for STS-133 also relates to the Boundary Layer Transition DTO, this time in terms of a catalytic coating applied to the surface of one downstream DTO tile.

“Re-flight of catalytic coating applied to one tile in BLT DTO region of influence would require shelf life extension of existing lot of catalytic coating material or production of new lot of catalytic coating (age life limited) and reapplication to selected tile,” notes the LSFR presentation.

Additional modifications for Discovery include the completion of Wing Leading Edge Spar “Sneak Flow” protection.

Designed to “limit allowable plume flow to 50 percent across the flow restrictor,” the Wing Leading Edge (WLE) Spar “Sneak Flow” Protection modification would increase the overall WLE panel damage tolerance by “adding a flow restrictor.”

Currently, all WLE panels on Discovery, less Left Hand panels 2-4, have been modified to date.

Completion of the modification would allow Left Hand WLE panels 2-4 to fly with the same damage resistance as the other WLE panels on Discovery; however, completion of the modification would take up valuable time in Discovery’s already short OPF flow toward STS-133 and would thus have to be balanced accordingly to prevent the OPF turnaround flow from impacting the mating and pad flow cycle as currently planned.

Similarly, the fourth modification also deals with the WLE panels, specifically Left Hand panels 2-4. For this modification, the lower Wing Leading Edge Carrier Panel Horse Collar Gap Filler was redesigned to an “enhanced design with additional sleeving.”

To date, this modification has already been carried out on all WLE panels except Left Hand panels 2-4. Completion of the mod would bring Left Hand WLE panels 2-4 into alignment with the remaining 41 WLE panels.

The final, baselined modification for Discovery relates to a connector saver redesign for the Left OMS Pod and Ku Band antenna.

“Connector Saver mod provides proper interfacial seal and wavy washer engagement retention force to reduce risk of inadvertent demate during use,” states the LSFR presentation.

This modification has already been carried out on other systems onboard Discovery, with only the Left Hand OMS Pod and Ku Band antenna remaining.

In addition to these baselined mods, one potential modification also exists for Discovery. This modification pertains to the Main Engine Ignition (MEI) Acoustic sensors.

“MEI Acoustic Sensor Filter Mod. Completion of MADS low pass in-line filter installation for MEI acoustic sensors (microphones) in the Left Hand OMS pod stinger,” notes the LSFR document.

This modification consists of “re-routing existing coax cable from the acoustic sensor to the new in-line filter mounted with a saddle clamp, and routing a new cable from the filter to the micro-WIS box.” The existing coax route is to the filter, not the micro-WIS.

In all, the LSFR notes that portions of this modification could be complete prior to STS-131. As such, all work regarding this modification that will be performed during the flow toward STS-133 will be documented at the Delta LSFR.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Processing Latest:

Hypergolic loading into various systems – such as the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) and Reaction Control Systems (RCS) – is a key moment in the pad flow, involving strict safety measures, due to the extremely hazardous nature of the chemicals.

Engineers at the pad don SCAPE (Self-Contained Atmospheric Protection Ensemble) suits to protect themselves from the deadly hydrazine, which when mixed with oxidizer in the RCS thrusters, causes a reaction that allows the orbiter to maneuver on orbit.

“OV-103 / ET-135 / SRB BI-142 / RSRM 110 (Pad A): Blank off plate removals were completed. GUCP (Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate) QD (Quick Disconnect) – on the External Tank leak – checks were completed,” noted the NASA Test Director (NTD) on L2-acquired processing information, which noted an issue with one of the right hand (RH) RCS QDs.

“S0024 Hypergolic Propellant Servicing is in-work. Hypergolic loading: RJD (Reaction Jet Driver) driver test is complete. SRB HPU (Hydraulic Power Unit) hydrazine loading is in work.

“RH RCS QD 322 issue: Bore Scope inspection of the QD was inconclusive. After HPU servicing, all QDs on the RH OMS Pod will be de-matted, the QD rack will be adjusted, QDs re-matted and leak checked in an attempt to resolve this issue. OMS (Orbital Maneuvering System)/RCS oxidizer servicing in work.”

STS-131 SSP FRR:

The Shuttle Program Flight Readiness Review was held on Wednesday – and as per STS-130, managers only required one day of evaluations to move the process forward. Usually, SSP FRRs take up to two days to conclude at the Johnson Space Center.

The next meeting is scheduled to be the JSC Center Director Pre-FRR, which will be on March 23rd, followed by the Agency FRR on March 26th – which will set the launch date, currently tracking April 5.

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

As expected, the observation of intertank foam liberations during a number of recent ascents provided the main talking point at the SSP FRR – although it should be stressed none of the losses have resulted in damage to the orbiter’s TPS (Thermal Protection System).

Regardless, SSP managers take all foam loss events extremely seriously, to the point predictions are made to pre-empt the threat level, should a liberation impact the orbiter.

“There was significant discussion on the intertank foam losses experienced on STS-130. It is still believed that contamination prior to TPS application is causing poor adhesion and in-flight foam losses,” noted one of the main post-FRR overview memos (L2).

“Flight rationale is based on expected conservatism in mass estimates (wind tunnel tests and imagery suggest debris will break-up upon release), stress analysis indicates losses in critical areas less likely, damage model assumes worst case orientations for debris impactors, and there have been no debris observed coincident with bond adhesion test locations.”

It is hoped that a change of cleaning procedures at the tank’s manufacturing base – the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) – may have resolved the issue of contamination remaining on the tank’s structure prior to foam application, resulting in stronger adhesive properties between the intertank stringer foam and structure.

“ET-135 (STS-131) had additional cleaning/inspections due to spray abort of initial TPS application (~lower half of intertank). Qualitatively, the likelihood of catastrophic damage is probably remote but due to uncertainties SE&I (Systems Engineering and Integration) continues to carry it as infrequent catastrophic hazard,” the memo continued.

As noted ahead of the SSP FRR, engineers have been working on Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) on the threat levels associated with intertank foam losses, although this is a routine process and mainly carried out from a documentation standpoint to ensure flight rationale remains in place by the time the Agency FRR meets.

As with all risk assessments, the numbers generated are mainly based on flight history. However, due to only a few flights suffering from the intertank liberations, not enough data is at hand to create an accurate PRA number.

This in turn led to some debate on the strength of the flight rationale – although the post-Columbia inspection techniques and Launch On Need (LON) ability automatically means the crew would not be in any danger, even in the highly unlikely scenario of serious damage to the TPS via a foam liberation from this area of the tank.

“There was a lot of discussion on whether there should be a quantitative PRA to characterize the risk. SE&I says they do not have enough confidence in the absolute number that would come out of a PRA and didn’t see it as value added to determine whether we should fly.

“The value of the PRA was to identify the highest contributors to risk and then go after those areas in terms of making changes or performing tests on the hardware. There was general agreement that with or without the PRA, the foam losses are of concern but a better understanding of the problem likely won’t be gained until we fly and collect more data.

“Some considered the flight rationale as weak without inspection and repair/LON capability but all agreed because we have those real-time mitigations in case we are wrong about the risk assessment, it is acceptable to fly.”

Four other issues – relating to IPRs (Interim Problem Reports) during Discovery’s STS-131 flow – were also discussed, such as the recent General Purpose Computer (GPC) issue.

All were cleared as no issue for gaining flight rationale, although it was noted the GPC Input/Output (I/O) issue may require the removal and replacement of a PCMMU (Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit) or an MDM (Multiplexer Demultiplexer) at the pad – pending the results of troubleshooting.

“The GPC I/O error that occurred last week was a correct response to annunciated BITE errors on PCMMU 1, MDM OF2, OF3, and OA1,” added the notes. All affected LRUs are on the OI data bus and the problem appears to be associated with data bus or a discrepant MIA.

“The plan is to install break out boxes on the OI data buses and go back to PCMMU1 to collect further data for troubleshooting.”

As seen with the intertank foam liberation discussions, IFAs (In Flight Anomalies) from previous flights make up a large part of the next mission’s FRR process. Although it wasn’t technically an IFA from STS-130, engineers discussed the protruding ceramic window insert that had been observed on orbit by the DAT (Damage Assessment Team).

Again, the level of evaluation that goes into even the smallest issue was exemplified by follow-on notes relating to Discovery’s inserts – even though Endeavour’s protrusion remained in place throughout entry and landing on STS-130.

“Due to the protruding ceramic insert on STS-130, the ceramic inserts on OV-103 (Discovery) with potential debris transport were visually inspected and replaced as required prior to OPF (Orbiter Processing Facility) rollout,” the FRR overview noted.

Thanks to the due diligence of not only evaluating potential issues relating to the insert on orbit during STS-130, but also via the inspections on the fleet, a problem was found with the inserts, which may result in a late change of plug on Discovery.

“A subsequent problem was identified during the OV-105 (Endeavour)/STS-130 post-flight inspections, which revealed an interference condition between the plug and the fastener head,” the notes continued. “The concern is that this interference could produce a load resulting in debris liberation.

“A design tolerance stack-up was performed for select locations and some were found to have negative clearance. The plan is for potential negative clearance locations, to perform direct clearance measurements and replace with a shorter plug if necessary.”

Only two other items of interest made the overview summary, one in reference to EVA support during the mission, and another noting a potential change to the mission’s landing opportunities.

“The EVA team is still working the Metox regenerator error. A combination of LiOH and available Metox will support the planned EVAs and Shuttle contingency EVAs but not a docked contingency EVA. They are looking at options such as flying additional LiOH, exercise prebreathe protocol, and R&Ring the Metox regenerator (spare onboard). Recommendation is expected in next few days,” added the summary.

“Discussion on changing to descending landing opportunities, cryo offload, and possible use or deletion of one of the +2 days (recall STS-131 is 13+2+2 to cover DDO (Dual Docked Operations) which is no longer a requirement) will be discussed (end of week).”

A second post-FRR overview memo – which will be summarized into upcoming articles, along with notes from the FRR’s 31 presentations (available on L2) – also noted that Discovery will be precluded from launching in-plane on the 9th and 11th, based on current state vector.

Between now and the Agency FRR, managers will also work on several items of open work, although none hold a threat to the launch date target at this time.

“Significant Open work: Descending landing opportunity/mission duration discussion. Metox regenerator recommendations. RSRM (Reusable Solid Rocket Motor) Random vibration exceedances. SRB RGA failure analysis. PCMMU BITE bit 10 errors. Ceramic insert inspection and corrective action for carrier panel fastener interference. STS-130 nozzle leak check.”

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Latest:

Discovery hasn’t suffered from any notable issues since arriving at Pad 39A, as she patiently awaits the loading of hypergolics during the second half of this week.

“Last week, completed the TCDT (Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test); it went well. Had the FRT (Flight Readiness Test) on Saturday. This week, will be working hyper-load preps. Will begin hyper-load Thursday and Friday,” noted Ground Operations via the Shuttle Standup/Integration report (L2).

This was expanded on via the NASA Test Director (NTD) report, which has so far only listed an extremely low count of 29 Interim Problem Reports (IPRs) for Discovery since she returned from STS-128 – the latest relating to an unexplained error on a General Purpose Computer (GPC). Otherwise, all is well with the pad flow.

“OV-103 / ET-135 / SRB BI-142 / RSRM 110 (Pad A): Helium Signature Test and Ball Seal Leak checks were successfully completed Monday. GH2/GO2 blank off plate removals are planned through to Wednesday. S0009: First motion checks and ET camera functional were completed.

“V1149 Orbiter/ET cavity purge verification and T-0 QD (Quick Disconnect) leak checks are planned, (leading into) S0024 Hypergolic servicing preps (which) continue through Wednesday. CTS (Call to Stations) for S0024 servicing is scheduled for 2200 EST Wednesday night.”

Wednesday marks another milestone for STS-131, as managers meet at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) for the SSP (Space Shuttle Program) FRR (Flight Readiness Review). The SSP FRR is usually conducted over two days.

“Have a good week of work ahead of us. The progress towards STS-131 appears good. Folks are doing a great job, and vehicle processing is going well, as well as it is for the other vehicles. We are in great shape,” noted manager LeRoy Cain – co-chair of the Mission Management Team (MMT).

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

No major items of interest have been flagged ahead of the FRR, although some data points will be deferred through to the Agency level FRR – which sets the launch date – later this month.

“Had TIM (Technical Interchange Meeting) at MAF (Michoud Assembly Facility) last Thursday on Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) for intertank foam,” noted comments on the Standup report. “Came to conclusion that could do credible PRA for RCC (Reinforced Carbon Carbon) and special tile, but did not have models to do tile shear-out or tile.

“For the FRR on Thursday, will not have any PRA numbers, but for the Agency FRR, will have RCC and special tile PRAs and will have flight rationale.”

This reference again notes the continuing evaluations into the intertank foam losses observed on recent flights. This is not likely to be a concern for managers at the FRR, as noted in the STS-130 IFA (In Flight Anomaly) review of External Tank (ET-134).

“Summary: Preliminary assessment of ET flight performance on STS-130 complete. 21 total losses observed on intertank acreage evaluated. The performance of the intertank is not meeting the design intent, but is within our expectations considering the issue we believe we have,” noted one of 15 STS-130 IFA presentations available on L2.

“To support integrated flight rationale to be provided by SE&I (Systems Engineering and Integration), additional bond adhesion tests were approved and successfully performed in debris critical locations as defined by SE&I. All other systems performed nominally.”

With only three IFAs in total for STS-130, STS-131’s FRR process will have little to discuss by way of previous flight items of interest. As such, STS-131 is continuing to track an April 5 launch date target.

“STS-131 is on track for April 5th launch. There are no anticipated range conflicts up to the beta cutout (launch beta cutout 4/15-4/29),” noted a Tuesday memo outlining the status of the near and long term manifest. “Even though SpaceX has the range on 4/12, they won’t be a conflict for subsequent launch attempts because they are using our SRB recovery ships. So if we incrementally slip through the April window, they slip.”

Manifest Evaluations:

Centered around the test problems with AMS, the final scheduled trio of shuttle flights are somewhat at the mercy of an April data point relating to STS-134, when engineers in Holland will overview what will have been the conclusion of highly complex testing.

“STS-132 mission, Atlantis: Pad turnaround from STS-131 will support 5/14 launch date with a few days of margin. There are some range conflicts to work but we expect to have the range for the 14th, 15th, and maybe the 16th. Assuming (Soyuz TMA) 21S undock on 6/2 (current plan), we have launch opportunities through 5/21 before we enter a ‘Dual Docked Ops cutout’,” added the schedule overview memo.

“If AMS slips out past 133 and we launch 131 in May, they will either use 133 ‘fly the next flight’ for LON (Launch On Need) – CSCS (Crew Shuttle Contingency Support) duration is adequate depending on the assumptions made – or fly 134 with AMS regardless of the thermal test results and round trip it if necessary. This means we no longer need to evaluate flying an empty cargo bay for the LON.”

The fine balance of finding acceptable launch slots for the shuttle missions – when playing musical chairs with other visiting vehicles, beta angle cutouts and range availability – had led to evaluations into slipping STS-132 into June or July. However, STS-132 remains on track for May, and that is likely to remain the case for the coming weeks at least.

“There has been some discussion of moving STS-132 to June or even July if AMS slips out past 133 to more evenly space out the flights and avoid a large gap between 132 and 133,” added the memo.

“There is a launch beta cutout from 6/12 to 7/1. If we launched between 6/8 and the beta cutout on 6/12, we would be in a dual docked ops scenario with 23S docking, which is still an option.

“Launching STS-132 in July is bad from ISSP’s (International Space Station Program) perspective because after (Russian Progress) 38P arrives on 6/30, all the RS (Russian Segment) ports are utilized and there would be no place to install MRM1.

“Although (ISS Manager) Mike Suffering said he could work with the Russians to support STS-132 in July, there was general agreement that we would not plan to fly STS-132 in July.”

As noted previously by NASASpaceflight.com, decisions on the final three flights will be made next month, based on the full AMS test results.

“The decision on whether to slip STS-132 from 5/14 into June will be made in mid-April after STS-131 is off the pad and after AMS has insight into the thermal test results,” the memo continued.

“The decision will be made before 4/13 since this is when Atlantis is rolled to the VAB (Vehicle Assembly Building) and SSP would prefer to stay in the OPF (Orbiter Processing Facility) if launch is going to be delayed to June. I expect that we’ll stay with the May 14th launch date assuming everything goes well with STS-131.”

Full specifics on the exact problem with AMS are yet to be noted on SSP documentation, although the scheduling memo did note a “thermal leak” is key to the concerns the mission may be delayed.

Should that become the case, STS-133 will fly before AMS, although this mission cannot be brought forward on the schedule due to the processing timeline of the Permanent Logistics Module (PLM), set to remain docked to the ISS as an additional module.

“STS-133 mission, Discovery: The station processing mission manager reported that the PLM will be at least two weeks late to the pad. They are modifying the MPLM flown on STS-131/19A (Leonardo) to become the PMM and the schedule is very tight. The two week delay does not account for an Edwards landing so it gets worse if STS-131 doesn’t land at KSC.

“However, Mr Suffredini made it clear that the PLM will be ready on time. He mentioned they are looking at using a different MPLM (Multi-Purpose Logistics Module) (probably Raffaello) but regardless they’ll be ready when SSP needs them to be ready. No further work required to evaluate accelerating STS-133.”

STS-133 is also highly likely to be reduced to a four person crew over the coming mission evaluation cycles.

Further information is expected on the status of AMS ahead of the April decision point, although the over-riding focus remains on successfully carrying out STS-131 prior to any decisions on the downstream manifest.

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AMS-02 Potential Delays:

As reported by NASASpaceflight.com, an unknown issue related to AMS’ testing is threatening a delay to STS-134’s slot in the manifest, to the point it may slip behind STS-133, or even as far as 2011 in a worst case scenario. However, memos on Monday noted that no decision will be made on the schedule until after additional testing results and the launch of STS-131 in April.

“STS-131 is on track for 4/5. Pad turn around supports 5/14 for STS-132. If AMS slips past STS-133, talked about moving STS-132 to June or July but docking ports will all be taken up for July so that would leave June,” Monday’s DA managerial notes (available on L2) confirmed.

“STS-132 rolls to VAB on 4/13, would rather keep orbiter in OPF (Orbiter Processing Facility) if going to delay,” the notes continued. “Want to get STS-131 off the Pad before discussions plus AMS testing is in April. Keep pressing with dates we have, will have decision mid-April.”

STS-134 Mission Planning Updates:

The mission, currently scheduled to be the penultimate flight of the Space Shuttle Program and the 25th and final flight of orbiter Endeavour, is already well into processing activities at the Kennedy Space Center.

Nonetheless, the brunt of processing operations are set the begin in earnest next month following the launch of the STS-131 off of MLP-3, the MLP on which the STS-134 stack will be erected.

Under the current processing schedule, MLP-3 (Mobile Launch Platform 3) will be moved into VAB High Bay 3 in early/mid April ahead of SRB stacking operations — which are currently baselined to occur in a 20+10 days contingency timeframe beginning in mid- to late-April.

Following completion of SRB stacking and closeout operations, SRB/ET mate operations would pick up on May 27 – 16-days after the Tank’s arrival at the Kennedy Space Center.

Orbiter Endeavour would then rollover from her OPF on June 17 after 108-days of OPF processing for mating with her External Tank.

Following a week of mating, integration, and vehicle checkouts, Endeavour and the STS-134 stack would then be moved to Launch Pad 39A on June 24 for 30+5 contingency days worth of pad processing for a July 29th launch.

According to the 93 page Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR) document – available for download on L2 – the current baselined (as of January 19, 2010) Ascent Performance Margin for Endeavour and STS-134 is 577lbs.

Additionally, Endeavour’s total weight (with payload and onboard propellant) meets all emergency abort and landing constraints expect for one, the Contingency Return case which would occur after the deployment of ELC-3 to the ISS but before deployment of AMS-02 and any middeck transfers.

For this case, Endeavour’s weight (with a Forward Center of Gravity case) would be 233,473lbs — 473lbs over the 233,000lbs contingency return weight limit.

The LSFR document further notes that, in the event of a RTLS (Return to Launch Site) abort, a 185-second ARCS (Aft Reaction Control System) and 25-second FRCS (Forward Reaction Control System) propellant dump would be required to meet RTLS landing CG and weight requirements.

Similarly, a 120-second ARCS and 65-second FRCS dump would be required for a TAL (Trans-oceanic Abort Landing) abort to meet landing CG and weight requirements.

In all, Endeavour will carry nine primary payloads during the 12+1+2 day mission.

These payloads include the AMS-02, the ExPRESS Logistics Carrier 3 (with numerous payloads attached), and a new MISSE (Materials on International Space Station) experiment in Endeavour’s payload bay.

Riding up on Endeavour’s middeck will be a new GLACIER (General Laboratory Active Cryogenic on ISS Experiment Refrigeration) and CGBA (Commercial General Bioprocessing Apparatus) payload.

Additionally, Endeavour will carry the now-standard MAUI (Analysis of Upper Atmosphere Injections), RAMBO-2 (RAM Burn Observations-2), SEITE (Shuttle Exhaust Ion Turbulence Experiment), and SIMPLEX (Shuttle Ionspheric Modification with Pulsed Local Exhaust) Payloads of Opportunity which, as the name suggests, will only be performed is conditions and mission timelines allow.

Furthermore, Endeavour and her six person crew will also be tasked with two Development Test Objectives — or DTOs.

These include DTO 805, Crosswind Landing Performance, and DTO 703, Sensor Test for Orion Relative-Navigation Risk Mitigation (STORRM).

For Endeavour’s 25th and final scheduled flight, the orbiter will utilize LP03 (Left Pod 03) and RP04 (Right Pod 04) for her two Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pods, External Tank 137 (which is currently expected to arrive at the Kennedy Space Center on May 11), SRB BI set 144 and RSRM-112 (Reusable Solid Rocket Motor stack 112), and Operational Increment software OI-34.

LSFR Baseline Modification for Endeavour:

As with all Space Shuttle missions, Endeavour will undergo a series of evaluations and modifications before her STS-134 mission.

For this flight, technicians in OPF-2 (Orbiter Processing Facility bay 2) will undertake one final modification to NASA’s youngest orbiter, as well as three (possibly four) Mission Kit modifications.

For the only Orbiter modification, a “dedicated power feed to the Fuel Cell H2 (hydrogen) flowmeter [that is] separate from the Cell Performance Monitor (CPM)” will be installed to ensure the protection of power to the CPM during flight.

This modification adjusts MPCAs 1 and 3 (Mid Power Cell Assemblies 1 and 3) to “utilize spare MPCA pin locations and 1-amp fuses to provide a dedicated power feed to the Fuel Cell H2 flowmeter separate from the CPM to protect against power loss of the CPM,” notes the STS-134 LSFR presentation.

The existing design feeds power to the Fuel Cell H2 flowmeter and CPM from the same 1-amp fused circuit.

“Separation of H2 flowmeter and CPM power feed would eliminate impact to CPM.”

A loss of power to a CPM during a countdown would result in an automatic launch scrub; likewise, a loss of power to a CPM during flight would “[result] in crew impact for alternate data collection to verify Fuel Cell health.”

Technicians have been tracking this problem through all three orbiters via inconsistent flowmeter behavior.

The worst of these behaviors came during the STS-124 flight of orbiter Discovery when a blown out fuse caused a loss of power to a CPM.

A temporary fix was devised in the form of flying the #1 and #3 H2 flowmeters in a powered down pattern after de-pinning them — a modification that was flown twice, once each of Discovery (STS-128) and Endeavour (STS-127).

LSFR STS-134 Mission Kits Modification Baseline Overview:

In all, three Mission Kit modifications are planned, with the possibility of one additional mission kit modification pending.

The first modification relates to a change in the IBA boom configuration.

For STS-134, the IBA (Inspection Boom Assembly) would be modified to “reflect new boom and sensor pack 1 installation changes as well as Orbiter return without Boom,” notes the LSFR presentation.

Since the OBSS (Orbiter Boom Sensor System) will be transferred to the ISS at the end for Endeavour’s docked mission, the IBA will be modified during this flight to an EIBA (Enhanced Inspection Boom Assembly) that is “more compatible” with the SSRMS (Space Station Remote Manipulator System).

The EIBA will have a modified grapple fixture interface and numerous, minor hardware modifications to better support long-term on-orbit stay.

For part of this modification, two crewmembers during one of the three STS-134 EVAs (spacewalks) will replace the standard Shuttle EFGF (Electrical Flight Grapple Fixture) from the grapple end of the OBSS with a standard ISS PDGF (Power Data Grapple Fixture).

The second baselined Mission Kit mod is for the STORRM (Sensor Test for the Orion RelNav Risk Mitigation).

This DTO is designed to “test the Vision Navigation Sensor (VNS) and Docking Camera planned for Orion” and will be tested during Endeavour’s docking and undocking to/from the ISS.

The modification here provides for a revision to the “order blanket installation and MECSLSI (Mission Equipment Cargo Support Launch Site Installation) plan.”

Finally, the last baselined Mission Kit modification relates to the Payload Cable Harness.

“Payload Cable Harness modification for ROEU (Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical) and AMS-02 updates MECSLSI to include two longer ELC-3 ROEU Power/Control cables to allow the ELC Sill Latch cables to be mated further forward on the starboard sill,” notes the LSFR presentation.

In this manner, STS-134 is a unique flight in that all 12 Payload Retention starboard sill location connections are required for the mission. Also, this is the first flight in which 2 ROEUs are required on the same side of the payload bay since both ELC-3 and AMS-02 require 2 starboard latch connection locations.

Each ROEU power/control requires “6 cables for 3 Sill connector locations and ELC3 ROEU power/control cable lengths are short for 2 available starboard sill connector locations.”

In short, this modification will lengthen the ELC-3 ROEU power/control cables and will “mate the ELC-3 Sill Latch cables further fwd to allow for the ELC ROEU Pwr/Control cable connections on the starboard sill.”

Finally, the yet-to-be-baselined modification pertains to the IBA.

“Port LWTSA (Light Weight Tool Stowage Assembly) Cushion modification” will modify the port LWTSA to accommodated the return of the OBSS’s EFGF — which will be removed as part of the EIBA (Enhanced Inspection Boom Assembly) modification.

Fit checks were planned for January 2010.

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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STS-131 Pad Flow Latest:

With the Terminal Countdown Demonstration Test (TCDT) – a two day dress rehearsal that mimics the final stages of the countdown, along with crew safety procedures – completed on Friday, work over the weekend will focus on Discovery’s Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and preparations for hypergolic loading.

“In work with Pad validation activities, those are proceeding well. IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) calibration completed second shift on Friday,” noted NASA Test Director (NTD) processing information on L2.

“HPU (Hydraulic Power Unit) carts were transferred from the Hyper Fuel Farm and lifted to the zero-level of the MLP (Mobile Launch Platform) on 3rd shift Friday morning. Due to conflicting resources, the Pad-A GH2 recharge is now rescheduled for next Wednesday, March 10th.

“Weekend Work: SSME Frequency Response Test and Helium Signature Test. S0024 Hypergolic servicing preps.”

With departmental FRRs already concluding, the results will make up what is usually a two day SSP FRR at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston – although STS-130’s SSP FRR only took up a day, thanks to a lack of issues from the previous flight, STS-129.

A similar situation for STS-131’s SSP FRR appears likely, with STS-130’s IFA (In Flight Anomaly) review at the PRCB (Program Requirements Control Board) on Thursday showing only three IFAs for the entire mission – with no issues of note for Endeavour herself.

STS-131 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-131/

“The STS-131 SSP FRR is March 10 and 11. Charts are due Monday. Special topics are due by (Friday). The STS-130 MMT (Mission Management Team) Debrief will be scheduled toward the end of the month,” noted the latest Shuttle Standup/Integration report on L2.

“Inputs for the debrief are due by Friday to see if a stand alone debrief is needed; otherwise it will be combined with a pre-brief for STS-131. Had a successful pre-FRR. Had three integrated IFAs that will be bringing forward to be dispositioned.”

The large Orbiter Project Office (OPO) only found one item of interest during their departmental FRR for STS-131, relating to inspections that are to be carried out on Discovery at the pad – following the STS-130 observation of Endeavour’s left hand outboard elevon flipper door sliding seal protrusion, and the protruding window insert.

“Had FRR with OPO. Have a little bit of open work left on OV-103 (Discovery) out at the Pad,” added OPO via the Standup report. “Still a little more to do with flipper door inspection with regards to the seal that came up during the last flight, and also a little more ceramic insert inspection to be done. Will have Chits in the system to do both of these.”

Other items that will highlight the FRR will be the External Tank, specific to the foam liberations from the intertank region.

STS-132 Processing Latest:

Atlantis’ final “scheduled’ mission – STS-132 – continues to work towards a May 14 launch date, with evaluations on ET-136’s intertank foam also set to take place shortly in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) High Bay 2 (HB-2) via plug/pull tests.

“In the VAB, got ET-136 offloaded and put into the HB-2 checkout cell. Will pick up with test and checkout activities,” noted processing information. “ET-136 (VAB HB-2 East) Shakedown/Receiving inspections continue. GUCP (Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate) and LO2/LH2 checkout preps continue.

“Will talk the ET-136 intertank foam bond adhesion testing (plug/pull tests) that needs to be done. Will discuss options. SSP (Space Shuttle Program Manager) Mr. (John) Shannon added that since going away from platforms to a cherry picker cleaning, it must be decided whether the same plug pattern is appropriate.”

The change from platforms to mechanical lifters relates to the process of cleaning the intertank structure during processing towards foam application at the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF). It is believed that the root cause for the liberations during ascent is caused by dust contamination, with the old platforms obstructing the proper removal of the offending dust.

A lack of intertank foam loss during ET-136’s ascent will confirm the root cause and the aforementioned solution.

The primary payload for STS-132 is the Russian Mini-Research Module 1 (MRM-1) and Integrated Cargo Carrier – Vertical Lightweight Deployable (ICC-VLD) pallet, with baseline evaluations continuing as per normal. Already noted is a Change Request (CR) relating to the mission duration.

“Processed the STS-132 CR for mission duration to 12+0 (days); went outside the board,” noted Flight Operations and Integration on the Standup report.

Processing of Atlantis continues to go well, following the installation of her three SSMEs and the start of booster stacking operations inside the VAB.

“OV-104 (STS-132) Got the clearance to start engine leak checks. Working base heat shield installation. Continuing installation of lower LESS carrier panels above the right and left wings,” noted Ground Operations. “In HB-1, will be picking up with SRB stacking, with the left aft booster going up.

“Orbiter: OV-104 (OPF Bay 1): Orbiter closeouts for rollout to VAB will be started Friday. Weekend Work: ECLSS (Environmental Control and Life Support System) GN2 servicing, SSME and TPS (Thermal Protection System) work.

“BI-143 / RSRM 111 (VAB HB-1): Left Aft Booster stacking is complete. Right Aft Booster stacking is scheduled for Friday.”

STS-134 Processing Latest:

From a processing standpoint, all is proceeding to plan with Endeavour, following her return from STS-130. Preparations for STS-134 are taking place, as engineers work towards the removal of her three SSMEs – which will begin on Monday.

“Thermography on the WLE (Wing Leading Edge) has been completed, and is in data review. Working engine removal preps. Picked up with checkout of the FRCS (Forward Reaction Control System). Continuing with post-flight window inspections,” outlined an overview from Ground Operations.

“Working on OV-105 (Endeavour) post-flight STS-130,” added SSME contractor Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, via the Standup report. “Will be working Saturday on engine removal preps, so that engine removal can start first thing Monday morning.

“It takes around three shifts to get those engines back in the Engine Shop. The first activity in the Engine Shop will be running the normal nozzle tube leak checks.”

One issue – or Interim Problem Report (IPR) – is continuing to be worked during nominal flow operations, relating to a payload bay door centerline latch limit switch noted as off when should be on.

“IPR-03 troubleshooting continues; the team performed bore scope inspection on the LH and RH (Left and Right Hand) PLBD (Payload Bay Door) shear pins,” the NTD reported. “Troubleshooting results are under engineering evaluation.

“RCC (Reinforced Carbon Carbon) Thermography completed Friday. FRCS functional checkout is complete. OBSS (Orbiter Boom Sensor System) removal Friday. Weekend Work: SSME removal preps. Fuel cells 1, 2 & 3 work.”

Potentially Large STS-134 Delay:

STS-134 currently has a launch date of July 29. However, memos started to circulate earlier this week requesting inputs from team leaders on the potential impacts of swapping the mission order, by allowing STS-133 to launch ahead of Endeavour’s mission.

Further memos on Friday informed managers to attend a program level meeting next Monday, due to the potential of a “significant” delay to STS-134, relating to problems during the testing of Endeavour’s payload – the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS).

“Conducting a quick look assessment of the impacts of flying STS-133/ULF5 prior to 134/ULF6. This option is being looked at due to problems that have been encountered with the AMS payload during testing (planned to fly on ULF6),” noted one of several memos that are being collated in L2 ahead of Monday’s meeting.

“It is not clear at this point how significant a delay will result from these AMS problems, but the Program wants to look at our options before too much time passes and it becomes too late to consider a swap.”

A full review of the situation will be published after Monday’s meeting in order to gain full details of the problem, and the potential length of the delay – although one memo intimated a slip of several months, while some sources claim it could be as serious as slipping well into 2011. NASA managers do hold flexibility in the schedule to move a flight into the first quarter of 2011 – if required.

Ironically, the potential slip to STS-134 comes at a time when lawmakers are pushing for a large extension to the shuttle’s operational lifetime, a drive which was acknowledged – at least by way of asking his teams to remained focus on the job in hand – by Mr Shannon.

“There are many stories in the news, as there always are. This time it seems they are more focused on our team (SSP). The best thing we can do is to continue to operate excellently as we have been, keep putting together outstanding vehicles with no problems in flight, and keep hitting our launch windows,” Mr Shannon added to the Standup report.

“The team has been doing a wonderful job of that. We just need to keep it up, and keep our heads down, and we will see where the country wants this team to go.”

L2 members : Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4500 gbs in size

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Shuttle Extension:

Efforts to reverse the 2010 retirement date of the shuttle fleet have been ongoing for a few years, without being realized – partly due to a lack of support from successive NASA administrators.

Former NASA boss Mike Griffin even worked directly against extension – mainly via protection of the Ares I launch vehicle’s budget – often citing safety concerns which had no basis in post Return To Flight reality.

With a level of support for an extension of the shuttle manifest – in tandem with the development of a Shuttle Derived HLV – gained at the Augustine Committee review into NASA’s Human Space Flight program, the door was opened for building on a 2008 Senate Bill that had already actioned pre-emptive measures to protect shuttle-related assets from decommissioning.

Central to the new Bill – also known as the “Human Space Flight Capability Assurance and Enhancement Act of 2010″ – is a solution to the short and mid term issue of “the gap” for US manned space flight capability, by extending the operational lifetime of the shuttle - as outlined in a series of instructions to current NASA administrator Charlie Bolden, pending the approval of the Bill.

“The Administrator shall take all necessary steps to ensure that all Space Shuttle Program (SSP) activities and operations are able to continue, or to be resumed, including flight operations and support, pending the completion of the reviews, requirements, and reports of this section,” noted the Bill.

“The Administrator shall take all steps necessary to ensure shuttle launch capability through fiscal year 2011 to enable launch, at a minimum, of all payloads manifested as of February 28, 2010.

“In fulfillment of this requirement, the Administrator is prohibited from terminating any contractor support which will endanger or inhibit the launching of shuttle payloads manifested as of February 28, 2010, should launches be required after the first quarter of fiscal year 2011.”

Such instructions hold their own difficulties, with numerous shuttle contractors already shut down via the current budget plan. However, it goes some way to protect the shuttle manifest from hitting a gap of its own, as SSP would enable the construction of the three spare tanks currently located at the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF), for example.

Recertification of the orbiters is not deemed to be a problematic issue, as previously confirmed by SSP management, and recently repeated by Mission Management Team (MMT) chair Mike Moses – who noted the fleet could ‘technically’ keep flying to 2020. A large level of recertification was already carried out on the fleet during the Return To Flight period.

However, in order to satisfy the likes of the ASAP (Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel) – who testified last year that it was their opinion an extension would require a recertification effort, the Bill calls for a short consultation period, in which a certification review would be carried out on the ability for the shuttle operations to continue for an additional five years.

“No later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act the Administrator shall ask the National Academies of Science to appoint a Flight Certification Review Committee, consisting of individuals with appropriate engineering expertise and experience in certification of space flight vehicle hardware, systems, and equipment testing and validation procedures, to review space shuttle certification activities undertaken or initiated after February, 2003.

“The Committee shall provide an assessment regarding the adequacy of those validation procedures in assuring vehicle durability, flight-worthiness, and sustainability for continued operations through a period of up to 5 years beyond the space shuttle flight manifest planned as of February, 2010 (see left for STS manifest as of March 2, via L2).

” The Committee shall take into account current and historical trends in anomaly detection and resolution within major components of the space shuttle systems.

“The Committee appointed under subsection (b) shall complete its task within 90 days of its appointment and shall provide its findings and determinations concurrently to the Administrator and to the committees of jurisdiction no later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act.”

The extension scenario – as outlined in the Bill – calls for two flights per year, which would allow NASA to retire at least one orbiter, likely to remain at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) as a parts donor for her sisters. Two flights per year would also help remove the threat of a gap during the extended manifest, as contractors “catch up” with providing for the additional flights.

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent practicable NASA shall operate the Space Shuttle program at a flight rate of no more than 2 missions in any consecutive 12-month period beginning during the fiscal years for which appropriations are authorized under section of this Act.

“The Administrator shall ensure that hardware components in existence as of March, 2010, remain available for use in connection with any additional flights required beyond those on the current flight manifest schedule.”

The Bill also outlines instructions and rules for the eventual termination of shuttle operations, closely associating the needs of the ISS – now extended to 2020 – with the priority of the shuttle’s unique payload capability. Dependant on the translation of the Bill’s language, it also appears to hint towards additional payloads – other than just resupply logistics – could return to the shuttle manifest.

“The Administrator shall immediately upon enactment of this Act, conduct an in-depth assessment of all essential modules, operational systems and components, structural elements, and permanent scientific equipment on board or planned for delivery and installation aboard the International Space Station, including both United States and international partner elements, to determine anticipated spare or replacement requirements to ensure complete, effective, and safe function and full scientific utilization of the ISS.

“The identification of spare or replacement elements and parts currently produced, in inventory, or on order, and the state of readiness and schedule for delivery to the ISS, including the planned transportation means for such delivery. Each element identified shall include a description of its location, function, criticality for system integrity, and specifications regarding size, weight, and necessary con1figuration for launch and delivery.

“The identification of anticipated requirements for spare or replacement elements not currently in inventory or on order, a description of their location, function, criticality for system integrity, the anticipated cost and schedule for design, procurement, manufacture and delivery, and specifications regarding size, weight, and necessary configuration for launch and delivery, including available launch vehicles capable of transportation of such items to the International Space Station.”

Full utilization of the ISS, and support of the outpost through to 2020, is the key for the extension of the shuttle’s upmass – and downmass – capability, with several pages outlining the importance of the “National Laboratory”. However, such a supporting extension of the shuttle will remain a moot point unless additional funding is found – or cuts are made from other programs.

On the topic of costs, the funding for an extension, the first two years are costed at an extra $1.2B in 2011, followed by an extra $2B in 2012. These figures are much less than previously touted, and may have a good selling point for the huge jobs – and more so skill set – savings a shuttle extension would provide.

Commercial Systems:

This latest Bill has been worked on since last year, with consultations and inputs from throughout the industry, including the United Space Alliance, NASA and even SpaceX and Lockheed Martin, with the latter heavily involved.

While the current plan aims to all-but hand over the role of US space flight to the Commercial sector, the new Bill dilutes the role – without U-turning on the FY2011 proposal.

The Bill aims at answering the critics who claim the commercial sector are unproven when it comes to human space flight, with the language aiming to steer commercial companies into successfully demonstrating their ability of providing logistical support to the ISS, prior to being handed over the keys to launching humans.

“The Administrator shall take steps to ensure that the development of space transportation vehicles, systems, and infrastructure shall occur in such a way as to ensure the availability of complementary and, where necessary, redundant transportation systems capable of delivering crew and cargo to low-Earth orbit, in particular to the International Space Station, and to destinations beyond low-Earth orbit.

“Systems developed and operated by the United States Government shall be the primary means for delivering crew and cargo to destinations in low-Earth orbit until such time as commercial entities demonstrate, through a successful flight regime, as determined by established milestones within current Space Act Agreements, that they have the capability to deliver cargo to destinations in low-Earth orbit, including the International Space Station.

“Systems developed and operated by the United States government shall be the primary means for delivering crew and cargo to destinations beyond low earth orbit. Commercially developed launch systems, such as those being developed under NASA’s Commercial Orbital Transportation System, for which the United States government will serve primarily as a customer, shall be the primary means for delivering cargo to the International Space Stations once they have successfully demonstrated that capability.”

Referenced as a “National Space Transportation System”, the Bill also addresses the question of the need for launch vehicle redundancy. This is where the Bill tips its hat to a potential use of the Orion and Ares I launch vehicle – from at least a technology standpoint.

“The Administrator is directed to develop a plan, no later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, for the establishment of a National Space Transportation System.

“The National Space Transportation System shall include (1) an architecture of government developed and operated space transportation systems, including one or more launch vehicles and associated crew and cargo carriers.

“(2) a streamlined approach to development and acquisition of such systems funded and overseen by the United States Government, including possible adoption or modification of effective acquisition practices utilized by the Department of Defense, where appropriate, to more effectively meet civil space transportation requirements; (3) an operational concept that utilizes existing government and industry personnel and infrastructure in an efficient and cost effective manner;

“(4) continuation or modification of ongoing programs, associated contracts, and testing and evaluation plans initiated under the Constellation Program, including the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares-1 Crew Launch Vehicle, to the extent that such elements are determined to be cost effective and operationally effective.

“(5) a plan for incrementally upgrading initially developed and deployed systems so that such systems can be made operational with existing technology at the earliest possible opportunity and then upgraded over time to fulfill more demanding missions and incorporate new technology as it becomes available; and (6) a United States Government managed approach for overseeing and ensuring crew safety, including oversight of human ratings requirements.”

A large section of the Bill is dedicated to the approach required by the commercial companies, including Human Rating, and makes an additional reference towards the ultimate NASA goal of concentrating on beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO).

“It is the sense of the Congress that the development of commercial capabilities for the use of space may be of value in maximizing the utility and productivity of the International Space Station by providing a commercial means of enabling crew transfer and crew rescue services for the International Space Station.

“The Congress further believes that once such commercial services have demonstrated the capability to meet established ascent, entry, and International Space Station proximity operations safety requirements the United States should make use of domestic commercially-provided crew transfer and crew rescue services to the maximum extent practicable.

“The Congress further believes that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should expedite, where possible, the use of domestic commercially provided International Space Station cargo missions, and that upon the certification by appropriate Federal agencies of operational flight readiness for the provision of commercial crew transportation capabilities, the Administrator should limit, to the maximum extent practicable, the use of a United States government crew transportation vehicle to missions carrying crew beyond low Earth orbit.”

References are also made for a commercial effort to provide cargo return capability – which will be all-but lost when the shuttle’s downmass capability ends with the orbiter’s retirement.

HLV – and return of the SD HLV option:

NASA’s long term focus has always related to exploration, with the central requirement of a large heavy-lifter underpinning the ambitions of a return to the moon and on to destinations such as Mars and its moon Phobos.

A HLV remains in NASA’s plans via the FY2011 proposal, though it relegates its development to one of spending years researching “game changing” propulsion, as opposed to the previously preferred – at the study level at least – transition for shuttle hardware into an Ares V type launch vehicle.

New technologies do receive a passing mention in the Bill, aimed to satisfy those that wish for launch vehicle propulsion to move away from the shackles of the traditional LOX/LH2-powered vehicles.

“The Administrator shall develop and keep up to date a technology development plan to support the evolving requirements of the National Space Transportation System, both for low-Earth orbit requirements and for missions beyond low-Earth orbit.

“Technology funding provided pursuant to this subsection shall be determined based on the specific mission benefits and the performance requirements needed to achieve clearly identified mission objectives, such as planning to reach destinations beyond low-Earth orbit.

“There are authorized to be appropriated to the Administrator such amounts for technology funding for propulsion elements as may be necessary to advance the state of the art in propulsion elements as a priority over developments of current state of the art in propulsion systems.”

However, the door is reopened by the Bill on the “safer, simpler, sooner” approach of building a HLV from shuttle legacy hardware – such as the External Tank (ET), Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) and other areas of commonality.

Such an effort would still require a trade study, the Bill notes, which had already been conducted at the request of General Bolden himself - which found in favor of an inline SD HLV over a sidemount SD HLV, and the RP-1 booster.

However, that study would be conducted again – likely taking in a range of HLV options, including Ares-legacy versions – and based on ambitious schedules listed in the Bill.

“As part of the National Space Transportation system, the Administrator is directed to conduct a review of alternative heavy lift launch vehicle configurations that may be developed by the United States government to transport crew and cargo to low-Earth orbit and beyond.

“The review shall: (A) include shuttle-derived vehicles which use existing United States propulsion systems, including liquid fuel engines, external tank, and solid rocket motor technology and related ground-based manufacturing capability, launch and operations infrastructure, and workforce expertise; (B) take into consideration technologies developed under the Constellation Program, including those developed for the Ares I system,

“Include consideration of the degree to which alternative vehicles may be developed in an evolutionary fashion with the objective of supporting initial crew and cargo transportation to the International Space Station by the end of 2013 and missions beyond low-Earth orbit by the end of 2018; and (D) include comparative development and projected operational costs.”

General Bolden would also be tasked with selecting one of the HLV options within six months.

“The Administrator is directed to select a heavy lift launch vehicle and accompanying crew vehicle design concept and to initiate detailed design activities no later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act. If ongoing program development elements and activities from the Constellation Program are to be included in such a National Space Transportation System, the Administrator shall take appropriate steps to extend or modify existing contracts to facilitate this objective.”

The 37 page document is deemed a working draft – though it is the final version (version 15) of the Bill’s development, which is been classed as “sponsored” by Senator Hutchison, with a companion (identical) bill to be introduced in the House by Reps. Kosmas and Posey, and possibly others. The above covers certain – but not all – elements of the Bill.

*To view the entire Bill, click here* – further articles will follow, based on NASA reaction.

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