SD HLLV (HLV) Latest:

The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) is coming to the end of an evaluation phase on the “currently favored” Heavy Lift Vehicle (HLV) – otherwise known as the Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (SD HLLV), as they move into a consultation period with the Constellation Program (CxP).

The vehicle, side mounted to the current design of the External Tank, is a true Shuttle Derived concept, with heritage from a previous concept known as Shuttle-C. The concept is capable of launching 80mt (metric tons) into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and around 54mt to the moon.

Over the past couple of months, numerous status reports have been posted on the Shuttle Standup/Integration reports – which SSP use to bring the teams up to date on vehicle and program status. The vast majority of updates have been positive, as the well-oiled Shuttle teams took a deeper look into the concept at the request of the Augustine Commission.

The concept appeared to suffer from only one drawback – via the large mass its payload carrier – before that was cleared as part of the “no showstoppers” conclusion last month.

Following a presentation of their findings to Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator of the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), the HLV concept has since been presented to the directors of both the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and MSFC (this week).

The latest update also noted that the concept is now in a dialog stage with the Constellation Program, with the aim of receiving feedback.

“Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLV) (NASA/JSC): HLV presented to the Center Director and had a good discussion. Got a bunch of questions and some actions,” noted this week’s opening Shuttle Standup/Integration report (L2).

“One action was to brief the Cx Program and other Centers about what they are doing. So, on Friday they presented to the Cx Program and had many questions from them. Starting to have a dialog.

“This week, HLV will go to MSFC to brief the Center Director. Have put out a preliminary draft of a HLV FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) document. Looking for feedback.”

HLV Special Team/Jupiter:

It was via an update on last week’s Standup report that the first mention was made relating to a “Special Team” that has been ordered to evaluate the other HLV alternative vehicles. With the SSP HLV team asked to support this MSFC-based effort, the standup noted this had become the top priority.

“HLV has been asked to support a special team looking at evaluating HLV alternatives,” noted the report. “The HLV Team is now treating this as a top priority. A report will be ready by Thanksgiving.”

Further inquires into the specific evaluations being carried out by the Special Team revealed that all viable – per the Augustine Commission’s initial options – HLV alternatives are being looked at “fairly”, with General Bolden himself responsible for ordering the report.

Sources note that the DIRECT team’s Jupiter launch system – an updated version of MSFC’s very own NLS (National Launch System) concept from the 1990s – has dominated early discussions at the Special Team meetings.

This runs parallels with the Augustine Commission, which presented the SD HLLV and Jupiter launch vehicle as the top two “Shuttle Derived” options during presentations over the last couple of months. Both of the SD options are also deemed as the best route to cater for the extension of the Shuttle Program.

Ironically, it was an earlier MSFC study which found “serious issues” with Jupiter’s performance and capabilities, whilst claiming the vehicles lacked the “operational safety and simplicity” of Ares. Those findings led to a 100 page rebuttal document being published by the DIRECT team.

The Special Team have also been asked to look into the CONOPs (Concept of Operations) for the HLV alternatives, although such an effort will be somewhat open-ended, as a final forward path for NASA’s exploration strategy is yet to be confirmed.

Waiting for the forward path:

With job losses already being suffered by the shuttle workforce, managers continue to send out updates to their employees on when NASA can expect to have a clear forward path, which – according to SSP manager John Shannon – is not expected until December at the earliest.

“The entire conversation – at the JSC Senior Staff Retreat – revolved around workforce requirements over the next few years. There are a great deal of rumors floating around, but little hard information,” noted Mr Shannon via the Standup report. “The week after Thanksgiving, the November Passback will be put out and this should clarify the near-term NASA budget.

“The Agency has demonstrated a strong commitment to exploration. SSP expertise will be tapped to support this goal. No decisions are being made at this time, as we await the budget information. Beginning in December and through the early part of next year, all of the stakeholders will convene to lay out the way forward.”

While Shuttle Extension remains on the cards – at least until the end of this year – as one of the options available to President Obama via the Augustine Commission’s findings, Mr Shannon has been consistent in not intimating the likelihood of any addition to the six remaining flights on the manifest.

“Everyone must remain calm and focused on the task at hand. We have six flights ahead of us, with this coming year likely to be very challenging and filled with complicated missions,” Mr Shannon added. “We must make sure that we continue to do everything to the best of our ability.

“After this is accomplished, we can turn our eyes back towards exploration. All future plans are keyed on operating the SSP correctly and safely performing its tasks over the coming year. (I have) absolute confidence in the Team being able to accomplish this work.”

Altair Defunded:

On the subject of exploration, the state of NASA’s plans continue to deteriorate, with sources noting they were informed on Monday that the Altair Lunar Lander project has been defunded. No official statement has been made at this time.

Very little has been heard from the Altair Program since heading into the opening development cycles (DACs) last year, which had been building from the Minimum Functionality Approach – as the relatively small team went about defining the lander concept.

The last cycle of the lander baseline, which was known simply as the ‘p711-b Lunar Lander’, had visible heritage in the ESAS (Exploration Systems Architecture Study) ’spider lander’. This concept was expected to change during downstream DACs – related to numerous elements, including the capabilities of the Ares V that was tasked to lift it into space.

With large scale funding shortages across the Constellation Program, and no realistic – from a monetary and schedule standpoint – lunar plans being built, the decision to end or mothball the Altair Program may be strategic, although it is likely they simply ran out of money.

With all of Constellation’s efforts being focused on the Ares I program – a vehicle that won’t be ready in time to launch to the ISS before it is currently scheduled to be deorbited and many years from playing a role in a Lunar mission – the need for increased funding is being made ever more apparent by decision makers at NASA, as the Agency continues to move towards a gap of up to seven years in human space flight capability.

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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History of DIRECT:

DIRECT is an alternative architecture, proposed to replace Ares I and Ares V with a single “Jupiter” vehicle, capable of performing both roles.

The DIRECT approach claims to offer significant improvements in performance, schedule, and budget expenditure – when compared to Ares – by relying more on the existing technology and components of the space shuttle and EELV programs.

The DIRECT proposal has its roots in the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) studies (1990s) to design a shuttle-based heavy lift cargo vehicle to compliment the space shuttle. Known as the National Launch System (NLS), the concept was deemed to have significant merit – before being deleted due to budgetary concerns.

In 2006, a group of engineers and members of the space community revived and modernized the concept, calling it DIRECT.

The proposal was first presented in October 2006, followed by a major revision in September 2007, known as DIRECT 2.0. The team claims to be comprised of eight public representatives and 62 NASA and contractor engineers – who work on the project on their own time.

NASA Analysis Background:

As DIRECT gained attention via two AIAA papers, and presentations at the ISDC, before MSFC performed two reviews of the DIRECT 2.0 architecture in May and October of 2007 – which found serious issues with DIRECT’s performance and capabilities.

“Analysis of the DIRECT architecture shows significant performance shortfall in assessed capability,” noted the October, 07 analysis.

“The DIRECT architecture aggressively estimates its stage dry mass predictions, which results in optimistic in-space performance. Consequently, the Direct 2.0 would likely be a Three Vehicle Launch Solution Mission to accomplish the Project Constellation Payload Requirements with NASA design margins, ground rules and assumptions.

“Assessed performance has improved from May 2007 EOR-LOR, but still fails to meet minimum requirements by at least 50 percent of needed Lander Payload.”

In order to back up these claims, NASA commissioned a ‘Team B’ review to attempt to design and fly a DIRECT lunar mission using NASA tools and specifications. Their results showed significantly larger masses and lower performance predictions, than those claimed by DIRECT.

“DIRECT currently unsuitable for its proposed goal of replacing the Ares I/V architecture to carry out the earth-to-TLI transportation functions for the Constellation Programs,” noted the review.

The analysis also attacks the infrastructure and development of the DIRECT vehicles, specifically DIRECT’s claimed redesign of the External Tank vs. Ares I’s clean sheet upper stage.

“Assessment of design would lead to major redesign, development and qualification of Mod ET Core for Jupiter 232 missions. Predicted touch labor of Ares 1 Upper Stage estimated to be significantly less than current ET touch labor.

“Examined approaches like this in the past 20 years: Concluded that this effort incurs significant expense and development with marginally applicable STS ET heritage.

“The Jupiter common core requires a new: Main Propulsion System, thrust structure, avionics, forward LOX tank structure and a payload shroud, substantial intertank/LH2 modifications, and a stack integration effort.

The October 07 analysis’ final major criticism of DIRECT referenced Ares’ operational safety and simplicity.

“DIRECT launch architecture requires increased number of spacecraft separations and dockings for all phases, increasing risk Separation, flip around and docking of Orion to Altair Rendezvous and docking of Orion-Altair stack to first EDS pre-TLI burn. DIRECT shows a 1/1400 PLOC for Jupiter 232 Lunar/Mission.

DIRECT’s Rebuttal:

DIRECT’s response to NASA’s analysis is forthcoming via a 100+ page rebuttal document that deals with the claims and explains why the criticisms are flawed – according to DIRECT. *CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE PRESENTATION*

The document centers around the allegation that DIRECT was significantly misinterpreted by NASA’s analysis teams in an attempt to discredit the proposal.

“NASA’s October 2007 analysis of DIRECT, on the surface, appears to be a carefully executed analysis of the DIRECT architecture and its central launch vehicle, Jupiter,” notes the rebuttal document.

“However, a closer examination of the document reveals significant flaws in the evaluation of DIRECT that sets up a scenario where DIRECT would inevitably look inferior when compared to Ares.

“The errors are so numerous that the only conclusion possible is that this document was not a true analysis, but rather an attempt to discredit the DIRECT architecture.”

DIRECT claims that NASA’s inability to match the DIRECT team’s claimed performance hinges on the arbitrary mass increase of the EDS (Earth Departure Stage) by ‘Team B’.

“For Every 1 kg Upper Stage Growth, 3 kg Less Payload Delivered through TLI. Arbitrarily increasing the mass of the Upper Stage penalizes the performance of the entire system 3-fold.

“On pages 55 & 56 of NASA’s Analysis, a breakdown of the mass of the Upper Stage shows NASA’s ‘Case #2 – Team B’ design methodology using INTROS, results in a 17,797kg difference in burnout mass for the Upper Stage; 23,062 kg vs. 40,859 kg – a 77 percent performance penalty.

“A penalty applied to the Upper Stage mass of nearly 18mT results in a net reduction of EDS lunar performance by nearly 36mT.”

DIRECT contends that this mass increase is due to the use of a NASA design tool that does not assume the Centaur-based components of DIRECT’s upper stage.

“NASA’s Upper Stage was designed using the NASA-developed “INTROS” tool,” claims the rebuttal. “While this is based on heritage data, this tool has never been utilized in the production of any flying vehicle to date. Boeing did not utilize the tool for its Delta-IV and Lockheed Martin did not utilize the tool for the Atlas V – the two most modern US launchers.

“NASA’s analysis (also) ignores DIRECT’s plan to use a Common Bulkhead design for the Jupiter Upper Stage.”

The DIRECT team also attempt to back up their claims that the External Tank (ET) would only have to undergo minor redesign – which is an area of contention due to claims DIRECT ignore the testing requirements any changes to the ETs require – by noting the “minor” claim is comparative to the “major” changes required by Ares I and Ares V.

“It is worth noting that the requirement to build two new SRB designs, a vast new 10m Core Stage, two new Upper Stages and two completely separate production and launch processing infrastructures to support both Ares I – and then Ares V – would certainly qualify as a “major” undertaking,” DIRECT claim – adding they would also save billions in development costs.

“In that single context, it might be accurate to describe DIRECT’s plans as comparatively ‘minor’.

“Development costs for Jupiter-120 are approximately $5,000m lower than Ares I. Development costs for Jupiter-232 are a further $9,000m lower than Ares V. Operations costs for two very different Ares vehicles are approx. $3,100m higher per year than for the common-core Jupiter’s. Total DIRECT lifecycle savings thru 2020 are greater than $19,000m.”

To address NASA’s last major criticism concerning safety and operations, DIRECT points out that the risk calculations have been easily skewed, and are essentially subjective.

“There is a ‘time factor’ at work also which severely skews NASA’s conjecture. The Jupiter’s LOC (Loss Of Crew) and LOM (Loss Of Mission) figures were calculated in late October 2007,” DIRECT claim. “This date coincides with the Ares I Integrated System Technical Interchange Meeting (IS-TIM) on November 8.

“The design of Ares I has not changed significantly since that time, only the methodology for calculating the risk has altered since then. Somehow Ares I has doubled its LOC claims to “1/2400″ – according to NASA, yet the Ares I still uses all the same engines and stages.”

However, it appears DIRECT completely ignore the central claim by Constellation that their first stage SRB has obvious safety benefits when compared to Jupiter’s “numerous moving parts” in its first stage liquid engines. DIRECT also admit they are still awaiting new analysis.

“At time of writing, DIRECT is still awaiting results of a new analysis and expects similar improvements as Ares,” the rebuttal admits.

DIRECT claim that they would have lower total mission risk due to its capability to return safety systems that have been stripped of Orion due to mass issues.

“Because of DIRECT’s surplus performance, all of the capabilities deleted from Orion in the Zero Base Vehicle (ZBV) studies could be added back in,” they claim.

“If those systems can be reintegrated, it would dramatically improve the overall mission LOM figures, which represent a far larger portion of the total risks than just the launch.”

DIRECT anticipates being heavily involved in the upcoming Blue Ribbon review for human space flight – which will include an evaluation on NASA’s current exploration direction - and the team will be presenting their latest proposals at the Orlando ISDC conference at the end of May and will also have representatives there able to discuss the latest evolutions of the proposal.

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NASA managers have been looking into the possibility of reducing the gap between the last shuttle flight, currently STS-133 in mid 2010 – with STS-134 not yet officially baselined – and the first manned flight of Ares I, carrying Orion 2 on the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) NET (No Earlier Than) March, 2015.

Acceleration studies have been taking place, but due to shortfall/overspend of funds available to Constellation – restricted yet further by expenditure on problem solving, such as Thrust Oscillation – any get-wells on the timeline have been related to the culling of a number of tests on hardware elements such as the Upper Stage.

Currently, Orion’s first crew rotation role with the International Space Station (ISS), know as Full Operational Capability (FOC), remains manifested as Orion 4, in 2016.

Funding shortages are also likely to delay Ares I-X’s test flight from Pad 39B at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) from July to as late as October of this year. It would likely take an injection of a few billion dollars to advance the whole Constellation program by around a year.

From the shuttle side, extending the program past 2010, by three flights, two years (five flights minimum) or even five years, would also cost billions. However, with the shuttle deemed as a “working system”, this option is understood to have wider support, notably at the political level.

Pre-empting the possibility of extending the shuttle program, the US Senate passed a new NASA Authorization Bill that outlined the ambitions of the space program, from taking “all necessary steps” to add STS-134′s mission to deliver the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) to the ISS, to working options for shuttle extensions.

The Bill also directed NASA to terminate or suspend (until April 30, 2009) any activities that would preclude flying the Shuttle after FY 2010. Extension studies have been more or less completed, with a White Paper outlining several options and costs by shuttle contractors already sent to NASA HQ.

Work behind the scenes, by way of discussions, are taking place on the roadmap for reducing the gap, mainly via talks with the NASA Advisory Council.

“At the NASA Advisory Council was held at KSC, with topics similar to those presented at the FRR (Flight Readiness Review) were discussed, along with updates on Soyuz issues,” noted one memo on L2 this month. “Other topics presented concerned commercial resupply services, the possibility of shuttle extension, and the Constellation Program acceleration.”

Discussions with Advisory Council range from extending the shuttle, to accelerating the Constellation manifest, although no firm decisions are expected anytime soon.

“(Shuttle Manager) Mr. (John) Shannon talked to the NASA Advisory Council last week after the FRR. That was a very good discussion. They are waiting, just like us, for a new administrator,” added another L2 acquired note on February 9. “They had a lot of really good comments about how NASA does its budget.

“They collected some data for us on the Cx Acceleration plans. We talked a little bit about Shuttle Extension regarding our assets and what could be done. They will fold all of that into some recommendations. Don’t expect anything near term on that.”

A final report on extension options was due 120 days after enactment of the law (NASA Authorization Bill), or on February 15. However, lawmakers have asked NASA to hold off on delivery of the report until the new Obama Administration can evaluate and make inputs – since it currently reflects the conclusions of the previous leadership. Bush/Griffin NASA leadership, which of course was rigidly “stay-the-course.” We’re looking at a mid-March delivery date at this stage.

A delivery date of mid-March is now expected, with the goal of working out a roadmap for the physical purchasing of assets that would allow for the extension to begin in June. However, getting to the point of approving extension is still some time away.

“The specific issue of shuttle extension as part of a solution to the gap is still TBD (To Be Decided), as a policy matter,” noted Jeff M. Bingham, Senior Adviser on Space and Aeronautics, Republican Staff Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, to NASASpaceflight.com.

“As a practical matter, there are things that will need to be done – starting no later than June – to prepare for extended shuttle operations, such as purchasing long lead-time items for ETs, etc., so that extension could be as seamless as possible, and not have a ‘gap within a gap’ in terms of being able to field shuttles for flights.

“We are expecting a formal report from NASA, required under our 2008 bill, which will tell us what steps – and what costs – are involved in meeting the requirement to keep the shuttle extension option viable through the end of April.”

“Those are costs which conceivably could be covered by new funds, even though they are carried under the “Exploration” account, not the “Space Operations” account. NASA needs permissive authority to transfer funds between accounts, but that can be handled.”

Those new funds refer to the $1 billion lawmakers have allocated within what is now a $789 billion economic stimulus package that was passed by the US Senate on Tuesday, and successfully negotiated with Congress on Wednesday..

Out of the $1 billion, $400m is currently tagged under the “Exploration” account, which NASA could use for whatever purposes they require under each account allocation for 2009 and 2010.

While this increase in funds is not part of the billions required to extend the shuttle past 2010, any additional money is good news, and will at least allow for some “initial steps” to be taken on reducing the gap.

“The money is a budget increase, in that it is “new money” added to the designated accounts within NASA’s existing budget structure, and is available to be used for the purposes intended. The bill simply requires that NASA notify the Appropriations Committee of its intended use for the funds,” added Mr Bingham.

“NASA needs at least $2 billion a year above its previously-planned top line to be able to effectively operate its various programs and to have any chance of reducing the gap in human spaceflight. Thus, it needs to find “new money” whenever and wherever it can.

“The inclusion of any NASA money in this particular bill represents a positive recognition that NASA programs offer economic benefit to the country, as opposed to simply being a fancy and adventurous “luxury.” That is a very important point, irrespective of the amount of money involved or even the “targeted use” for which it is appropriated.”

NASA is also waiting on new leadership, with the eventual replacement for Mike Griffin still expected to be some time away. Reducing the gap, via shuttle extension, Constellation acceleration, or a mix of both, won’t be fully planned out until the new administrator takes office.

“Right now, there is no cohesive plan by which the US government is looking to address “the Gap.” That is not possible until the new Administration completes its internal organizational and personnel decisions on civil space and then sets its sights on that issue and begins to address it,” Mr Bingham continued.

“The point is, absent such a plan, no one is ready to even guess at specifically “how much” it’s going to cost. But folks in Congress have already been gearing up to be ready to join with the Administration to seek a solution to the gap issue.

“Over the next two or three months, we will hopefully see the Administration get organized on the NASA front with a new Administrator, possibly a new policy structure within the White House, and the initial priorities they will set in a budget request for FY 2010, which is expected in early April.

“During that period, in addition to the development of the 2010 budget request, which is where one should hope and look for the beginnings of a ‘Plan’ for going forward and dealing with the Gap, there will be an additional appropriations bill, in the form of an Omnibus Appropriations, which will provide the amounts needed to fund NASA and other agencies for the remainder of FY 2009, that we are now in.

“The Stimulus package simply represented an ‘opportunity’ to get some additional funding early in ‘the game’ justified by the obvious fact that closing the gap helps secure jobs and avoid too severe a dislocation in an important sector of the economy, aerospace.”

From the standpoint of Constellation, all options are being considered as “fair game” at the political level, when it comes to their respective ability to close the gap.

While acceleration studies have been taking place for Constellation’s Ares and Orion vehicles, the alternative options of utilizing EELV vehicles – such as the Delta IV Heavy or the Atlas V Heavy – have been touted, along with the “Direct” proposal of using their Shuttle Derived Jupiter launch vehicles – which has gained increased interest and publicity over the last couple of years – to, as they claim, save money, shorten the gap, and avoid the shedding of Orion’s capabilities, as is currently required by Ares I’s performance shortcomings.

Even SpaceX’s Dragon capsule – potentially via a manned version of the COTS program – is considered as part of the ‘fair game’ in finding the best solution to reducing the gap between the retirement of the shuttle and the first manned flight of Orion.

However, it is too early in the process to know if the potential increase in funds would be used to advance studies into Constellation alternatives, but the very possibility such funds would now be available to NASA is also classed as good news.

“As for specific options to close the gap, I would simply say that virtually anything and everything is ‘fair game’ for consideration, and that includes everything from Ares/Orion acceleration, shuttle extension, Direct as a separate alternative, Direct in combination with human-rated EELV, Orion and/or Dragon on an EELV, accelerated COTS-D, etc., etc…it is far too early to know which option or combination of options is going to be likely.

“What is known is that any option is going to require some early money to be viable, and if some of that necessary money can be made available through the Stimulus package, that’s great, and that is the “good news” about this development.”

L2 members: Documentation – from which part of the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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