SLS Waiting For Primary Roles:

As outlined in previous articles on this site, NASA managers are continuing with their efforts to refine the Design Reference Mission (DRM) roadmap for the Agency’s new flagship launch vehicle.

While that process continues, clues to the roadmap’s foundations can be found in NASA documentation, such as the SLS Concept Of Operations (Con Ops) presentation (available on L2 – Link to Presentation), which provides a detailed overview of the large number of the DRMs under consideration.

*Click here for the list of SLS Con Ops Articles*

As to when the process will be complete, a lot will depend on information relating to budget support for NASA, specifically the SLS and Orion programs.

In turn, SLS managers need to present a roadmap and a schedule which is far removed from the “worst case” scenario, one which sees SLS involved in a widely-spaced opening salvo of missions, before increasing to a flight rate of just one mission per year in the 2020s – an unacceptably low flight rate in most people’s eyes.

NASA managers are fully aware of this, with the SLS team already looking as far ahead as FY14 in their recent manifest meeting, based mainly around the previously reported wish to halve the gap between SLS-1 in 2017 and SLS-2.

With the “worst case” manifest showing SLS-2 would launch in 2021 – otherwise known as the first crewed mission for SLS and Orion – it is understood that if this mission cannot be advanced to 2019, an alternative option would be to launch SLS on a cargo mission in that year.

It has not yet been determined what type of cargo would fly on the SLS – a Block I (70mt) HLV – in such a schedule scenario.

Other Roles For SLS:

SLS’ design was technically selected ahead of knowing what specific missions it would be conducting. While it has been argued the payloads should determine the design of the launch vehicle, its upmass capabilities and fairing size options at least provide some guidelines to its future passengers.

As noted in the SLS Con Ops presentation, flexibility is inherent with a vehicle that will debut as a 70mt deriviative, prior to growing to 100mt (Block IA) and later to a 130mt (Block II). The aim is to evolve the SLS to its full capability in time for potential missions to Mars.

“The SLS changes the paradigm of what can be launched, because its launch performance is far greater than that of any current vehicle. In addition, its dramatically larger launch fairing enables launching large, multi-element systems, greater science instrument mass fraction, larger electrical power supplies, and more mass for shielding and lower-complexity engineering solutions,” noted the SLS Con Ops presentation.

“This translates into an earlier return on science, a reduction in mission times, and greater flexibility for extended science missions.”

Notable additions to the DRM section of the presentation are roles for the SLS which are separate from those which involve NASA’s future exploration aspirations.

Secondary Payloads – SpaceX and SLS:

One of these additional roles relates to “Secondary Payloads” – in other words, spacecraft – usually much smaller than the primary passenger – that could potentially hitch a ride uphill with the SLS.

The subject of secondary payloads became an important subject for SpaceX recently, as the Californian company noted its agreement to launch 18 ORBCOMM Generation 2 (OG2) satellites would be carried out – as secondary payloads – during Falcon 9 launches.

Originally, the delivery of the second-generation satellites into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) was set to be carried out on the Falcon 1e launch vehicle.

SpaceX noted the switch to Falcon 9 was made to further maximize the cost-effectiveness of their COTS/CRS missions, by including these additional payloads as passengers on the Falcon 9′s second stage, allowing them to be deployed after the Dragon spacecraft separates from the launch vehicle.

When SpaceX were asked if there was still a future role for Falcon 1/1e following this switch, the company’s communications director Kirstin Brost Grantham told NASASpaceflight.com: “Current plans are for small payloads to be served by flights on the Falcon 9, utilizing excess capacity. This is a very cost effective solution for small satellite launch needs.”

With a number of the OG2 satellites set to fly with the next Falcon 9 – the combined COTS 2 and 3 Demo mission – NASA teams used their experienced Monte Carlo analysis methods to review the deployment of the satellites, so as to ensure they did not hold an impact risk to the International Space Station (ISS).

For SLS, the Con Ops presentation noted the potential use of an Encapsulated Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) ring to allow for additional passengers to ride with the monster rocket.

“The SLS will pursue opportunities to fly secondary payloads in conjunction with primary missions. These services can be provided by the Science Mission Directorate (SMD), allowing deployment of these payloads along the SLS trajectory. An ESPA ring may be flown to accommodate this class of payloads.”

For SLS/HLV Articles, click here: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/hlv/

SLS DoD Missions:

In a reminder of the Space Shuttle’s past, SLS managers are also eyeing up the possibility of launching military payloads on the HLV.

Currently, most DoD spacecraft are launch by EELVs (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle), such as the Atlas V or the Delta IV vehicles, under the control of the United Launch Alliance (ULA). However, for a period during the early years of the Shuttle’s lifetime, the orbiter’s role with classified DoD payloads was commonplace.

During the Shuttle era, the orbiters enjoyed both “dedicated” DoD missions – beginning with Columbia’s STS-4 flight – and “civilian” missions that carried, or deployed, DoD payloads. The last dedicated DoD mission was in 1992 with Discovery during STS-53, while the last “civilian” mission with a DoD payload was in 2000, during Endeavour’s STS-99′s mission.

SLS managers believe NASA’s previous experience with DoD missions opens up the potential to carry out SLS launches with military payloads.

“Other missions which may utilize the SLS capability are launches for other Government agencies, like the DoD and any Government agencies with classified missions,” the Con Ops presentation noted.

“DoD mission support will also be available on the SLS, which will be available to partner with DoD and international partners for them to use SLS launch capabilities and opportunities. Classified missions have previously been supported through the MCC (Mission Control Center) at JSC (Johnson Space Center).

“This capability, along with the large payload capacity of SLS, allows for a wide range of DoD payload development and flight that was not previously available within the United States.”

The presentation also claimed the SLS’ large payload capability may be attractive to some commercial partners, citing Bigelow Space Station modules as one example.

It is likely the SLS team will wait until they know the outcome of the exploration roadmap evaluations before pursuing the potential of launching additional payloads.

(Images: Via L2 content, driven by L2′s SLS specific L2 section, which includes, presentations, videos, graphics and internal updates on the SLS and HLV, available on no other site. Other images via NASA and SpaceX.)

(L2 is – as it has been for the past several years – providing full exclusive SLS coverage, available no where else on the internet. To join L2, click here: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/l2/)

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Agreement Details And Reaction:

The agreement to establish clear criteria for certification – of commercial providers of launch vehicles used for national security space and civil space missions – relates to a “new entrant launch vehicle certification strategy” in a cooperative effort by the Air Force, NASA and NRO, in order to take advantage of new launch capability for the three agencies missions.

The new entrant launch vehicle certification strategy is the latest step in a cooperative effort by the Air Force, NRO and NASA to further enable competition and expand the number of companies who are qualified to launch these missions.

The three agencies previously signed a Letter of Intent in October 2010, signalling their collaboration on launch requirements, and a Memorandum of Understanding in March, which outlined their plans for future EELV-class launch vehicle acquisition, including the need to coordinate their strategies for certifying new entrants into the field.

“This strategy is the best balance of ensuring reliable access to space while encouraging competition and innovation in the launch industry,” said Under Secretary of the Air Force Erin Conaton. “We are committed to providing a level playing field to all competitors in the interest of ensuring the best capability for our warfighters and the best value to the American public.”

The risk-based certification framework allows the agencies to consider both the cost and risk tolerance of the payload and their confidence in the launch vehicle. For payloads with higher risk tolerance, the agencies may consider use of launch vehicles with a higher risk category rating and provide an opportunity for new commercial providers to gain experience launching government payloads.

Within a given risk category rating, if new entrants have launch vehicles with a demonstrated successful flight history, then the government may require less technical evaluation for non-recurring certification of the new launch system. This new strategy further enables competition from emerging, commercially developed launch capabilities for future Air Force, NASA, and NRO missions.

The MOU will be followed by detailed guidance for prospective new entrants, which can be applied to any company, such as Orbital, or SpaceX - who immediately welcomed to the agreement’s announcement.

“SpaceX welcomes the opportunity to compete for Air Force launches. We are reviewing the MOU, and we expect to have a far better sense of our task after the detailed requirements are released in the coming weeks,” said Adam Harris, SpaceX Vice President of Government Affairs.

SpaceX are likely to offer their Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launch vehicles as options for USAF launch services.

Currently, the United Launch Alliance (ULA) EELV fleet of Deltas and Atlas’ carry out the vast majority of USAF launches, which SpaceX class as a “monopoly provider whose prices have consistently risen”.

Click here for recent SpaceX News Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/spacex/

Such language stems back to the legal arguments which resulted in court action in 2005, where SpaceX tried to block the formation of the ULA between Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

In a 44 page formal Complaint and Summons, SpaceX alleged a long history of anti-competitive conspiracy between the Atlas V and Delta IV launch programs. SpaceX claimed that Boeing and Lockheed Martin were guilty of manipulating the US Government-sponsored Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) rocket procurement program.

The anti-trust lawsuit continued through until 2006 – sandwiched by a dismissal – with SpaceX claiming it was being damaged by its exclusion form the USAF 2006 “Buy 3″ EELV Launch Services contracts, receipt of past and future Air Force subsidies, and the USAF’s “pre-allocation” of EELV launches through 2011.

However, the case was dismissed – for a second time – in May, 2006, with Judge Florence-Marie Cooper of the US District Court of Central California noting that “SpaceX’s alleged injuries arise either from past awards for which it was not eligible to bid or future claims that are speculative and unripe.”

Now in 2011, SpaceX are back to prove their worth in competing for the launch service contracts, an open competition which they claim would save the American taxpayer billions of dollars.

“Fair and open competition for commercial launch providers is an essential element of protecting taxpayer dollars,” said Elon Musk, SpaceX CEO. “Our American-made Falcon vehicles can deliver assured, responsive access to space that will meet warfighter needs while reducing costs for our military customers.”

Next up in the process will be the implementation plan, with the Air Force set to publish a new entrant certification guide, which will describe the process for reaching certified status.

In addition, the service is seeking opportunities for future missions that could be made available for new entrants and which would be used to collect technical data needed for their certification.

(Images via SpaceX, USAF)

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Background/Human Rating:

Several papers (see bottom of article for download link) - due to be presented at an upcoming American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)/Space 2009 conference – outline ULA’s ambitious plans to not only provide US manned access to Low Earth Orbit (LEO), but also create an exploration plan, one which includes fuel depots and lunar landing craft.

Addressing several key items that resulted in the EELV family missing out as the preferred architecture during the creation of the ESAS (Exploration Systems Architecture Study), the papers claim the EELV systems hold compliance to Human Rating requirements defined by NASA Standard, boosted by a flight rate that quickly builds sufficient history to rely on flight demonstrated reliability.

“NASA embraced these designs by selecting the Atlas V and Delta IV to launch the crewed Orbital Space Plane (OSP) due to their robust, flexible designs, the reliability (calculated and demonstrated) and the confidence in these launch vehicles resulting from their evolutionary development approach, which minimized the historical first flight risk,” opens one of the papers.

“These systems offer the key to significantly reducing the Gap in US Human Spaceflight by providing flight proven launch systems that offer the benefits of early Initial Launch Capability (ILC), lowest nonrecurring and recurring costs, and demonstrated reliability that meets or exceeds NASA Loss of Mission requirements.

“With the addition of a robust launch abort system, we believe both Atlas and Delta can exceed stringent NASA Loss of Crew requirements. Both launch vehicles offer unique advantages for a commercial crew development program, or for the launch of the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle.”

Playing to the key strength of flight history, the paper emphasizes the key difference between the current forward plan of Ares, and its Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle alternatives.

“Existing launch vehicles offer a number of benefits, most notably the demonstrated reliability offered by continuing uncrewed launches during on-going operations,” the paper continues. “This is evident in the significant reduction in the historical infant mortality rate of new launch vehicles. Design flaws manifest themselves in early flights, which is minimized by the evolutionary design approach demonstrated by Atlas and Delta.

“This means that with a common fleet of launch vehicles, the uncrewed missions bear the first flight risk, thus significantly reducing the risk for crewed missions.

“This illustrates the demonstrated reliability benefits of a common fleet of launch vehicles. Additionally, by 2015, the current Ares/Orion ILC, Delta IV will have flown over 50 Common Booster Cores, including 8 Delta IV-Heavy vehicles. Atlas V will have flown nearly 65 times.”

Citing the basis of their confidence on safety, the paper expands on the three primary factors of Human Rating a vehicle – specifically launch vehicle reliability, the addition of an Emergency Detection System, and intact abort capability.

“The combination of these three elements provides a common-sense, system-level approach to accomplish the goal of safe, reliable transportation to LEO.”

For EELV HR references:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/04/study-eelv-capable-orion-role-griffin-claims-alternatives-fiction/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/01/human-rated-atlas-v-for-bigelow-space-station-details-emerge/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2007/04/spacedev-announce-dream-chaser-agreement-with-ula-atlas-v/

Gap Reduction:

Currently, Orion won’t be launched on its debut flight (IOC – Initial Operating Capability) via Ares I until March, 2015 – at the very earliest, due to a low confidence level. Another year will pass before Orion 4′s (FOC – Full Operating Capability) flight to the International Space Station (ISS).

This “gap” between the previously scheduled 2010 retirement of the shuttle and Orion’s working schedule is one of the key concerns facing NASA, and indeed at the Augustine Committee’s review into the future of the US’ Human Space Flight plans.

An argument often made relates to changing course after several years of Ares development and several billion dollars of expenditure. More so, it has been argued that moving to a different launch vehicle architecture now would actually increase the gap between the shutte’s retirement – now likely in 2011 – and the operational capability of its successor.

ULA counter this, claiming they have a proven history of being able to refine their family of vehicles for manned flight in a timescale that would result in Atlas V being ready to launch Orion in less than four years.

“Atlas and Delta have a long history of successful launch vehicle development and launch pad activation. ULA has built on that experience by developing a detailed plan and schedule to provide crew launch services for NASA and commercial providers. Based on our understanding of the requirements, we believe that that an Atlas V can be ready for commercial Human Spaceflight in less than 4 years and that the Delta IV-Heavy can be ready to launch Orion in 4-1/2 years.

“These schedules are consistent with the US experience during the Mercury-Atlas and Gemini-Titan Program experience, both of which flew the first manned mission within 4 years of the selection of the launch vehicle.”

Outlining the elements of their current ground and launch systems for the purpose of conforming to the Human Rating requirements, the paper cites the need for modifications to be carried out at the launch site, plus redundancy/safety upgrades, and the inclusion of an Emergency Detection System (EDS).

“We anticipate that this system will be similar for either Atlas or Delta, and will use the recent Atlas V Fault Tolerant Inertial Navigation Unit (FTINU) as the point of departure for design and development,” the paper added on the specific note on the EDS.

“The FTINU was developed in less than 3 years and was launched on an Atlas 551 for the NASA Pluto New Horizon mission in 2006. With EELV vehicle subsystem highly characterized, and with added flights-of-opportunity to check out the EDS (without its LAS) EELV has lowered schedule, technical, and cost risk for EDS development.”

All of which factors in to the EELV’s Loss of Mission (LOM)/Loss of Crew (LOC) ratings, which range from the Atlas V 401′s rating of 1/250 for a LOM and 1/2500 for LOC, to the Delta IV-Heavy’s 1/80 LOM and 1/800 for LOC, although the table notes that all the values represent 50 percent confidence level – in part due to Delta IV’s lack of flights.

“System reliability was one of the most important design considerations for the EELV systems, Atlas V and Delta IV. It was one of only four critical performance parameters specified by the Operational Requirements Document (ORD),” added the paper on the LOM and LOC values. “As such, a tremendous amount of effort was expended to develop credible reliability estimates to prove that the requirements were met.

“Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) type analysis was used to determine so-called design reliability. But mission reliability, what the program called the true reliability, was calculated by applying a Bayesian update to incorporate actual flight experience of similar systems or subsystems.

“This approach was arrived at through lengthy technical interchanges between the EELV contractors and the Aerospace Corporation, representing the Air Force customer. The results of the analysis (are based) with the associated LOC numbers assuming the probability of a failed abort is 1/10.”

For CxP Gap References:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/news/constellation/

Atlas V vs Delta IV Human Rating:

With the paper continuing by citing the attributes of both the Atlas V and Delta IVs on preference for which vehicle would be best to Human Rate.

Atlas V has numerous benefits, not least due to the minimal modifications the vehicle would require to launch humans into space, with only ground support and the addition of a EDS required.

“The Atlas V 401 and 402 vehicles are well suited for commercial human spaceflight. They are simple, low cost, reliable systems with a long successful heritage. They use two flight proven propulsion systems (RD-180 & RL-10), with only two engine starts, and two separation events.

“They have benign, well characterized environments, robust margins, and high demonstrated reliability (100% for the 401) and design reliability (.9960 for the 401 and .9942 for a 402). Atlas 401 and 402 can provide up to approximately 27,500lbs of performance to LEO, depending on the specific configuration of the crew vehicle.

“Trajectories can easily be shaped to eliminate ‘Black Zones’ with no appreciable impact to performance. (‘Black Zones’ are defined as any period of flight when an abort would result in unsafe landing conditions if: 1) the aborting capsule falls into hostile terrain; or 2) High-g loads occur during a reentry.

“Atlas V can accommodate commercial human spaceflight with no changes to the existing vehicles. The only enhancements will be the addition of the Emergency Detection System and changes to the Mobile Launch Platform to allow crew ingress and egress. Once a particular crew vehicle is selected, Atlas V will conduct a series of analyses and system testing to integrate vehicle on a 401 or 402. These include Hazard Analyses, Design Margin Analyses and Mission Unique Analyses specific for the Crew vehicle configuration.

“In addition, we may conduct wind tunnel tests and subsequent aerodynamics and loads analyses to ensure that we maintain our existing vehicle margins. The Atlas V 4XX offers the lowest risk, lowest cost solution for commercial crew.

“The demonstrated reliability record and robust vehicle design allows Atlas the flexibility to meet the needs of a variety of commercial crew vehicles currently being contemplated and designed.”

Delta IV-H wins on performance, with over 4 metric ton of margin for both ISS and Lunar Orion delivery, even after taking into account the elimination of black zones – often cited by Constellation as one of EELV’s main flaws in being able to Human Rate.

“The Delta IV has ample performance margin. For the ISS crew mission, based on current Orion weight allocations, the Delta IV Heavy has 4.8t of margin for lifting the Orion capsule to the ISS delivery orbit. This drops to 4.3t of margin for the Lunar Crew delivery mission. These 20 percent margins are very healthy, especially given that Orion would be flying on a demonstrated launch vehicle.

“These margins are after depressing the trajectories to close all Black Zones. (Performance margins would have been ~1t higher if this had not been done.) These performance margins are so big that they can cover almost any conceivable human rating penalty, or combination of penalties, including a 1.40 safety factor, and significant RL-10 derating.

“NASA has now acknowledged that they believe that the Delta IV Heavy has adequate performance margin and no Black Zones. This should refocus any questions about EELV compatibility onto human rating, reliability, and schedule.

“The human rated Delta IV Heavy fundamentally is the same Delta IV vehicle that has flown successfully three times, and is expected to fly 10 times by the projected mid 2014 IOC date. (32 total Delta IV CBC booster elements are projected to have flown by this same date.). This is a huge benefit from a crew safety standpoint.

“Though there are many measures of reliability, demonstrated reliability is the least subjective measure. Even with an analytic reliability which is higher, the EELVs cumulative launch total before the 2014 IOC, and additional accumulation of launches including DoD, means that the Ares 1 or another new vehicle might effectively never catch up with Delta’s demonstrated reliability.”

However, more work is required on this vehicle when it comes to modifications in order to provide the necessary Human Rating safety additions – which would also need to satisfy the Delta IV’s main customer at present, the Department Of Defense (DOD).

“Delta IV vehicle changes include removal of the fairing, and replacement with the Orion System, including service module and launch abort system and adapters. The Emergency Detection System will be incorporated into the launcher. An array of relatively small redundancy and safety modifications have been identified based on NASA requirements, but these remain modest in scope compared to the legacy design.

“We anticipate these upgrades to be acceptable to the DoD customers, and expect these to be incorporated fleetwide with no need for a unique NASA vehicle design apart from the EDS kit. Currently 1.40 safety factor has been removed from NASA requirements, though a return to this requirement driving some regauging and requalification could be accommodated within the same proposed schedule.”

Numerous upgrades and modifications are listed, but also with cited uncertainty as to how many of the modifications would be required.

“The details of redundancy upgrades on Delta remain an area of interest. Of note is that quite a few of the requirements are not driven by explicit redundancy requirements, but on other anticipated safety criteria as the desire to reduce the release of burning H2 at RS-68 start,” added the paper.

“Also, in some cases different redundancy upgrades (RS-68 backup valves, feedline prevalves, and hydraulics redundancy) need to be traded off to find the smartest implementation path. This makes the final suite of upgrades somewhat uncertain. However, the anticipated total scope and cost of these safety upgrades is programmatically small, with engine mods the most expensive due to high intrinsic recertification cost.

“Generally speaking, schedule impacts on IOC (effecting the US human spaceflight “gap”) is a more significant consideration.”

One interesting line near the end of the “Atlas and Delta Capabilities to Launch Crew to Low Earth Orbit” paper is a reference to both vehicles being used to launch humans into space.

“Though we assume Orion on Delta IV, and commercial crew capsules on Atlas, the difference in human rating is intrinsic to the launch vehicles, and not to assumed differences in human rating requirements.”

In summary, the “winner” of becoming a Human Rated launcher between the Atlas V and the Delta IV comes down to a question of schedule, risk numbers and performance.

“The EELVs are ready to support crew lift with flight proven vehicles that will have an even longer legacy of flights by the crewed IOC date with superior demonstrated reliability compared to any new system. Our schedules are grounded by ULA’s unmatched legacy of vehicle development and modifications programs and launch pad developments,” the paper summarizes.

“The Atlas V, with the relatively minor addition of an Emergency Detection System and a dedicated NASA Vertical Integration Facility (VIF) and Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), is ready for commercial human spaceflight and complies with NASA human rating standards. The 3 1/2 year integration span is likely shorter than the development for any new commercial capsule that might fly on it.

“The Delta IV has ample performance to support the existing Orion vehicle, without Black Zones. The Delta IV can support a mid-2014 Crewed IOC, which is superior to Orion launch alternatives. The proposed 37A pad is a look-alike counterpart to the existing 37B pad with low development risk.

“Human rating the Delta is a relatively modest activity, with the addition of an Emergency Detection System, an array of relatively small redundancy and safety upgrades, both in the vehicle and the engines that are minor compared to the original development of the Delta IV.”

An architecture complimented by fuel depots:

ULA are proposing a change of direction that is unmatched by the other alternative architectures, combining the use of vehicles that are already flying, with an on orbit ability to refuel in space via fuel depots.

As a result, one of the greatest challenges vehicles face – the need to launch with all the propellant they intend to use on orbit – can be staged in space.

“The present ESAS architecture for lunar exploration is dependent on a large launcher. It has been assumed that either the ARES V or something similar, such as the proposed Jupiter ‘Direct’ lifters are mandatory for serious lunar exploration,” another associated paper opened.

“These launch vehicles require extensive development with costs ranging into the tens of billions of dollars and with first flight likely most of a decade away. In the end they will mimic the Saturn V programmatically: a single-purpose lifter with a single user who must bear all costs. This programmatic structure has not been shown to be effective in the long term. It is characterized by low demonstrated reliability, ballooning costs and a glacial pace of improvements.

“The use of smaller, commercial launchers coupled with orbital depots eliminates the need for a large launch vehicle. Much is made of the need for more launches – this is perceived as a detriment. However since 75 percent of all the mass lifted to low earth orbit is merely propellant with no intrinsic value it represents the optimal cargo for low-cost, strictly commercial launch operations.

“These commercial launch vehicles, lifting a simple payload to a repeatable location, can be operated on regular, predictable schedules. Relieved of the burden of hauling propellants, the mass of the Altair and Orion vehicles for a lunar mission is very small and can also be easily carried on existing launch vehicles. This strategy leads to high infrastructure utilization, economic production rates, high demonstrated reliability and the lowest possible costs.

“This architecture encourages the exploration of the moon to be conducted not in single, disconnected missions, but in a continuous process which builds orbital and surface resources year by year. The architecture and vehicles themselves are directly applicable to Near Earth Object and Mars exploration and the establishment of a functioning depot at earth-moon L2 provides a gateway for future high-mass spacecraft venturing to the rest of the solar system.”

ULA provide a “Proposed Architecture Concept of Operations” in the paper, which shows a logistics stream and a crew stream feeding off depots, including one at L2 (Lagrange point). However, the paper notes that “the architecture is illustrated using ULA vehicle concepts for convenience. In reality, no single industrial entity can entirely support this architecture.

“The production and launch rates are simply not sustainable by a single team. It must be a concerted effort of several launch providers, perhaps a consortium linking industry and NASA.”

The backbone of the architecture is the ACES (Advanced Common Evolved Stage), which is currently being developed by ULA, and expected to replace the three existing cryogenic upper stages presently being used.

“Containing 41 mT of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen it is powered by four RL10 class engines. ACES builds on over 200 flights of Centaur and Delta, fusing technologies from both programs: sharing the Delta IV 200” tank diameter but with a common/nested intermediate bulkhead. ACES uses tank geometry, low conductivity tank structures, passive thermal protection and vapor cooling to suppress cryogenic propellant loss to boiloff,” noted the paper.

“Since it is wholly protected from aeroloads during launch a thick MLI blanket surrounds every exposed surface – drastically reducing external heating. ACES has no helium or hydrazine systems- all pressurization, attitude control and power is generated by consuming its two main propellants. Most importantly ACES is designed to be refilled with propellants once in space.”

The 41 mT ACES propellant capacity is sized for usage with DoD, NASA science and commercial payloads. Because ACES sub-systems are concentrated on an aft mounted equipment deck the propellant capacity can be readily modified through changes in tank side wall length.

However, thanks to the use of propellant depots lunar exploration can efficiently be accommodated with as few as two tank volumes, the basic 41 mT. ULA provide an outline of Orion riding with ACES, Altair with ACES and the ACES tanker.

“In the Orion Service Module configuration, an ACES 41 is mated to an ECLSS module and the Orion Command Module. ACES provides its own power and that for Orion by consuming its ullage gases. Solar arrays and dedicated radiators are unneeded – ACES provides these services,” the paper adds.

“Attitude control is provided by ACES working in concert with the Orion RCS (Reaction Control System). The Orion-peculiar services such as N2 replenish , CO2 scrubbing and voice communications are provided by the ECLSS module.

“In the Altair configuration, ACES 41 is mated to a Lunar Cargo Module or the Crew Ascender as well as multiple 1,000 pound thrust lateral-facing engines and landing gear for the final hover and landing phases.

“In its simplest and most common configuration the ACES tanks are stretched so that they contain 71 tons of propellants. This ACES 71 vehicle has no payload attached and uses the very simplest of payload fairings. Its principle purpose is to deposit or remove propellants from a depot. The ACES tanker is capable of supporting propellants that are subcooled.

“Subcooling of the LH2 and LO2 allows propellants to absorb heat while stored in LEO without saturation pressures rising excessively. This permits extended storage times in high heating conditions without suffering excessive mass losses.”

The result of this multi-use of the ACES system is the ability to create the fuel depots in space, which is an idea that was heavily supported by the Augustine Review panel.

“The ACES depot is an ACES 41 mated to a modified ACES 71 Tanker. The tanker has a shifted intermediate bulkhead to maximize LH2 storage. The main engines have been removed and a high performance deployable sunshield installed. The LH2 storage element is launched empty as a payload on an Atlas 554 or Delta IV HLV,” the paper continues.

“Because it is not filled with cryogenic propellants on the ground it can dispense with external conductive insulation such as foam. Its thermal protection is strictly optimized for vacuum operations. The depot provides the multiple interfaces for transferring propellants to and from the docked vehicles and can supply power and support services to those vehicles for extended periods.

“Multiple Orion, Altair and tanker vehicles can be simultaneously docked. The proposed architecture relies on two depots – one in LEO and the other at L2.

“Being an empty shell the depot is extremely light, weighing approximately 12 mT. Launched on a Delta HLV results in nearly 20t of residual propellant remaining in the ACES 41 upper stage. Once in LEO, the ACES-41 residual LH2 is transferred into the LH2 depot tank. The ACES-41 LO2 residuals are then transferred to the now empty ACES-41 LH2 tank, after the tank has been evacuated of any residual H2.”

Other solutions are noted, such as a passive Thermal Protection System (TPS) for the depot in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), to protect against propellant boiloff, whereas the far lower heating rate for the depot at L2 can establish near-zero boiloff losses – amounting to a few pounds per day which also nearly matches the minimal station keeping requirements at the quasi stable L2.

A dedicated paper further outlines the depot plan, and available options for alternative paths.

Lunar Exploration:

With the combination of the EELV heavy lift options and the fuel depots en route, the proposed path to returning to the moon involves the ACES/Altair duo being launched on a Delta IV HLV booster with ACES/Altair replacing the Delta IV upper stage providing a total LEO lift mass of 36t.

“Refueled from the LEO depot the ACES/Altair can deliver in excess of 30 tons of combined cargo and vehicle mass to L2,” notes the paper. “Generally however it arrives at L2 with substantial propellant residual. If the Altair is intended to be cached at L2 for future crew use it deposits its propellants into the depot for efficient long term storage.”

The result of using depots at LEO and L2 would allow for 20mt and a crew of four astronauts to be landed on the lunar surface.

“The ACES/Altair is loaded or topped from the L2 depot just prior to lunar descent. This includes the loading of the Ascender propellant tanks which are used during the terminal hover/landing phase. Fully loaded, it can deliver a combined mass of vehicles (such as the ascender), cargo and unused propellants greater than 40t to the lunar surface.

“The ACES tanks on the landed descenders are used for cryogenic propellant storage on the lunar surface and just as at L2 they gradually build their stores. The cycle of power generation would be established with fuel cells active during the lunar night and solar systems during the day. The conversion of water to the reactants and back in rhythm with the lunar day would be established.

“The support of a substantial crew on the lunar surface requires the storage, handling and transport of industrial quantities of reactants, water, sewage, nitrogen, scrubbed CO2, etc. The landed descenders each have substantial capacity to support the storage and processing of these materials and with each landing the ACES tanks are added to this lunar base tank farm.

“The ability to close the local ecosystem would gradually increase with a subsequent reduction in lost mass. Transfer of fluids between tanks is enabled by the ability to move the ACES/Altair after landing. It can be driven or towed to be adjacent to other landed vehicles so their systems can be joined.”

The paper outlines each of the paths required to launch the crew, pass them through the depots – including transportation to L2 – to the lunar surface and subsequent return to Earth. It also provides a roadmap for the move to the ACES system.

“ACES first flight would occur with either a commercial or DoD payload nearly five years before the first crewed flight to the moon. The final six crew flights to ISS would be conducted using ACES and the Orion capsule. To demonstrate the lunar lander as quickly as possible a robotic lander mission is included in 2016 with a direct lunar descent.

“Initial crewed landing would occur in 2018. Either a single crewed mission per year coupled with 20mT of cargo or two crewed missions per year can be supported within the anticipated budgets. The assumed cost of transport to LEO ranged from 9.2 to 10.2 $M/mT depending on launch vehicle. This scenario also assumes the cost of flights to the ISS are included at a rate of 2/year commencing in 2013.”

Expanding on costs, one graph lays out the funding requirements for as far downstream as 2024.

Four to five billion a year would cover the costs of development and operation through to 2017 – which includes lunar systems (which the current Constellation Program has been struggling to find monies for) – before rising to seven billion per year from 2020 to 2024.

Lunar Lander – DTAL:

At the center of the lunar landing plan is the DTAL – or Dual Thrust Axis Lander. The vehicle – which lands horizontally, uses an RL10 engine to accomplish the descent deceleration to just above the lunar surface. Final landing is accomplished using thrusters mounted along the DTAL body. ULA claim this configuration places the crew and payloads safely and conveniently close to the lunar surface.

“ULA’s Centaur and Delta IV upper stages provide an excellent cryogenic propulsion framework for developing a reliable, mass efficient lunar lander.

“Initial DTAL-enabled large robotic missions allow NASA to return to the moon quickly and demonstrate hardware to be used by crews that follow. This same mission design supports placement of large lunar base elements (habitats, power plants, rovers, excavation equipment, etc),” the paper on the DTAL notes.

“As the uncrewed missions are completed, and the system matures, astronauts will then use the same, now proven system to access the lunar surface.

“The reliable DTAL propulsion stage provides the flexibility to visit destinations other than the moon. DTAL’s mass and thermal efficient design provides the capability to visit NEO’s or possibly even Mars. By supplying the life support consumables with O2 and H2 from the large primary propellant tanks long duration missions are possible.”

The DTAL looks completely different to the current Altair design that NASA are working on – although the Constellation Program have noted Altair is likely to change in design as it matures. Interestingly, it’s that very design of Altair that reduces crew safety during their expeditions on to the lunar surface.

“Even with the multi-tank, imbedded engine design, Altair results in the crew and cargo being over 6 m above the lunar surface. This configuration results in increased risks to the crew who must regularly access the lunar surface from the equivalent of a three story building.

“There is the potential added risk of the crew being required to work under suspended loads during cargo off-loading. For the dedicated cargo missions, the Altair design requires dedicated cranes or a building sized ATHLETE, JPL’s lunar rover, to support habitat and other large cargo transfer to the lunar surface.”

The horizontal design of the DTAL places the crew near the surface, with the descent engines mounted on the side – as opposed to the bottom – of the vehicle. Design images even show wheels on the bottom of the DTAL.

“The Dual Thrust Axis Lander (DTAL) provides another solution that addresses the conflicting requirements of descent and landing while keeping the lander intact all the way to the surface. Like the DASH concept (from the Langley Flight Research Center), DTAL utilizes efficient LO2/LH2 propulsion for descent, but transitions to small engines mounted along the stage allowing horizontal landing.

“The use of high side-mounted thrusters for terminal descent and landing provides the pilot with a clear view of the surface, unobscured by entrained regolith, easing DTAL’s ability to adjust touchdown to ground terrain.

“DTAL uses the RL10 to perform most of the descent burn and then rotates until its long axis is parallel to the ground. At about 6,000 feet above the lunar surface DTAL transitions to the lateral thrusters, turning off the RL10. The lateral thrusters, which are aligned perpendicular from the RL10, support the final descent and terminal landing.

“The small, responsive lateral thrusters allow precision control of the descent and translation rates. DTAL will build on ULA’s existing propellant slosh – vehicle dynamic control logic experience to ensure that induced slosh does not adversely couple with flight control system.”

The variants of the DTALs are based around crewed and robotic missions. Initially, robotic missions (DTAL-R) would be launched, allowing for precursor flights and the ability to prove reliability.

“Commonality between DTAL-Crew, DTAL-R and ACES provide a large number of flights prior to the first crew mission will ensuring that the propulsion system design is sound,” the paper added.

“Exploration of the moon benefits from combining robotic and crewed missions. Exploratory robotic science missions provide the early, initial inspection of new locations, and enable investigation of a greater number of locations than would otherwise be possible.

“Subsequent larger robotic missions enable much deeper understanding and prepare for larger cargo missions deploying habitats, rovers, power systems and other elements required to support human life beyond Earth. Once people are habitually living and working on the moon, robotic cargo missions will provide the supply chain to support their daily needs.”

The proposed DTAL-R lander would be utilized for the “larger” missions, capable of landing over 15 mT of payload depending on exploration architecture. DTAL-R provides the lunar surface access for large, oversized payloads that would be required for setting up a lunar outpost – another casualty of the current Constellation funding issues that was identified by the Augustine Review.

See here for NASA’s Altair Lander:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/02/altair-project-buying-into-orion-lessons-for-development-process/

This is where the widely spaced landing gear comes into play, providing DTAL with stability even on rough or uneven terrain. This horizontal configuration results in the cargo-hold resting just a meter above the lunar surface, providing surface obstacle clearance for all proposed landing sites.

“Multiple 3m long rovers could disembark from DTAL-Rs cavernous 5m diameter cargo hold. DTAL-R’s 5 m cargo hold and lunar performance are capable of supporting all of NASA’s planned lunar surface systems, including hard shell and inflatable habitats, crewed rovers, ATHLETE, in-situ resource plants, lunar telescopes, or large drilling rigs. Egress is a simple matter of descending a shallow ramp to the surface.”

This increased ability to place large payloads on the lunar surface supports the most ambitious lunar base plans NASA has previously spoken of.

“DTAL-R can support NASA’s most massive current lunar surface system (LSS) elements including the 9.6 mT Fission Surface Power System (FSPS),” the paper claims. “NASA’s current plan calls for the surface elements to be launched horizontally on Altair’s large diameter deck inside a 10 m shroud.

“With DTAL-R, most of these elements would be launched axially and land horizontally on the lunar surface for easy egress. DTAL’s slim 5 m diameter design is compatible with existing EELV payload fairings as well as side-mounted and in-line shuttle derived launch vehicles.

“At this early stage in the surface element designs, potential design modifications for vertical launch are not anticipated to be challenging. The Lunar Electric Rover (formerly the Small Pressurized Rover) with its 5m length is an example of a system that would have to be packaged vertically on DTAL-R, similar to the rovers.

“JPL’s ATHLETE can be folded for flight and stowed in whatever orientation is most convenient for packaging with other LSS elements.

“The heaviest pressurized habitat module is currently estimated to be just under 8 mT. DTAL-R’s performance capability allows NASA to grow the habitats capability, or co-manifest habitats with other LSS elements. For human presence beyond Earth to be sustainable, we must eventually learn to ‘live off the land’.

“In-Situ-Resource-Utilization (ISRU) takes advantage of local material to derive useful products. Oxygen production from lunar regolith may well be one of the first ISRU steps toward a sustainable human presence.”

Again, safety and reliability are referenced in the paper, citing the four RL10 engine configuration that ensures that the vehicle will survive and continue the mission even with multiple engine failures. The paper also claims the DTAL (Crew) ascent module “is placed far forward with a clean, unencumbered separation plane allowing for full flight abort capability.

“The clean separation plane and gimbaled lateral thrusters ensure that the ascent module can separate from the descent vehicle even under severe spin conditions and through all phases of descent.”

Also, the pilots are placed at the front of the DTAL, allowing them a downward facing, panoramic window viewpoint for a clear view of the landing terrain. The high mounted distributed lateral thrusters also minimize surface dust entrainment, maximizing pilot visibility throughout the descent and landing.

Departing from the surface of the moon involves the DTAL’s “Ascender” – which separates from the front of the DTAL, rising back up into the lunar orbit.

“To return to lunar orbit after the surface mission the Ascender propellant tanks are brought to pressure. With the Descender stage systems stowed and umbilicals retracted the Ascender thrusters are brought to 30 percent power to achieve positive upload at the Descender/Ascender separation interface. Commanding separation, the Ascender then ramps up thrust, departing the lunar surface and descent vehicle at a steep angle.

“With this benign separation orientation the Ascender does not directly blast the spent descent stage with its engine plume allowing the descent stage to be preserved without damage for potential future use.”

Future use is also central to an option of creating habitable volume from the DTAL’s LH2 tank, in additional to the volume already allocated at the forward section of the craft.

“Converting DTAL’s tank for living space once on the lunar surface offers a mass ‘free’ habitat: This very large volume compares very favorably to habitable volumes provided by ISS, Altair, Orion, proposed lunar habitat volumes, LaRC’s proposed DASH lander or even Bigelow’s planned Sun Dancer module.

“The conversion of the LH2 tank support crew quarters provides an attractive option for the start or addition to a lunar base.

“The forward, ‘payload’ habitat node includes the entire infrastructure to support people, environmental control and life support system (ECLSS), bathrooms, showers, galley, etc. fully integrated on Earth. A tunnel leading aft to the DTAL LH2 tank would open up a lot of extra habitable volume once on the lunar surface.

“Prior to opening the node-tank connecting tunnel, the H2 tank would be vented to evacuate any residual H2 and allowed to warm up to room temperature and filled with air.”

The associated papers are being published on ULA’s site here:
 http://www.ulalaunch.com/index_published.html

No related posts.

EELV/Orion Study:

The Californian-based Aerospace Corporation has provided independent technical and scientific research, development, and advisory services to the space program for over 40 years.

They were approached by NASA to conduct a study on replacing Ares I with an EELV, focusing on the Delta IV-H. The ULA (United Launch Alliance) were asked to contribute a limited review of the technical elements of the study. However, they were not given access to the cost or schedule data that was to be used in the findings.

It is claimed the study was called for by Mr Griffin, in order to disprove growing references that an EELV could close the gap between shuttle retirement and the first manned flight of Orion (Orion 2), currently scheduled for March 2015 – although that date is currently based on a “zero confidence” schedule, pending a summit meeting to find solutions to funding and schedule disconnect issues, found during the ongoing PMR (Program Milestone Review) process.

The results for both the Delta IV-H and Atlas V-H are encouraging, and point towards large margins on both the ISS and Lunar Orion vehicle. However, that is only part of the story.

“ISS (requirement of 19.2 t). Delta IV-Heavy = 24.2 t. Atlas V Heavy = 25.4 t. Lunar (requirement of 21.8 t). Delta IV-H = 26.3 t. Atlas V-H = 27.3 t,” noted information acquired by L2.

The Delta IV-H numbers include use of the RS-68A, which is an upgraded version of the current RS-68 – currently undergoing testing and due to come into service in a few years time.

It is also noted that the ULA used the same ascent trajectory constraints as Ares I, such as the LAS (Launch Abort System) jet at Upper Stage Ignition (+30 sec, -30x100nmi injection).

The data did, however, point towards the ULA being required to optimize their current trajectory elements, although that would be refined after an “apples-to-apples” comparison with Ares I – which was the focus of the study.

On costs, information notes a new, dedicated launch pad (LC-37A) for Delta IV-H – if required – would cost around $750M, although sources claim it would be a lower dollar figure. An alternative Vehicle Integration Building (VIB) and Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) for Atlas V-H on LC-41 would cost around $350M.

It would also cost another $350m and 30 months to finish non-recurring work and field Atlas V-H.

The issue of “Black Zones” – often cited by Constellation managers as a negative issue with the EELVs – has been closed, and is not deemed to be a restrictive issue for “human rating” the vehicles.

However, ULA’s estimate of $400M to human rate the Delta IV-H – and a figure of around $200m to carry out the same process on an Atlas V-H – are deemed as “wildly off base” by NASA sources, who claim it would take many billions and many years to satisfy NASA ground rules. Those sources refused to expand on what their larger estimates are based on.

A major negative point for switching to EELV relates to the NASA workforce, especially at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and other “shuttle derived” centers and contractors.

Currently, a percentage of the shuttle workforce have – or will be – transitioned over to Constellation, although several thousand will still lose their jobs at the end of the shuttle program. A switch to EELV would see the job losses rise dramatically, according to NASA sources, who add it would also destroy the skill set.

It is also claimed that either an Atlas V-H or a Delta IV-H would be ready to launch with the existing Orion until 2014, which is later – but potentially more realistic – than previous claims reported in the media.

A large gap in US manned space flight would still exist without shuttle extension, although the current five year gap until Ares/Orion’s IOC (Initial Operating Capability) is unstable, and likely to grow, even if the upcoming PMR summit finds short term solutions to the funding shortage and schedule disconnects.

Mike Griffin Speech:

With a new NASA administrator expected to be announced very shortly – within days some sources claim – the seriousness of NASA’s funding through the transition to a return to the moon, and the future aim of manned missions to Mars was bluntly outlined by the former NASA administrator, during a speech on April 17 to the National Space Club Goddard Dinner.

Citing the proposed Fiscal 2010 budget outline released by President Obama, Mr Griffin notes the current plan to retire the space shuttle in 2010 as “good news” – despite the growing schedule pressure of needing to complete nine missions in around one and a half years, and the resulting gap of at least five years – a situation that grew worse under his watch.

“A few weeks ago, President Obama released his new administration’s proposed Fiscal 2010 budget. For those of us who understand the value of human space exploration, of going once again beyond the shoals of low Earth orbit, the words accompanying the budget release were encouraging,” noted Mr Griffin on a transcript of his speech.

“The President’s budget reiterated support for the retirement of the Space Shuttle and its replacement by the initial Constellation elements, continuation of International Space Station operations after 2015, and for human lunar return by 2020. All of that is good news.”

However, Mr Griffin then went on the offensive, claiming the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for the Constellation Program’s problems, noting they have removed $15 billion from the NASA pot since President Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE).

“Work at the staff level continues out of view of the nation’s elected leadership, and in the recent passback to NASA from the Office of Management and Budget, the news is not so good. After a small increase this year, Exploration Systems at NASA goes down by $3.5 billion over the next four years.

“When combined with earlier reductions of almost $12 billion during the Bush Administration, well over $15 billion has been extracted from the Exploration Systems budget in the five short years since the new space policy was announced. Funding for lunar return in the Constellation program was already less than $4 billion in the years prior to 2015.

“This was to be allocated to early work on the Ares V heavy-lifter, and the Altair lunar lander. With only a half-billion dollars now available, this work cannot be done.”

Noting the change of direction within the Agency since the loss of Columbia and her crew on STS-107, Mr Griffin added: “in the last five years two presidents and two Congresses have provided the top-level direction necessary to ensure that the root cause of Columbia’s loss – the lack of a guiding strategic vision for NASA – never happens again.

“But apparently something more is needed. We’re not matching the words with the necessary actions at the staff level. How soon we forget.

“Let me be clear. In a democracy, the proper purpose of the OMB is not to find a way to create a Potemkin Village at NASA. It is not to create the appearance of having a real space program without having to pay for it. It is not to specify to NASA how much money shall be allocated for human lunar return by 2020.

“The proper purpose of the OMB is to work with NASA, as a partner in good government, to craft carefully vetted estimates of what is required to achieve national policy goals. The judgment as to whether the stated goals are too costly, or not, is one to be made by the nation’s elected leadership, not career civil service staff.”

After noting the advances made by other countries in their goals of building towards exploration, and the resulting threat they pose in overtaking the US as the world leader in “defining, occupying, and extending the human frontier,” Mr Griffin turned his attentions towards the criticism of Ares I, saying “so what?” to the possibility there are better alternatives available, given the amount of money and effort that would have been wasted on Ares, if it was to be cancelled at this stage of development.

“I’ve grown impatient with the argument that Orion and Ares I are not perfect, and should be supplanted with other designs,” he noted. “I don’t agree that there is a better approach for the money, but if there were, so what?

“Any proposed approach would need to be enormously better to justify wiping out four years worth of solid progress. Engineers do not deal with “perfect”. Your viewgraphs will always be better than my hardware.

“A fictional space program will always be faster, better, and cheaper than a real space program.

“No one can wrest leadership in space from the United States. We’re that good. But we can certainly cede it, and that is the path we are on.

“In this 40th anniversary year of Apollo, we need to ask ourselves some hard questions. Do we actually want to have a real space program? Do we want to be a leader in space, a leader on the frontier? Or do we just want to talk about what we used to do, and what we plan to do, someday?”

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

Related posts:

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Constellation Turmoil:

Constellation’s schedules have been slipping at an alarming rate over the past few years, with the last PMR (Program Milestone Review) confirming a 12 month slip in the IOC (Initial Operational Capability) to March, 2015. This date relates to Orion 2, with Orion 4 – currently classed as the first crew rotation for the International Space Station (ISS), otherwise known as FOC (Full Operational Capability) – launching one year later in March, 2016.

While these dates continue to be the official timeline, internal reviews have found those schedules to be “broken”, with CxP departments across the program reporting they are at “zero percent confidence” for keeping to the March, 2015 (IOC) timeline.

While continued changes to the designs of Ares and Orion are part of the natural development cycle, issues such as Thrust Oscillation and vehicle performance have come at a price for both schedule and costings, despite fine work from the engineering teams tasked with mitigating the issues.

CxP attempted to protect the schedule and budgetary pressures by offsetting these additional strains by deleting test items – notably on the Upper Stage. However, this only proved to cause further disconnects throughout the program.

Issues with the Ares I Upper Stage engine, J-2X, have also been noted, although no specific information has been made available due to the classified nature of certain vehicle elements.

“Disconnects” have been previously noted on various stages of the vehicle, such as with a key Launch Abort System (LAS) test, cancelled with just 24 hours notice due to additional testing requirements being cited by the Orion program, adding months to the realigned test schedule, which in turn added further strain to the already heavily-delayed Orion PDR (Preliminary Design Review).

Orion contractor Lockheed Martin were already complaining last year about continued changes to the requirements of vehicle, which is likely to undergo another major change during the upcoming summit meeting, after it was noted the switch from a crew of six to four will be a lead item for discussion.

Several vehicle systems have been progressing through their development cycle to plan, but have subsequently suffered via waiting for related systems to catch up due to technical challenges, or return to a steady funding cycle, in turn causing a schedule mismatch “ripple effect” through the master timeline.

The summit will attempt to realign all the individual schedules, find potential funding ‘get-wells’, and create a viable timeline to try and bring Ares and Orion back into the March 2015 IOC target. However, confidence this can be achieved without a major boost to Constellation funding is classed as low.

Gap Reduction:

The serious nature of the “broken” schedules have been known for a few months, with an immediate slip of six months added internally to the master schedule, during a period when CxP were evaluating acceleration options. This occurred prior to the latest estimate of a slip of between 12 to 18 months – in total – on top of the current schedule.

Those acceleration options have since fallen by the wayside, with the worst case cost estimate coming in at around $7 billion just to bring the program back to the 2007 tatget of a 2014 launch of Orion 2. The priority now is to attempt to find a “magic solution” of bringing Ares/Orion in with a shot of making the March, 2015 IOC date. Avoiding further slips to the right is the goal, as opposed to acceleration of the schedule.

The situation with Ares is known in key areas of the Agency, with a “9th Floor” NASA HQ effort already taking place to evaluate the viability of cancelling Ares I, and replacing the launch vehicle with an EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) – such as an Atlas V Heavy or a Delta IV Heavy – whilst moving the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) effort towards concentrating on Ares V.

NASA managers have alternative options, including COTS-D, which would initiate SpaceX into bringing their Dragon manned vehicle on line as a bufferzone during the gap. However, while NASA are supportive of SpaceX’s efforts, sources claim it would take a major leap of faith to hand the task of buffering the gap to such a ‘new’ space flight company.

Shuttle Extension:

Building up a head of steam is shuttle extension, with wide-scale support at both the program and political level. Initially curtailed by former NASA administrator Mike Griffin – who was firmly in the Ares camp – the strongest wording in favour of extension, at a program level, was seen this week on the Shuttle Stand-Up/Integration report, on L2.

“Last week, around 200 prime contractors and suppliers went to Washington D.C. and got briefs from the Hill and key NASA people,” noted the report. “They went over to the Hill and talked to over 100 Congress representatives or their staffers.

“The message was that the Shuttle is operating well and is safe to fly.”

That “message” directly counters Mr Griffin’s efforts to warn against extending the shuttle, after citing safety numbers that intimated a disaster was on the cards if the vehicles flew past 2010. It also makes the point the shuttle is an operating vehicle, whereas the alternatives remain out of sight.

The report goes on to note the need to avoid CxP from falling yet further behind its originally schedule – whereas previous statements have alluded to the possibility of acceleration – which is no longer viable without additional billions being pumped into the program, potentially the same amount it would take to extend the shuttle by two years.

“To close the gap it would be necessary to hold the funding to make sure the CxP does not move any further to the right, and to add additional funding if Congress deems it necessary to fly into 2011 and 2012,” added the report. “It was well received but these are tough budget times.”

There are conflicting numbers on how much it would cost to extend the shuttle program, with various options available. Most of the options opt for two orbiters flying though the extension, with one grounded as a ‘near flight ready’ orbiter that can supply spares to her two sisters.

Program milestone charts acquired just this week by L2 confirm that the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) ‘additional’ tanks have been set up the purpose of pre-empting extension, with opening work completed on at least two brand new tanks past the yet-to-be-approved STS-134.

A refurbished ET-122 is also available for STS-135 – currently the Launch On Need (LON) tank for STS-134.

Should extension receive the required funding, MAF would be able to build new tanks, as all the shuttle related tooling has been protected via the outlines in the recent Senate Bill. However, a decision will need to be made soon, with layoffs of key skill set workers already taking place in New Orleans, and a systematic shutdown of shuttle related contractors soon to head past the point of no return.

The end of April has been deemed as D-Day for the shuttle program’s potential to extend. However, the in-built protection from the Senate Bill is understood to have gained enough time for the cut-off to be as late as the summer.

A lot will depend on what the next NASA administrator prefers, and more so the political will to find the best solution to ensure the United States does not suffer from a lack of domestic manned launch capability for over half a decade.

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

Related posts:

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2. Orion weight saving refinements continue – focus on ISS access The Lockheed Martin Orion spacecraft has received a new set...
3. Saving spaceship Orion – Zero Base Vehicle task complete NASA Constellation and Lockheed Martin engineers have completed the first...

NASA managers have been looking into the possibility of reducing the gap between the last shuttle flight, currently STS-133 in mid 2010 – with STS-134 not yet officially baselined – and the first manned flight of Ares I, carrying Orion 2 on the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) NET (No Earlier Than) March, 2015.

Acceleration studies have been taking place, but due to shortfall/overspend of funds available to Constellation – restricted yet further by expenditure on problem solving, such as Thrust Oscillation – any get-wells on the timeline have been related to the culling of a number of tests on hardware elements such as the Upper Stage.

Currently, Orion’s first crew rotation role with the International Space Station (ISS), know as Full Operational Capability (FOC), remains manifested as Orion 4, in 2016.

Funding shortages are also likely to delay Ares I-X’s test flight from Pad 39B at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) from July to as late as October of this year. It would likely take an injection of a few billion dollars to advance the whole Constellation program by around a year.

From the shuttle side, extending the program past 2010, by three flights, two years (five flights minimum) or even five years, would also cost billions. However, with the shuttle deemed as a “working system”, this option is understood to have wider support, notably at the political level.

Pre-empting the possibility of extending the shuttle program, the US Senate passed a new NASA Authorization Bill that outlined the ambitions of the space program, from taking “all necessary steps” to add STS-134′s mission to deliver the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) to the ISS, to working options for shuttle extensions.

The Bill also directed NASA to terminate or suspend (until April 30, 2009) any activities that would preclude flying the Shuttle after FY 2010. Extension studies have been more or less completed, with a White Paper outlining several options and costs by shuttle contractors already sent to NASA HQ.

Work behind the scenes, by way of discussions, are taking place on the roadmap for reducing the gap, mainly via talks with the NASA Advisory Council.

“At the NASA Advisory Council was held at KSC, with topics similar to those presented at the FRR (Flight Readiness Review) were discussed, along with updates on Soyuz issues,” noted one memo on L2 this month. “Other topics presented concerned commercial resupply services, the possibility of shuttle extension, and the Constellation Program acceleration.”

Discussions with Advisory Council range from extending the shuttle, to accelerating the Constellation manifest, although no firm decisions are expected anytime soon.

“(Shuttle Manager) Mr. (John) Shannon talked to the NASA Advisory Council last week after the FRR. That was a very good discussion. They are waiting, just like us, for a new administrator,” added another L2 acquired note on February 9. “They had a lot of really good comments about how NASA does its budget.

“They collected some data for us on the Cx Acceleration plans. We talked a little bit about Shuttle Extension regarding our assets and what could be done. They will fold all of that into some recommendations. Don’t expect anything near term on that.”

A final report on extension options was due 120 days after enactment of the law (NASA Authorization Bill), or on February 15. However, lawmakers have asked NASA to hold off on delivery of the report until the new Obama Administration can evaluate and make inputs – since it currently reflects the conclusions of the previous leadership. Bush/Griffin NASA leadership, which of course was rigidly “stay-the-course.” We’re looking at a mid-March delivery date at this stage.

A delivery date of mid-March is now expected, with the goal of working out a roadmap for the physical purchasing of assets that would allow for the extension to begin in June. However, getting to the point of approving extension is still some time away.

“The specific issue of shuttle extension as part of a solution to the gap is still TBD (To Be Decided), as a policy matter,” noted Jeff M. Bingham, Senior Adviser on Space and Aeronautics, Republican Staff Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, to NASASpaceflight.com.

“As a practical matter, there are things that will need to be done – starting no later than June – to prepare for extended shuttle operations, such as purchasing long lead-time items for ETs, etc., so that extension could be as seamless as possible, and not have a ‘gap within a gap’ in terms of being able to field shuttles for flights.

“We are expecting a formal report from NASA, required under our 2008 bill, which will tell us what steps – and what costs – are involved in meeting the requirement to keep the shuttle extension option viable through the end of April.”

“Those are costs which conceivably could be covered by new funds, even though they are carried under the “Exploration” account, not the “Space Operations” account. NASA needs permissive authority to transfer funds between accounts, but that can be handled.”

Those new funds refer to the $1 billion lawmakers have allocated within what is now a $789 billion economic stimulus package that was passed by the US Senate on Tuesday, and successfully negotiated with Congress on Wednesday..

Out of the $1 billion, $400m is currently tagged under the “Exploration” account, which NASA could use for whatever purposes they require under each account allocation for 2009 and 2010.

While this increase in funds is not part of the billions required to extend the shuttle past 2010, any additional money is good news, and will at least allow for some “initial steps” to be taken on reducing the gap.

“The money is a budget increase, in that it is “new money” added to the designated accounts within NASA’s existing budget structure, and is available to be used for the purposes intended. The bill simply requires that NASA notify the Appropriations Committee of its intended use for the funds,” added Mr Bingham.

“NASA needs at least $2 billion a year above its previously-planned top line to be able to effectively operate its various programs and to have any chance of reducing the gap in human spaceflight. Thus, it needs to find “new money” whenever and wherever it can.

“The inclusion of any NASA money in this particular bill represents a positive recognition that NASA programs offer economic benefit to the country, as opposed to simply being a fancy and adventurous “luxury.” That is a very important point, irrespective of the amount of money involved or even the “targeted use” for which it is appropriated.”

NASA is also waiting on new leadership, with the eventual replacement for Mike Griffin still expected to be some time away. Reducing the gap, via shuttle extension, Constellation acceleration, or a mix of both, won’t be fully planned out until the new administrator takes office.

“Right now, there is no cohesive plan by which the US government is looking to address “the Gap.” That is not possible until the new Administration completes its internal organizational and personnel decisions on civil space and then sets its sights on that issue and begins to address it,” Mr Bingham continued.

“The point is, absent such a plan, no one is ready to even guess at specifically “how much” it’s going to cost. But folks in Congress have already been gearing up to be ready to join with the Administration to seek a solution to the gap issue.

“Over the next two or three months, we will hopefully see the Administration get organized on the NASA front with a new Administrator, possibly a new policy structure within the White House, and the initial priorities they will set in a budget request for FY 2010, which is expected in early April.

“During that period, in addition to the development of the 2010 budget request, which is where one should hope and look for the beginnings of a ‘Plan’ for going forward and dealing with the Gap, there will be an additional appropriations bill, in the form of an Omnibus Appropriations, which will provide the amounts needed to fund NASA and other agencies for the remainder of FY 2009, that we are now in.

“The Stimulus package simply represented an ‘opportunity’ to get some additional funding early in ‘the game’ justified by the obvious fact that closing the gap helps secure jobs and avoid too severe a dislocation in an important sector of the economy, aerospace.”

From the standpoint of Constellation, all options are being considered as “fair game” at the political level, when it comes to their respective ability to close the gap.

While acceleration studies have been taking place for Constellation’s Ares and Orion vehicles, the alternative options of utilizing EELV vehicles – such as the Delta IV Heavy or the Atlas V Heavy – have been touted, along with the “Direct” proposal of using their Shuttle Derived Jupiter launch vehicles – which has gained increased interest and publicity over the last couple of years – to, as they claim, save money, shorten the gap, and avoid the shedding of Orion’s capabilities, as is currently required by Ares I’s performance shortcomings.

Even SpaceX’s Dragon capsule – potentially via a manned version of the COTS program – is considered as part of the ‘fair game’ in finding the best solution to reducing the gap between the retirement of the shuttle and the first manned flight of Orion.

However, it is too early in the process to know if the potential increase in funds would be used to advance studies into Constellation alternatives, but the very possibility such funds would now be available to NASA is also classed as good news.

“As for specific options to close the gap, I would simply say that virtually anything and everything is ‘fair game’ for consideration, and that includes everything from Ares/Orion acceleration, shuttle extension, Direct as a separate alternative, Direct in combination with human-rated EELV, Orion and/or Dragon on an EELV, accelerated COTS-D, etc., etc…it is far too early to know which option or combination of options is going to be likely.

“What is known is that any option is going to require some early money to be viable, and if some of that necessary money can be made available through the Stimulus package, that’s great, and that is the “good news” about this development.”

L2 members: Documentation – from which part of the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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