SLS History:

Not unlike most launch vehicles, SLS has suffered from a complicated birth, most of which was not of its own doing – as the political element of NASA decision making process questioned the motives of the design, and even the need for a HLV.

Regardless, the wait is now over, as the in-line SD HLV has finally been revealed in the official arena, after a heavily delayed announcement by General Bolden – flanked by lawmakers – on Wednesday.

For SLS/HLV Articles, click here: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/hlv/

“The next chapter of America’s space exploration story is being written, right here, right now. We’ve selected the design for a new space exploration system that will take humans far beyond Earth. This important decision will create high-quality jobs here at home and provide the cornerstone for America’s future human space exploration efforts,” noted the General in an address to employees.

In fact, the chapter – from an in-line SD HLV standpoint – was technically written years ago, and even earlier if taking into account the often-ridiculed mix of NASA engineers and space enthusiasts which created the Direct (Jupiter) alternative to the Constellation Program (CxP), itself based on an old Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) concept.

With the Constellation Program cancelled, the SD HLV launch system started to receive an official groundswell of interest, with General Bolden himself – back in January, 2010 – reviewing one of the subsequent trade studies, which showed the in-line HLV as the winning configuration.

With the President’s FY2011 budget proposal effectively putting the HLV on a five year backburner – in order to “study game-changing propulsion” – the highly unpopular outline for NASA’s future was itself realigned via the Senate’s 2010 Authorization Act, which put its weight behind a Space Launch System (SLS) which utilized both Constellation (Ares) and Shuttle hardware.

Under the guidance of the Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT), three Requirements Analysis Cycle (RAC) teams undertook what was by far the most in-depth evaluation of all types of HLV.

RAC-1 studied in-line, LH2 core vehicles with Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB). While this vehicle was based around the SD HLV, the teams avoided the use of such a name, given they were allowed to trade Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) with RS-68s, while also trading SRBs with Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs), in order to ensure they have the best configuration to battle with the other HLV candidates.

RAC-2 studied a Saturn V-type vehicle, utilizing an RP-1 first stage and LH2 second stage. Like RAC-1, the team was allowed to trade different engine options, within their designated configuration. RAC2 included SpaceX’s Falcon XX (huge vehicle with six Merlin 2 engines) in the trades. Ironically, the announced SLS was given the fanfare of being more powerful than the Saturn V.

RAC-3 studied vehicle designs based around several options, such as EELVs, with a large amount of latitude to study different tank sizes, including the evaluation of clusters of Atlas-sized tanks similar to how the Saturn IB first stage was built.

While some people associated with losing vehicle options claim the study process was automatically aligned to favor the SD HLV, this configuration officially won, as the records show.

Becoming the Design Reference Vehicle (DRV), the SD HLV had to endure a sustained political attack, as the preliminary version of a final report – demanded by the 2010 Authorization Act – insisted the vehicle could not be affordable under the requirements, prior to listing numerous caveats that such findings were incomplete.

With future evaluations centered at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) under the RAC process, confidence was high that a compliant outline could be presented, which eventually resulted in a completed overview ahead of STS-135 – a timeline which allowed for the announcement, albeit late, to be made on STS-135′s launch day.

The July 8 announcement, which was even noted by Atlantis’ commander Chris Ferguson, was then cancelled, as a stalling process was put into effect, apparently under the order of the White House. This process was classed as a requirement for an independent costing assessment, to be carried out by Booz Allen. Such a process would delay the final report yet further.

Even after the cost assessment process was complete, no announcement was made, much to the anger of several Senators involved with the Authorization Act, brought to a head when a – somewhat mis-written – cost overview was leaked to the Wall Street Journal, in what is claimed to be an attempt to create large-scale opposition from within the space community.

It backfired, as the leaked report caused several meetings between political and NASA heads, based around revealing the true cost estimate findings, and ultimately leading to a joint agreement between all relevant bodies. This agreement paved the way for Wednesday’s official announcement of the vehicle.

“This launch vehicle decision is the culmination of a months-long, comprehensive review of potential designs to ensure that the nation gets the best possible rocket for the investment – one that is not only powerful but is also evolvable so it can be adapted to different missions as opportunities arise and new technologies are developed,” added General Bolden.

“The selection of the vehicle needed to transport our astronauts beyond low Earth orbit is one of the most important decisions NASA will make this decade, and it requires a major commitment on the part of the American people. That’s why we took the time to get it right.

“The hard work and expertise of you in the NASA Family have brought us to this point and will be critical as we continue to do the big things only NASA can do and challenge ourselves as a people to reach our highest potential. The future is bright for exploration, and we can be proud of the major step forward we are taking today.”

SLS – The Vehicle:

Heavily based on Shuttle heritage hardware, the design of the vehicle has been known for some time – as reported by this site. There will be two major roles for SLS, one is to launch cargo and one to launch the Orion (MPCV).

The core stage is an 8.4m diameter “External Tank” heritage system, with the top converted to host the Upper Stage structure, and the aft restructured to house the Main Propulsion System (MPS) – which will drive what will initially be three Space Shuttle Main Engines (RS-25Ds).

The system is designed to eventually fly with five engines in the core.

This core effort – to be hosted at the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans - is said to be one of the biggest challenges for the engineering work on SLS. Some “pathfinder” work, conducted by Boeing, has already been completed.

The role of Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR) is now official, with SLS’ path towards its 2017 IOC (Initial Operating Capability) ready to utilize the 12 RS-25Ds available for one-off roles with SLS flights, following their transition from the Space Shuttle Program (SSP).

The Kennedy Space Center’s stock of SSMEs consists of the three orbiter sets, now removed from the vehicles, and three engines which made up the spare set.

It has also been confirmed that there will be a transition to the expendable version of the SSME, known as the RS-25E, either after the four sets of RS-25Ds have been used, or after two additional RS-25D sets have been manufactured – per reserved stock at PWR.

The eventual engine driving the core stage is confirmed as the RS-25E, a cheaper engine due to its expendable nature.

As reported, the three shuttle orbiters are now very likely to see their orbiter MPS plumbing and hardware donated to the SLS program.

Discovery’s MPS is likely to be used on test structures, while Atlantis and Endeavour’s MPS are likely to ride with SLS-1 and SLS-2.

Final evaluations are taking place into this $20m effort, with the next SLS article to overview the latest status presentations (L2).

SLS-1 and potentially SLS-2 will ride with ATK’s five segment boosters, although the competition for the confirmed booster of choice for the remainder of SLS’ lifetime will begin shortly.

With the Core designed to be compliant with several booster options - so as not to prejudice to the competition – working with commonality on the core interfaces, and standard approach of the boosters providing stability for the vehicle when attached to the pad, will be some of the baseline requirements.

While the competition will involve a number of booster options, ATK have already published a statement showing their confidence in continuing with SLS through its lifetime.

“ATK applauds NASA’s decision to move forward with a Space Launch System for human deep space exploration. We are proud that NASA will utilize ATK’s five-segment solid rocket motors as the baseline design for the initial flights,” noted the Utah-based company.

“ATK’s five-segment boosters provide unmatched capability and we will deliver this performance within the current budget. We are confident in the design and look forward to the early test flights to demonstrate our capability.

“We are also well positioned to compete for the final design because of our proven performance and a thrust-to-weight ratio of our solid rocket motors which are ideally suited for first stage propulsion.”

As far as ATK’s approach for the fully evolved SLS vehicle, source notes claim a future static test could be provided as a pathfinder test for an upgraded booster.

Such potential upgrades to the booster may include recently proposed change to a HTPB (Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene) fueled solid in “composite over wrapped steel cases” thus allowing higher MEOP (Maximum Expected Operating Pressure) – to as much as 1500 psi. This could become key, with NASA mentioning the competition will be mainly looking into the performance numbers of the booster candidates.

As previously reported, there are also proposals to use lighter weight nozzles with expansion ratios up to 12:1, although such a large scale change would require study at least at a Ground Support Equipment (GSE) level, given its relation to Launch Platform design.

SLS will launch from a modified version of the Ares Mobile Launcher (ML), which means ATK’s Liberty Launch System – should it survive the commercial crew evaluations – will have to find a new launch platform to host its rollout and launch from Pad 39B.

A second ML, or a major conversion to the Shuttle Mobile Launch Platform (MLP-3), will be the likely options available to the Ares-1 style vehicle.

The SLS vehicle is being designed with an Upper Stage, which will be evaluated up to the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) stage. This Upper Stage will be driven by the Constellation-born J-2X engine, currently undergoing initial testing at the Stennis Space Center.

The vehicle will be able to fly without the Upper Stage, and in some cases would fly with a smaller replacement in the form of a Delta IV “Kick Start” Upper Stage system.

SLS will not be decked out in the Saturn V “White and Black” paint, as seen in graphics of the vehicle, which sources note was only for publicity purposes. The vehicle will sport the orange “spray applicated” Thermal Protection System (TPS) foam, as seen on the Shuttle External Tanks.

SLS – Forward Work:

It now appears – as noted at the time – that the initial schedules and costings (leaked or otherwise) were based on worst case estimations, with only the 2017 opening launch date for the vehicle confirmed during Wednesday’s announcement.

The fear the second SLS mission – which would be the first crewed launch – would have to wait until 2021, a four year gap between flights, is now heavily associated with only a total worst case scenario, “the disaster schedule” as one source claimed.

Instead, an increased flight rate, based mainly on finding additional uses of the large fairing design and upmass capability of SLS, has been intimated. Former Space Shuttle Program (SSP) manager John Shannon has also been tasked with creating a schedule and mission architecture for the vehicle.

Work on a schedule and funding path is being worked internally by NASA and in the political arena, but as of this week, no long-term schedule can be cited until the key driver of the funding profile – which is classed as still under consideration, and not final – is officially created.

A lot will depend on what the Congress is able to provide through the annual appropriations process, with the only “official” targeted flight being SLS-1, in 2017. This date is set, with no allowance for it to slip to the right, even in the event of unexpected funding issues.

Work on later goals – such as the Upper Stage for the 130mt version of SLS, or mission content for SLS flights – would instead be slipped or re-worked to protect the 2017 date, which is likely where the “worst case” 2021 date for SLS-2 – and the low flight rate through to 2032 – was formed, based on a scenario where initially achieving the 2017 IOC date suffered from major issues.

Wednesday’s official announcement is vital to SLS, as it enables NASA to now have an approved, focused program planning effort to initiate work that will lead to the usual Systems Requirements Review and Preliminary Design Reviews.

This will lead to final determination of cost and schedule, as is normally the case with any new major vehicle development.

Next up on this path will be the procurement process, which includes meetings this week, through to next week, ahead of an industry day meeting later this month.

As mentioned, the core stage work will be the main opening challenge for the engineering teams, which in turn will drive the vehicle’s major milestone of the PDR, currently scheduled for early 2013.

Earlier key milestones (L2) cite October 24, 2011, for the SRR (System Requirements Review) Checkpoint, and February 15, 2012 for the combined SRR/SDR (System Design Review) kickoff.

(Images: Via L2 content, driven by L2′s new SLS specific L2 section, which includes, presentations, videos, graphics and internal updates on the SLS and HLV. Other images via NASA, ATK and Philip Metschan)

(L2 is – as it has been for the past several years – providing full exclusive SLS coverage, available no where else on the internet. To join L2, click here: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/l2/)

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Senate “Compromise” Bill:

The bill – to authorize the programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 – provides $58 billion for NASA over that three year period. It was passed by a vote of 304 yeas, versus 118 nays, with 10 non voters.

Once the bill came up for debate late in the day on Wednesday, a string of lawmakers outlined their support for S. 3729, citing the need to protect the workforce from further widescale cuts, through to the more dramatic claims that President Obama was aiming to destroy manned space flight via his FY2011 budget proposal.

Only one voice was heard in opposition, when Arizona Representative Gabrielle Giffords took a large amount of the debating time to cite her strong opposition to passing the bill – which was expected following her previous stance, and continued calls to reject all bills which threatened to cancel the Constellation Program.

“This is a bad bill, this will do damage to NASA and should be voted down,” noted Rep. Giffords, before moving into a tirade against the content of the bill, claiming the provision for a HLV was for a vehicle that was designed by Senators, not NASA engineers.

Despite Rep. Giffords leading the movement against the compromise bill – mainly via her personal preference to the now-defunct Constellation Program (at least major elements of the program) – along with some diluted support from several lawmakers, including the chairman of the House Science and Technology Committee, Rep. Bart Gordon, the debate ended with a voiced vote which recorded a majority support for the bill.

Initially it appeared the bill was going to pass there and then, until Rep. Giffords called for a recorded vote at the last moment. Lawmakers then had to wait several hours until the business of the house worked it way though the schedule to allow for an electronic vote. The result finally passed the bill, 304 to 118.

Earlier in the day, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden – who has been underfire over his role with the creation of the FY2011 budget outline and rollout – made an official statement of support for the Senate Bill.

“Today, a historic vote will occur in the House of Representatives on a comprehensive NASA authorization bill that is expected to chart the future course of human space flight for years to come.  I am hopeful that S. 3729 – the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 – will receive strong support in the House and be sent onto the President for his signature,” noted General Bolden.

“Earlier this year, President Obama laid out an ambitious new plan for NASA – one that helps blaze a new trail of innovation and discovery. His plan would invest more in NASA; extend the life of the International space station; launch a commercial space transportation industry; foster the development of path-breaking technologies; help create thousands of new jobs; and embark on a fundamentally more ambitious strategy to expand our frontiers in space.

“Passage of this bill represents an important step forward towards helping us achieve key goals the President has laid out. If passed, the bill would help put the U.S. space program on a more sustainable trajectory and inspire a new generation of Americans to pursue careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. This important change in direction will not only help us chart a new path in space, but can help us retool for the industries and jobs of the future that will be vital for long term economic growth.

“I also salute our dedicated employees for continuing their good work and keeping their eyes on the prize during these important deliberations. Our workforce has proven time and again that it can meet any challenge. Congress and the President are once again calling on us to step up and move this nation forward in space exploration.”

Notably, General Bolden made no reference to what is arguably the centrepiece of the Senate Bill, a HLV which will utilize major elements from both the Shuttle and Constellation Programs. All current studies continue to show a preference for an inline SD HLV, with the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) set to take the lead on the project.

The HLV – to be ready to launch by 2016 – will initially provide a backup to commercial fleet, prior to a leading role as the NASA vehicle for Beyond Earth Orbit (BEO) exploration.

General Bolden also made no reference to STS-135, which now receives funding via the Senate Bill – noted as the final hurdle for the mission, following the creation of a mission baseline and the successful conclusion to the required safety assessments. General Bolden was previously quoted by the BBC during a tearful interview as saying there would not be any additional shuttle missions past STS-134.

Following the Senate Bill’s successful passage through Congress, General Bolden made a second statement – again making no reference to a HLV or the additional shuttle mission, once again claiming the Senate Bill is an important step forward towards helping us achieve the key goals set by the President, even though the Bill is a major refinement of the FY2011 budget proposal.

“We thank the Congress for their thoughtful deliberations about NASA’s future over the past months. Both the House and the Senate provided insight, ideas and direction that were truly exemplary of the democratic process. It is clear that our space program inspires passion and dedication across party lines, and for that we are truly thankful,” noted the NASA Administrator.

“This important vote today in the House of Representatives on a comprehensive NASA authorization charts a vital new future for the course of human space exploration. We are grateful that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 received strong support in the House after its clearance in the Senate, and can now be sent on to the President for his signature.

“The President has laid out an ambitious new plan for NASA that pioneers new frontiers of innovation and discovery. The plan invests more in NASA; extends the life of the International Space Station; launches a commercial space transportation industry; fosters the development of path-breaking technologies; and helps create thousands of new jobs. Passage of this bill represents an important step forward towards helping us achieve the key goals set by the President.

“This important change in direction will not only help us chart a new path in space, but can help us retool for the industries and jobs of the future that will be vital for long term economic growth. NASA appreciates all of the hard work and effort that has gone into advancing this legislation.”

The next key step for the Bill will come when S. 3729 appears in the White House, requiring the signature of the President. The President holds the power to veto the Bill, although such a drastic measure is not expected.

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The Compromise Bill:

Since initially passing different NASA Authorization acts for FY 2011 in August 2010, the House of Representatives and the Senate appeared to be at impasse regarding the future of the premiere space agency. 

Since, under U.S. law, both bills required reconciliation into one bill – approved then by the House and Senate – before being sent to the President’s desk for approval or veto, a compromise in the bicameral legislature was finally proposed and submitted for review by the House Committee on Science and Technology.

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NASA managers have been looking into the possibility of reducing the gap between the last shuttle flight, currently STS-133 in mid 2010 – with STS-134 not yet officially baselined – and the first manned flight of Ares I, carrying Orion 2 on the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) NET (No Earlier Than) March, 2015.

Acceleration studies have been taking place, but due to shortfall/overspend of funds available to Constellation – restricted yet further by expenditure on problem solving, such as Thrust Oscillation – any get-wells on the timeline have been related to the culling of a number of tests on hardware elements such as the Upper Stage.

Currently, Orion’s first crew rotation role with the International Space Station (ISS), know as Full Operational Capability (FOC), remains manifested as Orion 4, in 2016.

Funding shortages are also likely to delay Ares I-X’s test flight from Pad 39B at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) from July to as late as October of this year. It would likely take an injection of a few billion dollars to advance the whole Constellation program by around a year.

From the shuttle side, extending the program past 2010, by three flights, two years (five flights minimum) or even five years, would also cost billions. However, with the shuttle deemed as a “working system”, this option is understood to have wider support, notably at the political level.

Pre-empting the possibility of extending the shuttle program, the US Senate passed a new NASA Authorization Bill that outlined the ambitions of the space program, from taking “all necessary steps” to add STS-134′s mission to deliver the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) to the ISS, to working options for shuttle extensions.

The Bill also directed NASA to terminate or suspend (until April 30, 2009) any activities that would preclude flying the Shuttle after FY 2010. Extension studies have been more or less completed, with a White Paper outlining several options and costs by shuttle contractors already sent to NASA HQ.

Work behind the scenes, by way of discussions, are taking place on the roadmap for reducing the gap, mainly via talks with the NASA Advisory Council.

“At the NASA Advisory Council was held at KSC, with topics similar to those presented at the FRR (Flight Readiness Review) were discussed, along with updates on Soyuz issues,” noted one memo on L2 this month. “Other topics presented concerned commercial resupply services, the possibility of shuttle extension, and the Constellation Program acceleration.”

Discussions with Advisory Council range from extending the shuttle, to accelerating the Constellation manifest, although no firm decisions are expected anytime soon.

“(Shuttle Manager) Mr. (John) Shannon talked to the NASA Advisory Council last week after the FRR. That was a very good discussion. They are waiting, just like us, for a new administrator,” added another L2 acquired note on February 9. “They had a lot of really good comments about how NASA does its budget.

“They collected some data for us on the Cx Acceleration plans. We talked a little bit about Shuttle Extension regarding our assets and what could be done. They will fold all of that into some recommendations. Don’t expect anything near term on that.”

A final report on extension options was due 120 days after enactment of the law (NASA Authorization Bill), or on February 15. However, lawmakers have asked NASA to hold off on delivery of the report until the new Obama Administration can evaluate and make inputs – since it currently reflects the conclusions of the previous leadership. Bush/Griffin NASA leadership, which of course was rigidly “stay-the-course.” We’re looking at a mid-March delivery date at this stage.

A delivery date of mid-March is now expected, with the goal of working out a roadmap for the physical purchasing of assets that would allow for the extension to begin in June. However, getting to the point of approving extension is still some time away.

“The specific issue of shuttle extension as part of a solution to the gap is still TBD (To Be Decided), as a policy matter,” noted Jeff M. Bingham, Senior Adviser on Space and Aeronautics, Republican Staff Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, to NASASpaceflight.com.

“As a practical matter, there are things that will need to be done – starting no later than June – to prepare for extended shuttle operations, such as purchasing long lead-time items for ETs, etc., so that extension could be as seamless as possible, and not have a ‘gap within a gap’ in terms of being able to field shuttles for flights.

“We are expecting a formal report from NASA, required under our 2008 bill, which will tell us what steps – and what costs – are involved in meeting the requirement to keep the shuttle extension option viable through the end of April.”

“Those are costs which conceivably could be covered by new funds, even though they are carried under the “Exploration” account, not the “Space Operations” account. NASA needs permissive authority to transfer funds between accounts, but that can be handled.”

Those new funds refer to the $1 billion lawmakers have allocated within what is now a $789 billion economic stimulus package that was passed by the US Senate on Tuesday, and successfully negotiated with Congress on Wednesday..

Out of the $1 billion, $400m is currently tagged under the “Exploration” account, which NASA could use for whatever purposes they require under each account allocation for 2009 and 2010.

While this increase in funds is not part of the billions required to extend the shuttle past 2010, any additional money is good news, and will at least allow for some “initial steps” to be taken on reducing the gap.

“The money is a budget increase, in that it is “new money” added to the designated accounts within NASA’s existing budget structure, and is available to be used for the purposes intended. The bill simply requires that NASA notify the Appropriations Committee of its intended use for the funds,” added Mr Bingham.

“NASA needs at least $2 billion a year above its previously-planned top line to be able to effectively operate its various programs and to have any chance of reducing the gap in human spaceflight. Thus, it needs to find “new money” whenever and wherever it can.

“The inclusion of any NASA money in this particular bill represents a positive recognition that NASA programs offer economic benefit to the country, as opposed to simply being a fancy and adventurous “luxury.” That is a very important point, irrespective of the amount of money involved or even the “targeted use” for which it is appropriated.”

NASA is also waiting on new leadership, with the eventual replacement for Mike Griffin still expected to be some time away. Reducing the gap, via shuttle extension, Constellation acceleration, or a mix of both, won’t be fully planned out until the new administrator takes office.

“Right now, there is no cohesive plan by which the US government is looking to address “the Gap.” That is not possible until the new Administration completes its internal organizational and personnel decisions on civil space and then sets its sights on that issue and begins to address it,” Mr Bingham continued.

“The point is, absent such a plan, no one is ready to even guess at specifically “how much” it’s going to cost. But folks in Congress have already been gearing up to be ready to join with the Administration to seek a solution to the gap issue.

“Over the next two or three months, we will hopefully see the Administration get organized on the NASA front with a new Administrator, possibly a new policy structure within the White House, and the initial priorities they will set in a budget request for FY 2010, which is expected in early April.

“During that period, in addition to the development of the 2010 budget request, which is where one should hope and look for the beginnings of a ‘Plan’ for going forward and dealing with the Gap, there will be an additional appropriations bill, in the form of an Omnibus Appropriations, which will provide the amounts needed to fund NASA and other agencies for the remainder of FY 2009, that we are now in.

“The Stimulus package simply represented an ‘opportunity’ to get some additional funding early in ‘the game’ justified by the obvious fact that closing the gap helps secure jobs and avoid too severe a dislocation in an important sector of the economy, aerospace.”

From the standpoint of Constellation, all options are being considered as “fair game” at the political level, when it comes to their respective ability to close the gap.

While acceleration studies have been taking place for Constellation’s Ares and Orion vehicles, the alternative options of utilizing EELV vehicles – such as the Delta IV Heavy or the Atlas V Heavy – have been touted, along with the “Direct” proposal of using their Shuttle Derived Jupiter launch vehicles – which has gained increased interest and publicity over the last couple of years – to, as they claim, save money, shorten the gap, and avoid the shedding of Orion’s capabilities, as is currently required by Ares I’s performance shortcomings.

Even SpaceX’s Dragon capsule – potentially via a manned version of the COTS program – is considered as part of the ‘fair game’ in finding the best solution to reducing the gap between the retirement of the shuttle and the first manned flight of Orion.

However, it is too early in the process to know if the potential increase in funds would be used to advance studies into Constellation alternatives, but the very possibility such funds would now be available to NASA is also classed as good news.

“As for specific options to close the gap, I would simply say that virtually anything and everything is ‘fair game’ for consideration, and that includes everything from Ares/Orion acceleration, shuttle extension, Direct as a separate alternative, Direct in combination with human-rated EELV, Orion and/or Dragon on an EELV, accelerated COTS-D, etc., etc…it is far too early to know which option or combination of options is going to be likely.

“What is known is that any option is going to require some early money to be viable, and if some of that necessary money can be made available through the Stimulus package, that’s great, and that is the “good news” about this development.”

L2 members: Documentation – from which part of the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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The official protest comes shortly after all three companies were debriefed by NASA’s Source Evaluation Board (SEB) on the outcome of the award – which opted to hand Orbital 54 percent of the contract, and SpaceX 46 percent, with Planetspace missing out.

Planetspace’s team of legal teams have submitted a protest to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) – which is the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of the United States Congress, citing 19 separate legal issues.

Drawing exception to multiple items in the award, Planetspace’s main problem relates to what they feel was NASA Associate Administrator for Space Operations Bill Gerstenmaier’s dilution of the findings presented by the SEB in relation to Planetspace’s bid, as noted in the 21 page Source Selection Statement (available in full on L2).

“On December 15, 2008, I met with the members of the Source Evaluation Board (SEB) appointed to evaluate proposals for the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) Contract Solicitation,” wrote Gerstenmaier in an opening overview of the award.

“CRS is a Firm-Fixed Price (FFP), Commercial, Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) procurement. This acquisition is a multiple award contract for a minimum guarantee dollar value for 20 metric tons (MT) of upmass.

“The scope of the CRS effort includes the following tasks: the delivery of pressurized and/or unpressurized cargo to the International Space Station and the disposal of cargo or return of cargo to NASA from the International Space Station. In addition, there are Non-Standard Services and Special Task Assignments and Studies that can be ordered to support the primary Standard Resupply Service.

“On April 14, 2008, the contracting officer issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) with a past performance proposal receipt date of May 27, 2008, and technical and price proposals receipt date of June 30, 2008. Five offerors responded to the Past Performance due date; however, only three offerors submitted the Offer, Mission Suitability, and Price volumes.

“The fully respondent offeror’s are Orbital Sciences Corporation, PlanetSpace Incorporated and Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) Corporation.

“RFP Section VII, Evaluation, states that Mission Suitability is more important than Price. It also States, under the Mission Suitability heading of this Section, that NASA will consider a contractor that provides the full range of services more favorably. This full range is defined in the RFP as internal and external upmass, disposal downmass and return downmass.

Scoring System.

A scoring system was used to evaluate the capability of each company – this was called he “Mission Suitability factor” – which was weighted and scored on a 1000 point scale. The bidding company’s past performance was evaluated as “part of each distinct Mission suitability subfactor.”

The 1,000 point value was divided into three subfactors: Technical Approach, Management Plan, and Small Business Utilization. Mission Suitability was also evaluated and rated by percentage rankings.

“The SEB evaluated each proposal on the basis of Mission Suitability and Price in accordance with the criteria in the solicitation. On August 29, 2008, the Contracting Officer determined that all three offerors’ proposals should fall within the competitive range. I concurred with the Contracting Officer’s determination,” noted Mr Gerstenmaier.

“Accordingly, the Board invited all three offerors to participate in written and oral discussions. and each was given the opportunity to correct, clarify, substantiate, or confirm the contents of its respective proposal and to submit a final proposal revision (FPR), as well as a signed model contract reflecting the offeror’s intent to be bound contractually.

“After considering the results of the FPR, the Board concluded its final evaluation and determined the Mission Suitability scores for the proposals.”

The scores resulted in Planetspace ‘beating’ Orbital, with SpaceX listed first. However, that only proved to be part of the story, as Planetspace lost its position in the final evaluation.

“SEB Findings: The SEB gave the Orbital Sciences Corporation proposal an overall Mission Suitability score of 796 points out of the maximum 1000 points. On the subfactor level Orbital’s proposal was determined to be “Very Good” in Technical Approach, “Very Good” in Management Approach, and “Good” for Small Business Utilization.

“The SEB gave the PlanetSpace proposal an overall Mission Suitability score 827 points out of a maximum 1000 points. On the subfactor level, PlanetSpace’s proposal was determined to be “Very Good” in Technical Approach, “Very Good” in Management Approach, and “Very Good” for Small Business Utilization.

“The SEB gave the SpaceX proposal an overall Mission Suitability Score of 877 points out of a maximum 1000 points. On the sub factor level, SpaceX’s proposal was determined to be “Very Good” in Technical Approach, “Very Good” in Management Approach, and “Very Good” for Small Business Utilization.”

Orbital’s SEB Evaluation.

The Mission Suitability Evaluation for each company overviewed the specifics of each strength and weakness of the bidding companies, of which Orbital was deemed to have one significant strength, five strengths, four weaknesses, no significant weaknesses and no deficiencies in its Technical Approach for a rating of “Very Good.”

“Orbital’s significant strength was within one of four technical subfactors, ISS Resupply Mission Performance Plan,” noted the document.

“This significant strength noted Orbital’s detailed CRS operational concept which clearly demonstrated their comprehension of the scope, content, and complexity of resources required to execute individual missions and integrate multiple vehicles simultaneously to meet NASA’s annual task order demand.

“The concept of operations included key mission integration activities, milestones, reviews and products from Authority to Proceed (ATP) until End of Mission.”

In the Management Approach subfactor, Orbital’s proposal had three significant strengths, three strengths, one weakness, no significant weaknesses and no deficiencies for a rating of “Very Good”

“Orbital received all three significant strengths in one of the three subfactors, Company Information. Orbital received a significant strength for its approach to teaming with highly relevant companies possessing complementary expertise in development, integration and certification,” added the document.

“Orbital, as a prime, has extensive in-house expertise in space launch, manufacturing and operation. Orbital proposed teaming with highly relevant companies to augment its expertise in areas specific to CRS requirements.”

The second significant strength was for “a high degree of comprehension and realism in the proposed management approach fixed-price launch vehicle and spacecraft development, operations, and production,” resulting in high potential to successfully execute the firm fixed-price CRS contract. The third significant strength noted “heritage processes which are derived from best practices on previous, often fixed price, contracts.”

SpaceX’s SEB Evaluation:

The Mission Suitability Evaluation review of SpaceX was a glowing report, with three significant strengths, twelve strengths, no weaknesses, no significant weaknesses and no deficiencies in its Technical Approach for a rating of “Very Good.”

“SpaceX’s significant strengths were within one of the four technical subfactors – System Capabilities and Summary of Performance,” the evaluation noted. “The first significant strength was SpaceX’s approach to an in-house supply chain that avoids outsourcing lead times, reduces external manufacturing delays, and enables effective corrective action response.

“By maintaining multi-mission critical path production in-house and avoiding single source dependencies, SpaceX proposed a very sound approach that greatly enhances schedule efficiencies and reduces overall technical risk to ISS cargo supply.

“The second significant strength was launch vehicle safety and robustness. The Falcon 9 launch vehicle design exceeds requirements by providing a structural factor of safety of 1.4 (versus industry standard of 1.25) which provides added robustness against process and material variations and unexpected flight loads.

“The Falcon 9 also features a dual redundant avionics system and a first stage engine-out capability. These design features which exceed industry standards demonstrate an extremely sound design solution.

“SpaceX’s third significant strength was offering the full range of vehicle services beginning in 2010. They proposed an orbital vehicle configuration that is capable of providing all vehicle services on each mission – internal upmass, external upmass, disposal downmass and return downmass. By offering the full range of vehicle services beginning in 2010, SpaceX provided a highly suitable proposal which substantially enhances NASA’s ability to resupply and sustain the ISS.”

In the Management Approach subfactor, SpaceX’s proposal had one significant strength, four strengths, two weaknesses, no significant weaknesses and no deficiencies for a rating of Very Good. SpaceX’s Small Business Utilization subfactor had one significant strength, no strengths, no weaknesses, no significant weaknesses and no deficiencies for a rating of Very Good.

Planetspace’s SEB Evaluation.

The Mission Suitability Evaluation of Planetspace had three significant strengths, four strengths, three weaknesses, no significant weaknesses and no deficiencies in its Technical Approach for a rating of “Very Good.”

“PlanetSpace’s significant strengths were across three of the four technical subfactors – System Capabilities and Summary of Performance (Past Performance), ISS Integration and Demonstration, and ISS Resupply Mission Performance Plan.

The first significant strength was past performance of the PlanetSpace team’s key personnel and subcontractors in launch and orbital vehicle development, ISS mission and cargo integration, and flight product development.

“Past customer inputs on relevant contracts rated the major subcontractors proposed by PlanetSpace as outstanding, with some ratings of very good,” the evaluations found.

“The second significant strength was for a comprehensive plan for ISS Integration that utilizes sound processes and existing and planned facilities which reduces schedule and technical risk and demonstrates a realistic approach to interface testing, verification closure and procedures development.

“The third significant strength was for a comprehensive description of analytical integration and operational concepts, demonstrating detailed understanding of the interrelationships and complexity of vehicle, cargo, and mission integration processes.

In the Management Approach subfactor, PlanetSpace’s proposal had three significant strengths, four strengths, five weaknesses, no significant weaknesses and no deficiencies for a rating of “Very Good”, with the company receiving significant strengths in two of the three subfactors, listed as Company Information and Safety and Mission Assurance.

“The first significant strength was for past performance of the PlanetSpace subcontractors’ management teams and key personnel,” added the evaluation. “Customers noted a long history of accomplishments and successes by the PlanetSpace subcontractors on highly relevant contracts, such as launch vehicle components and manned spacecraft development, sustaining, processing and operations.

“The second significant strength was for PlanetSpace’s sound teaming arrangements, clear systems engineering and integration (SE&I) responsibilities and comprehensive work-breakdown structure. The third significant strength is for PlanetSpace’s Safety and Health Plan which … an extremely effective and complete approach to preventing injury 10 their employees and visitors and preventing damage to company and NASA property and greatly enhancing CRS production and quality.”

Mr Gerstenmaier’s Findings.

On the “Selection Decision”, the highly regarded Mr Gerstenmaier notes that he evaluated and consulted over the SEB findings, in order to ensure the best value for NASA.

“During the presentation, I questioned the SEB on the findings presented and carefully considered the detailed findings the SEB presented,” he noted. “I solicited and considered the views of key senior personnel at NASA Headquarters and Center representatives during the executive session after the SEB’s presentation.

“These key senior personnel have responsibility related to this procurement and understood the application of the evaluation factors set forth in the RFP. In determining which proposal offered the best value to NASA,” which referred to an evaluation on the RFP’s “Mission Suitability is more important than Price.”

“I believed the SEB had done a thorough job of reviewing the proposals, identifying significant discriminators, explaining how it believed the discriminators would affect performance, and evaluating the proposals without comparing proposals.

“It was my responsibility to compare the proposals using those SEB findings I agreed with and which I found to be discriminators for purposes of selection. My duties also required me to use my independent judgment to determine how the SEB findings identified as discriminators would be used for purposes of selection.

“I carefully applied the evaluation criteria contained in the solicitation when making my award decisions. I agreed with all findings the SEB made regarding any of tile offerors as part of my examination of the SEB presentation; however, I did not always agree with the significance the SEB placed on a particular finding or with the impacts the SEB identified in regards to a finding.”

Mr Gerstenmaier’s Evaluation of SEB’s Orbital Evaluation.

Mr Gerstenmaier went on to evaluate each company via their related SEB findings. Orbital received an expansive overview, in which Mr Gerstenmaier agreed with most of the findings, such as “Orbital’s demonstration of a clear and effective understanding of the scope, content, and complexity of the resources required to produce individual missions and integrate multiple vehicles at once.”

There was also agreement that Orbital had no “significant weaknesses”, with the “one weakness” relating to “certain engines” on their Taurus II launch vehicle.

“During written discussions and in the FPR, Orbital satisfied concerns about its proposed use of certain engines; however, a new concern was raised regarding the Government of Russia’s approval to use these engines on a Taurus II,” noted Mr Gerstenmaier. “I questioned whether the need to obtain approval from the Russian Government would be a discriminator for purposes of selection.

“My senior advisors indicated this finding was properly classified as a regular weakness by the SEB, as opposed to a significant weakness because 1) another company had received approval from the Government of Russia to use these engines on a different US-produced rocket, 2) the approval was being worked at the lower levels in the Russian Government, and 3) Orbital’s U.S. supplier had physical possession of the engines in question.”

The SEB finding that Orbital’s schedule for Service Module Integration and Passive Common Berthing Mechanism development was deemed aggressive was also evaluated.

“The SEB responded that this finding pertained only to the “Early Bird” flight in 2010 and that Orbital is actively managing this risk.”

Mr Gerstenmaier also questioned the SEB finding that the proposed double mid-deck locker did not appear to meet the 53.6 kg requirement.

“Specifically, I asked the SEB whether this finding meant the proposal failed to meet one of the requirements of the solicitation. The SEB responded that this finding highlighted an inconsistency that appeared between the text in multiple areas of the proposal indicating that Orbital would meet this requirement and a single table in the proposal that would not meet the requirement.”

The rest of the overview was highly positive, with Mr Gerstenmaier citing Orbital’s experience with fixed-price contracts coupled with its use of cost controls as “extremely relevant” and that “financial information provided by Orbital demonstrated that Orbital’s cash on hand and financing were sufficient to support activity to complete ISS Integration.”

Mr Gerstenmaier’s Evaluation of SEB’s SpaceX Evaluation.

Mr Gerstenmaier review of the findings on SpaceX agreed with the SEB, regarding the “significant strengths of the technical approach for this proposal,” with praise for the Falcon 9 launch vehicle.

“Falcon 9 launch vehicle design exceeded requirements by providing higher structural margin, first stage engine-out capability, and dual string avionics; and its proposed architecture that would provide a full range of vehicle services in 2010 coupled with the capability to deliver and return a large majority of requested cargo from 2010 through 2015,” noted Mr Gerstenmaier.

“These findings revealed the design of the Falcon 9 was comprehensive in scope, content, and complexity. I was also impressed this was the only proposal that offered to provide a full range of vehicle services in 2010.

“The SEB gave this proposal a significant strength under the Management subfactor for its broad and diverse customer base with multiple commercial, international, and US customers for missions prior to the first CRS mission. Having a broad and diverse customer base greatly decreased the financial risk to NASA prior to the CRS missions and indicated that the commercial market had confidence in SpaceX’s approach.”

Mr Gerstenmaier’s Evaluation of SEB’s Planetspace Evaluation.

Planetspace’s overview by Mr Gerstenmaier – by far the largest write up – is where the company will have drawn a large part of their exceptions to the point of protest. It opened with a negative point in the opening paragraph.

“I noticed this proposal had been substantially rewritten,” which points towards the initial presentations from Planetspace to be inferior to the other bidding companies.

The second paragraph continues to dilute the SEB findings and the strength of Planetspace’s bid, relating to the “first significant strength” for excellent past performance based upon numerous highly relevant NASA and Department of Defence contracts, which the SEB concluded would greatly enhance the likelihood of successful performance.

“The SEB indicated this significant strength was based upon the past performance of subcontractors and not on PlanetSpace’s experience,” noted Mr Gerstenmaier. “The SEB cannot give PlanetSpace negative Past Performance, because it had little or no relevant experience, itself, as a prime contractor.

“I concurred the SEB could not give an offeror a negative evaluation because it had little or no Past Performance; however, I disagreed with the SEB assessment that this finding was a significant strength.

“I determined the significance of this finding was offset by PlanetSpace’s lack of experience in development, production and operation of large, complex space systems and, therefore, concluded this finding was not relevant for purposes of selection.”

While Mr Gerstenmaier agreed with the SEB’s finding of a “significant strength” for Planetspace’s comprehensive plan for ISS integration that utilized existing ISS processes in combination with one of the PlanetSpace subcontractor’s high fidelity test facilities, concerns were raised with the company’s use of an alternate launch vehicle to provide initial cargo delivery capability in December 2011 instead of relying on the still immature new launch vehicle.

“The SEB found this to be a weakness because the proposed use of the alternate launch vehicle still did not meet the cargo resupply requirements in 2010 nor most of 2011. I further noted that PlanetSpace did not propose to provide a full range of vehicle services until December 2013,” he added.

“I questioned whether the delay in full mission capability should have been deemed a significant weakness and whether this proposal could realistically launch pressurized cargo mission using an alternate launch vehicle by December 2011. The SEB responded that, per the RFP, an offeror providing the full range of capabilities would be considered a strength.

“Also, the SEB stated that the initial launch in December 2011 was a weakness, due to its inability to provide resupply services during the first twenty-three months of the demand.

“It was my opinion that the use of the alternate launch vehicle was significant discriminator for selection purposes; PlanetSpace was the only offeror that proposed a configuration requiring verification and integration of its orbital vehicle with two launch vehicles to meet the requirements of CRS, which potentially increases the technical and schedule risk to NASA.

“Further, the SEB informed me that PlanetSpace did not provide sufficient technical detail or an explanation of resources required to integrate and certify the orbital vehicle and NASA cargo for environments on the alternate launch vehicle.”

Mr Gerstenmaier also appeared to class a SEB classification of “weakness” in PlanetSpace’s technical approach as an even larger risk, based on the need for heritage components to be re-qualified to meet the vibro-acoustic environment of the new launch vehicle.

“The SEB indicated this was a general weakness; however, I felt re-qualification posed a significant technical challenge due to loads induced by the first stage solid rocket motor,” he noted.

Another “weakness” also received similar treatment upon Mr Gerstenmaier’s evaluation, which surrounded the static envelope of the payload failing, which was increased without a change to the outside diameter.

“It was my opinion that resolution of the fairing issue would be a significant technical challenge to PlanetSpace because changes in fairing design can drive changes to schedule and cargo environments and reduce upmass capacity,” he added.

“After examining the technical subfactor, I studied PlanetSpace’s Management Approach carefully to verify whether I believed the offeror was capable of assuming the increased technical challenge to qualify an orbital vehicle for two different launch vehicles, re-qualify heritage components for use in the new launch vehicle configuration, and address the fairing issue,” Mr Gerstenmaier continued.

“The SEB gave the proposal three significant strengths in the area of Management: for its management team’s key personnel and subcontractors; for providing additional information on and augmenting its teaming arrangement; and a strength for having an exceptionally effective and complete Safety and Health Plan.

“I concluded two findings were offset as being discriminators for selection because of the absence of a corresponding strength regarding the prime contractor’s abilities to perform the contract. It can be a significant strength to have strong subcontractors: however, I did not believe these findings should be discriminators for selection when almost all of the technical expertise appeared to reside at the subcontractor level.”

However, the strongest issue raised related to Planetspace and its contractor team – which includes Lockheed Martin, Boeing and ATK. Notably, none of these large companies are understood to be involved with the protest action.

“The SEB identified five weaknesses associated with the PlanetSpace Management approach, three of which I found to be significant for purposes of selection,” noted Mr Gerstenmaier. “The first weakness involved the use of cost-plus subcontracts for the large subcontractors until first flight, subcontractors which were responsible for the majority of the work and would be addressing the technical difficulties identified in the proposal.

“The SEB raised this issue during oral and written discussions because the finding was initially identified as a significant weakness in PlanetSpace’s proposal. PlanetSpace retained the same subcontract type in its Final Proposal Revision, but told the SEB it would manage this risk through incentives and cost controls. I believed the subcontracting structure still represented a significant risk to the successful performance of the program.

“I believed it was extremely risky for PlanetSpace to have a fixed-price contract with NASA when most of the effort in the early stages of the contract would be performed under cost type subcontracts. Moreover, I questioned whether PlanetSpace could successfully manage much larger subcontractors responsible for the majority of the performance under the contract.

“Furthermore, although one was not required by the solicitation, I was concerned that the proposal did not contain a backup plan in the event one of the major subcontractors was unable to perform given the sizable amount of responsibilities PlanetSpace proposed to place at the subcontractor level.”

Other issues that were deemed as a greater risk to NASA referred to concerns about how PlanetSpace addressed the issue of Licenses and Permits from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), among other items.

Concluding the Planetspace segment of Mr Gerstenmaier overview, he asked the SEB if they agreed with him on his realigned findings noted in his comments, after he found his overview gave him “a very different picture from the one the SEB presented,” on Planetspace’s bid.

“At the conclusion of the SEB’s briefing on the Technical and Management subfactors, I asked the SEB if they disagreed with my observations on the PlanetSpace proposal. The SEB responded that they understood my thinking; however, they did not believe their evaluation of the Technical subfactor in the PlanetSpace proposal could be influenced by the findings they made in the Management portion of the proposal.

“The SEB told me it was their responsibility to evaluate each proposal in accordance with the evaluation criteria, something which prevented them from mixing the two subfactors in their evaluation. It was my responsibility to integrate the Technical and Management findings. The integration of these subfactors gave me a very different picture from the one the SEB presented.

“The facts from the SEB revealed that the PlanetSpace proposal contained considerable technical risks due to use of two completely different rockets, the need to re-qualify heritage components, and the issue with the fairing margin. Each of these challenges could be met if the offeror had a strong Management approach; however, I concluded the considerable risk inherent in PlanetSpace’s Management approach made the likelihood of successful performance of this proposal remote.

“The SEB and I also agreed on the facts in PlanetSpace’s Management approach; however, I disagreed with the SEB’s overall rating of this sub factor finding certain weaknesses represented a greater risk to PlanetSpace’s performance than the SEB did. For the reasons described above, I concluded these weaknesses in the Management approach proposed by PlanetSpace were significant and relied upon them as part of my basis for selection.”

Mr Gerstenmaier’s Conclusions.

In conclusion, Mr Gerstenmaier again gave another glowing report of SpaceX – which mirrored the SEB findings, noting “overall, I agreed with the SEB’s assessment that SpaceX submitted the highest rated proposal for the CRS requirement.”

Mr Gerstenmairer continued by comparing Orbital’s bid with Planetspace’s bid, by applying the evaluation factors in weighing the relative importance of specific findings in deciding between the remaining offerors.

“I compared these two proposals and noted PlanetSpace offered to provide a full range of services by the end of 2013, while Orbital offered to provide a full range of services in 2012.

“More importantly, the Management approach contained in the PlanetSpace proposal was a key discriminator, since I did not believe the Management approach provided sufficient margin for PlanetSpace to address the technical challenges contained in its proposal.”

“The two aspects of the Management approach in the PlanetSpace proposal that particularly concerned me were 1) the fact that much of the work would be performed on large subcontracts on a cost reimbursement basis while PlanetSpace would be the prime contractor having a firm, fixed-price contract with NASA and 2) the fact PlanetSpace did not project it would recoup its sizable investment in the CRS program until close to the end of the contract.

“These risks made me believe it was highly unlikely PlanetSpace would have the ability needed to address technical challenges in its proposal such as the re-qualification of heritage components to new launch vehicle environment, and the potential changes to fairing size to accommodate unpressurized cargo.

“On the other hand, I found that Orbital, in its role as a prime, was enhanced by having sound and effective subcontractor management processes. This proposal was also augmented by Orbital’s significant strength for utilization of existing processes and tools to manage fixed-price spacecraft development, operations and repetitive production contracts.

“In contrast, PlanetSpace had no relevant experience managing in a fixed-price environment on a contract with this level of complexity, which potentially presents a significant risk in their proposal. I was also concerned that the proposal did not contain a backup plan in the event one of the major subcontractors was unable to perform its sizable responsibilities under this proposal.

“I concluded that the subcontracting team proposed by Orbital had a much smaller role since that team amplified Orbital’s extensive in-house experience in specific areas of the CRS requirements as opposed to being responsible for most of the technical aspects of the proposal as was the case with PlanetSpace.

“Based on my assessment of the complexity and interplay of PlanetSpace’s technical and management risks, I had much higher confidence in Orbital’s ability to provide resupply services on a fixed-price basis. My opinion was bolstered by Orbital’s earlier availability of ISS cargo resupply services and lower schedule and technical risk.

“Therefore, I concluded Orbital had the second best proposal based on Technical and Management subfactors under Mission Suitability. It should be noted I concluded the subfactor on Small Business Utilization under Mission Suitability was not a discriminator for purposes of selection.”

Effectively ending Planetspace’s chances of winning part of the CRS contract award, Mr Gerstenmairer explained that while mission suitability was more important than price – as noted in the RFP – he couldn’t even trade-off between Orbital and Planetspace, due to the his belief that Planetspace could not successfully carry out the contract in the first place.

“Although I recognized the evaluation criteria provided that Mission Suitability was more important than price, I could not conduct “typical” trade-off analysis since I believed there was a low likelihood PlanetSpace could successfully perform the contract. Instead, I believed my decision was whether I would make one award or two awards.

“Although I consider SpaceX a clear choice, I deemed it extremely important to the success of the ISS Program to select multiple suppliers to maximize the probability of ISS cargo resupply after retirement of the Space Shuttle. When considering multiple awards, a more robust approach to cargo resupply is required to ensure NASA does not have to reduce research nor reduce the number of crew members on ISS.

“This assured timely access outweighs the downside of spreading budget across multiple contractors. CRS is a very complex service with high risk of performance.

“In addition, the offerors are providing new space vehicles and industry has a high failure rate on new launch and orbital vehicles. Thus, selecting multiple providers will result in reduced risk to the Agency. Accordingly, I selected Orbital as the second CRS contract based upon my conclusion that two awards was the optimal decision fur the ISS program.”

While the specifics of Planetspace’s legal protest have not been revealed, they will have to be able to ably prove the findings noted in the Source Selection Letter to be incorrect/inaccurate.

It is understood the GAO has to rule within 90 calendar days by law.

L2 members: All documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

No related posts.

The CRS contract deals with the resupply needs of the International Space Station (ISS) after the shuttle retires. However, with a decision date coming within the next few months on extending shuttle to 2012, there remains the possibility that there could be a deferral of a quantity of CRS related launches until 2013. The contracts themselves would not be altered, should NASA decide to extend shuttle.

The award from NASA orders eight flights valued at about $1.9 billion from Orbital and 12 flights valued at about $1.6 billion from SpaceX.

Working on the premise of shuttle retirement in 2010, NASA needed to find a solution to launching up to 150,000 lbs of cargo to the ISS, without the hefty upmass of the shuttle.

The CRS contract – part of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, with funding coming from NASA’s Space Act agreements – will cover at least 44,000 pounds of that requirement, joining with the cargo fleet of vehicles such as the European ATV, Japanese HTV and Russian Progress.

With Tuesday’s award, that fleet is being joined by two new launch systems from SpaceX, based in California, and Orbital Sciences Corp, based in Dulles, Va – well known for their Pegasus launch system and Minotaur family.

OSC’s Taurus II – a new medium class launch vehicle – is scheduled to carry out a COTS demonstration mission in the fourth quarter of 2010. Interestingly, the CRS award schedules the first launch to the ISS as a resupply element in October, 2011, followed up by the second launch in June, 2012. This may be related towards aligning with the projected extension of the shuttle, or funding timelines.

“CRS represents a dramatic departure from NASA’s traditional contracting practices that will be greatly beneficial to both the space agency and the nation’s industrial base,” said Dr. Antonio L. Elias, Executive Vice President and General Manager of Orbital’s Advanced Programs Group, which oversees both the COTS and CRS projects.

The Orbital system will include a new advanced maneuvering spacecraft called Cygnus, along with several interchangeable modules for pressurized and unpressurized cargo. Thales Alenia Space teamed up with Orbital on the cargo modules for the Cygnus vehicle, while the pressurized carriers – based on the Multi-Purpose Logistics Modules – will be built in Italy.

The Cygnus spacecraft to be launched aboard the Taurus II rocket will be capable of delivering up to 2,300 kg of cargo to the ISS and will be able to return 1,200 kg of cargo from the ISS to Earth.

“We are very appreciative of the trust NASA has placed with us to provide commercial cargo transportation services to and from the International Space Station, beginning with our demonstration flight scheduled in late 2010,” said Mr. David W. Thompson, Orbital’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

“The CRS program will serve as a showcase for the types of commercial services U.S. space companies can offer NASA, allowing the space agency to devote a greater proportion of its resources for the challenges of human spaceflight, deep space exploration and scientific investigations of our planet and the universe in which we live.”

A “high-energy second stage” has also been mentioned as one option of utilizing a liquid second stage to increases the payload performance for the OSC system.

SpaceX won their part of the CRS contract via its Falcon 9 launch vehicle - with stages of the vehicle already arriving at SpaceX site at Complex 40, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, ahead of its debut flight in 2009.

Based on the Falcon 1 – which enjoyed its first successful flight on its fourth attempt this year – the Falcon 9 is a two stage, liquid oxygen and rocket grade kerosene (RP-1) powered launch vehicle. It uses the same engines, structural architecture (with a wider diameter), avionics and launch system.

Nine SpaceX Merlin engines power the Falcon 9 first stage with 125,000 lbs-f sea level thrust per engine for a total thrust on lift-off of just over 1.1 Million lbs-f. A single Merlin engine powers the Falcon 9 upper stage with an expansion ratio of 117:1 and a nominal burn time of 345 seconds.

Riding on the Falcon 9 is SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft – which comprises of a pressurized capsule and unpressurized trunk used for Earth to LEO transport of pressurized cargo, unpressurized cargo, and/or crew members.

The Dragon capsule is comprised of three main elements: the Nosecone, which protects the vessel and the docking adaptor during ascent; the Pressurized Section, which houses the crew and/or pressurized cargo; and the Service Section, which contains avionics, the RCS (Reaction Control System) thrusters, parachutes, and other support infrastructure.

In addition, an unpressurized trunk is included, which provides for the stowage of unpressurized cargo and will support Dragon’s solar arrays and thermal radiators.

“The SpaceX team is honored to have been selected by NASA as the winner of the Cargo Resupply Services contract,” said Elon Musk, CEO and CTO, SpaceX.

“This is a tremendous responsibility, given the swiftly approaching retirement of the Space Shuttle and the significant future needs of the Space Station.  This also demonstrates the success of the NASA COTS program, which has opened a new era for NASA in US Commercial spaceflight.”

Losing out is PlanetSpace Inc, who partnered with Boeing, Lockheed Martin and ATK.

They proposed cargo solutions via their Athena III, a three stage vehicle is based on a 2.5 segment Solid Rocket Booster, with an ATK Castor 120 second stage, topped off with an ATK Castor 30 third stage and Orbit Adjust Module (OAM).

The upgraded vehicle would provide an additional 1,560 lbs of payload capability for International Space Station (ISS) missions, carried via the Lockheed Martin and Boeing designed Orbital Transfer Vehicle spacecraft.

The fixed-price indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts will begin Jan. 1, 2009, and are effective through Dec. 31, 2016. The contracts each call for the delivery of a minimum of 20 metric tons of upmass cargo to the space station. The contracts also call for delivery of non-standard services in support of the cargo resupply, including analysis and special tasks as the government determines are necessary.

NASA has set production milestones and reviews on the contracts to monitor progress toward providing services. The maximum potential value of each contract is about $3.1 billion. Based on known requirements, the value of both contracts combined is projected at $3.5 billion.

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