Atlantis and ISS aid Dragon’s future:

The Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Communication Unit rode in the middeck stowage locker on Atlantis during STS-129 late in 2009, before being handed over to ISS crewmembers ahead of the demonstration flights.

The new system will allow ISS crewmembers to monitor and command approaching or departing Dragon spacecraft during cargo delivery missions to the orbiting laboratory.

Led by SpaceX’s soon-to-launch Falcon 9 launch vehicle, the Dragon spacecraft has three demonstration flights planned for its cargo supply version. Dragon is also in the mix to become the a crew transport vehicle for US astronauts heading to the ISS after the shuttle retires.

Among the demo tests will be the capsule’s establishment of communication and relative GPS with ISS at 23 km, before carrying out a fly-by at 10km below the Station, leading to a final demo, which will involve Dragon’s debut rendezvous and capture at the ISS, with the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) transitioning the capsule for mating to the Node 2 Nadir port.

Demo cargo is yet to be manifested for transfer to/from ISS during its 14 day stay on Station, and the schedule remains open-ended, based on the success of Falcon 9′s debut – currently scheduled for next month.

“CUCU provides a bi-directional, half-duplex communications link between Dragon and ISS using existing ISS UHF Space to Space Station Radio (SSSR) antennas, which provides a communication path between MCCX (SpaceX) and Dragon during proximity operations and a command security between ISS and Dragon,” noted STS-129 Flight Readiness Review (FRR) documentation on L2.

“Unit mounted inside a rack on ISS and connected to ISS data, audio, and UHF antenna resources – provides a separate Crew Command Panel (CCP) for crew interface to Dragon.”

The on-orbit checkout of the CUCU began January 25, 2010, when astronaut Jeff Williams, ISS Expedition 22 Commander, who has since returned to Earth, worked with ground-based team members at SpaceX headquarters and ISS mission control in Houston to power-up and check out the new system.

On March 11, SpaceX and NASA Houston performed an additional series of tests, using the new system to send communications between the ISS and the NASA Dryden ground station. This provided a baseline of the radio frequency performance and confirmed the first set of antennas performed as expected and is ready for mission operations.

Additional testing is expected for a second set of antennas as well as ongoing verification of the overall system.

The tests employed live video and telemetry links from the ISS to verify the hardware’s functionality, broadcast and reception signal strengths, and the system’s stability over long-duration operations.

“The success of this series of tests speaks to our close collaboration with NASA as well as the SpaceX process that allowed the rapid development of this new hardware,” said Marco Villa, SpaceX Mission Operations Manager.

“Furthermore, the January tests marked the first official joint operations between SpaceX Mission Control in California, and NASA Mission Control in Houston. Everything went smoothly, and we eagerly anticipate the upcoming Dragon visits to the ISS.”

Developed by SpaceX under a NASA Space Act Agreement, the new system allows for communication between the ISS and SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft while in the vicinity of the ISS. Its design leverages the abilities of the ISS communication systems, providing data exchange with ground-based mission control.

Designed from the beginning to transport crew, SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Dragon spacecraft were selected by NASA to transport cargo to and from the ISS starting in 2011. The $1.6B contract represents 12 flights for a minimum of 20 tons to and from the ISS. The first demonstration flights under the COTS program are scheduled for 2010, following the inaugural launch of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket.

This was the second time an orbiter had provided assistance to SpaceX, following Endeavour’s role with the DragonEye (DE) Detailed Test Objective (DTO) box – with flash LIDAR and data acquisition unit – during STS-127.

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Endeavour’s Status:

Endeavour enjoyed an issue-free rollout to 39A, following first motion out of the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at 4:13am local time on Wednesday morning – just a quarter of an hour behind schedule. Pad Validation work is set to take place later this morning.

“Orbiter: OV-105 / ET-134 / SRB BI-141 / RSRM 109 (VAB HB-1) – The team is working towards a February 7th launch date. S0044, launch countdown simulation was completed Tuesday,” noted Wednesday morning processing information on L2.

“SSV Rollout call to stations was completed at 1700 yesterday and first motion occurred at 0413 EST this morning. S0009 Launch Pad Validation call to stations is targeted for approximately 1030hrs.”

Over the next month, engineers will make final preparations for Endeavour’s 25th voyage to space, including installation of the mission’s payload into Endeavour’s Payload Bay – a task which will take place shortly after the payload is delivered to Pad-A in mid-January.

In all, NASA managers and engineers will spend the next four weeks making final preparations and clearances for Endeavour’s flight via the series of FRRs, the first of which occurs tomorrow: the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) FRR at JSC.

Following the MOD FRR, the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) will conduct its standard two-day FRR on January 19 and 20.

Finally, one week later, the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) will hold their FRR at the Kennedy Space Center on Wednesday, January 27, during which an official launch date for STS-130 will be selected/approved.

STS-130 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-130/

Aiding the FRR process for STS-130 is the extremely clean nature of orbiter Atlantis’ STS-129 flight to the International Space Station in November 2009 in terms of the relatively low number of total IFAs reported by the various departments.

Flight Operations & Integration Review of STS-129:

In all, the Fight Operations & Integration (FO&I) office reported no IFAs for the STS-129 mission.

“SSP Flight Operations & Integration recommends that none of the STS-129 in-flight issues/problems be tracked as new STS-129/ULF3 FO&I IFAs,” notes the FO&I IFA presentation – available for download on L2.

STS-129 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-129/

FO&I is tracking two issues that were observed in-flight. These issues are classed as items of interests and – while not being constraints to STS-130 next month – are, nonetheless, issues which FO&I would like to resolve/understand.

“FO&I will track two in-flight issues as items of interest: ULF3 Urine Processing Assembly (UPA) Distillation Assembly (DA) Containment for Return and ISS Emergency (Fire) Event Not Annunciated by Shuttle Onboard Fault Summary.”

In terms of the UPA DA, “Work performed real-time to secure the DA and protect its tubing and tin sides from damage during entry,” notes the presentation.

The presentation mentions that the safety community performed “real-time” assessments of safety issues for the unscheduled return of the UPA DA on Atlantis. The UPA DA return will be reviewed for “lessons learned” to ensure that, should another ISS component require an unscheduled return on a future Space Shuttle mission, all SSP incorporation tasks are properly outlined.

The second item of interest from FO&I was a failure of the Shuttle Onboard Fault Summary (OFS) to annunciate an ISS Emergency Event (fire).

“ISS Emergency (Fire) Event Not Annunciated by Shuttle Onboard Fault Summary (OFS),” notes the presentation. “The reason for the alarms not heard was investigated by INCO (Instrumentation and Communication Officer) and ODIN (Onboard, Data, Interfaces, and Networks).”

An explanation for the anomaly was explained by INCO and ODIN. FO&I is currently tracking this issue as an item of interest.

KSC IFAs:

In all, 24 items reported post-launch of STS-129 met the NASA Space Transportation System (NSTS) definition of a KSC IFA. Twenty-one of these items were classified as General Pad Debris items and three were classified as System Specific Debris.

All System Specific Debris items have been reviewed and closed, with none of these items being incorporated into the Integrated IFA summary.

Conversely, the 21 General Pad Debris items were – at the time of the IFA review in early December – still “open,” with a final closure date of December 14.

In all, STS-129′s 21 General Pad Debris items is the third highest number since STS-117. The launch’s three System Specific Debris items ties with STS-128 for the lowest number, while the launch’s zero System Specific GSE (Ground Support Equipment) debris items ties for the lowest number with STS-128, STS-125, and STS-119.

Orbiter and Government Flown Equipment IFAs:

In all, the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) and the Government Flown Equipment (GFE) division each reported two IFAs in the wake of STS-129.

For the OPO, the failure of the mid-Starboard Payload Bay Floodlight and the premature stop of a waste dump were the only two items to gain IFA status.

For the mid-Starboard Payload Bay Floodlight #4 failure, “During payload bay floodlight power-up on FD8 (Flight Day 8), the current signature on Main Bus C MPC3 was less than expected for an illuminated floodlight, and the Aft-Port or Mid-Starboard Floodlight was considered suspect,” notes the OPO/GFE IFA presentation – available for download on L2.

During the flight, the crew was asked to troubleshoot the floodlight by moving the power switch to “off” – leading to the mid-Starboard Floodlight #4 being declared failed.

The failure of the floodlight held no impact to the mission or to crew safety. However, the presentation notes that the loss of multiple Payload Bay floodlights could require a Shuttle crew to use hand-held spot lights to “verify latches during Payload Bay Door closure operations.”

This issue is not a constraint to STS-130 (Endeavour), STS-131 (Discovery), or STS-132 (Atlantis).

The second OPO IFA, however, is classified as a constraint to Atlantis’ next mission: STS-132 in May 2010. Nonetheless, it is not a constraint to either STS-130 or STS-131.

This IFA relates to the premature stop of a waste water dump.

“The waste water dump initiated post-undock exhibited a nominal waste dump rate (~2.0 percent/min) until the waste dump rate degraded to ~ 0.3 percent/min,” notes the OPO/GFE presentation. “The dump was terminated by closing the dump valve and nozzle was reheated to ~258 deg F.”

A second dump was also terminated due to an off-nominal dump rate.

Inspections of the waste dump nozzle revealed no ice buildup and a FD-11 Condensate Contingency Water Container dump was successfully performed through the suspect nozzle – which cleared the water dump nozzle as the cause of the waste water dump flow degradation.

“A subsequent waste water tank dump through the High Capacity Filter using the conventional dump configuration was unsuccessful. The waste dump isolation valve was closed for 60 sec and another attempt to dump was unsuccessful.”

The post-flight plan for this IFA is to sample urine from the waste tank and analyze it. The urine filter will also be Removed and Replaced (R&Red) and a biocide and citric acid flush of the waste system will be performed.

On the Government Flown Equipment (GFE) side, the first of the two IFAs pertained to a loss of audio in EV-1′s (spacewalker #1′s) CCA (Communications Cap Assembly).

“During the FD-4 EVA-1, EV1 reported loss of CCA headset audio in his right earphone. Shortly thereafter, EV1 reported to not receive audio at all,” notes the presentation. “EV2 adjusted volume control for EV1 and audio was restored temporarily.”

A post-EVA comm check revealed good comm for the CCA in question. It was later discovered that moisture was present in the CCA left-ear section. The CCA was dried and a new moisture barrier earphone diaphragm was installed prior to EVA-2.

Nonetheless, during airlock depress operations and comm checks before EVA-2, EV1 again reported faint audio and “did not hear the caution and warning test tones when switched to battery power.”

The volume level was maxed but only faint audio was heard. Real-time troubleshooting efforts yielded marginal results.

“Afterward, a comparison test was performed with other CCA headsets using the EV1 suit. It was determined that the receiver audio level in the prime CCA/CCEM for EV1 was lower than nominal when compared with the other CCA headsets when installed in the same configuration.”

The suspect CCA/CCEM were removed from Atlantis and returned to JSC for troubleshooting and repair efforts.

The issue is not a constraint to any downstream Shuttle flight.

The second and final GFE IFA relates to the gobbling of tapes in the WVS 1 V10.

“When attempting to configure the WVS 1 V10 to support wireless video operations on FD-4, the crew reported the WVS 1 V10 recorder was eating videotapes,” notes the presentation.

The WVS 1 V10 was swapped with the Mon 2 V10 and the EVA proceeded as scheduled.

The WVS 1 V10 was removed from Atlantis and returned to JSC for troubleshooting.

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size

No related posts.

Highlighting the second half of 2009 for NASA was the resolution of the Gaseous Hydrogen leaks at the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate on the Shuttle launch pad (which resulted in the successful launch of STS-127/Endeavour in July), the midnight ride of Discovery on STS-128 in August, the amazingly successful test flight of the Ares I-X rocket in October, the discovery of water on the moon in October/November from the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite and the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, and the logistics run of shuttle Atlantis to the ISS in November.

*See also 2009 Review Part 1*

The Gaseous Hydrogen Leaks and the STS-127 – LRO/LCROSS Range Debate:

Kicking off the second half of 2009 for NASA were the launch campaigns for shuttle Endeavour’s STS-127 mission to deliver the Japanese exposed experiment facility to the ISS and the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) and shepherding spacecraft Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) on the Atlas V rocket.

Initially targeting a June 13 liftoff for STS-127, the main constraints facing NASA for Endeavour’s launch window were the scheduled June 17 launch of the LRO/LCROSS mission – a mission which only had a 3-day launch window before standing down until early July – and an imposing Solar Beta Angle Cutout with the ISS that began on June 20 and ran through July 10.

Given the Eastern Range’s need of roughly 48-hours to reconfigure all their tracking and communication equipment between the various vehicles launched from the Cape Canaveral area, Endeavour was constrained to a 3-day launch window in the early morning hours of June 13, 14, and 15 in order to allow LRO/LCROSS to launch on June 17.

This plan was thwarted, however, in the evening hours of June 12 as launch personnel were nearly finished fueling Endeavour’s External Tank (ET) with over 500,000 gallons of Liquid Oxygen (LOX) and Liquid Hydrogen (LH2).

Just before the LH2 tank of the ET entered stable replenish mode, launch personnel noted an abnormally high concentration of gaseous hydrogen around the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP) assembly – a system used to vent the extremely flammable gaseous hydrogen (caused by LH2 boil off inside the LH2 tank) safely away from the Shuttle stack.

Following the scrub of Endeavour’s first launch attempt, NASA mangers reported that the signature of the leak was “nearly identical” to the leak seen during the first launch attempt of STS-119 in March. Since the Removal and Replacement (R&R) of the GUCP Quick Disconnect seals fixed the leak back in March, NASA managers decided to repeat the R&R procedure after obtaining critical data on the area of the leak for a root cause investigation.

However, the R&R of the seals meant that launch of Endeavour would not be possible until the early morning hours of June 17 – two days past the end of Endeavour’s launch window because of the Eastern Range launch conflict with the scheduled June 17 launch of LRO/LCROSS.

Nonetheless, engineers pressed forward with the R&R of the GUCP Quick Disconnect seals while the Agency as a whole began discussions on which mission now had priority.

Ultimately, through cooperation between the Space Shuttle Program, the LRO/LCROSS team, and the Eastern Range, a compromise was reached in which Endeavour would be given a launch opportunity at 5:40a.m. on June 17 while the LRO/LCROSS team would proceed toward a late afternoon/early evening June 18 launch with the understanding that if Endeavour launched on June 17, LRO/LCROSS would have to be delayed until June 19 – the last day of the LRO/LCROSS’ June launch window – because of Eastern Range reconfiguration time constraints.

Per the terms of the agreement, should Endeavour launch on June 17, LRO/LCROSS would take an additional one day delay and launch on June 19. However, should Endeavour scrub for any reason prior to 12 midnight June 17 (a scrub on calendar day June 16), the Eastern Range would undertake a 36-hour reconfiguration effort to allow LRO/LCROSS to maintain its ~5p.m. June 18 launch date/time.

As it would be, the GUCP leak reoccurred during ET fueling on June 16/17 and the launch was officially scrubbed at 1:55a.m. EDT. Later, Shuttle Program managers stated that they would not try to launch Endeavour before July 11 to allow for an investigation into the GUCP leaks.

However, the scrub came nearly two hours after the midnight deadline for LRO/LCROSS on June 18. Nonetheless, the Eastern Range undertook the reconfiguration effort and completed these operations on time for the June 18 launch of LRO/LCROSS. That day, during the final minute of the launch window, the Atlas V rocket carrying LRO/LCROSS lifted off from its seaside launch pad, returning NASA to the moon.

In the days that followed the second scrub of STS-127, engineers focused their attention on a minor misalignment between the GUCP and the External Tank Carrier Assembly (ETCA), the component on the ET to which the GUCP is mated.

In the end, the ETCA was realigned using high fidelity 0.515″ alignment pins and the Flight Seal in the GUCP was replaced.

Once the R&R procedure was complete, a tanking test was performed on July 1 to verify the integrity of the repair and confirm that no leaks were present. The tanking test was a success and no leaks were detected.

This paved the way for the July 11 launch attempt of Endeavour, which was postponed prior to fueling because of extra time needed to clear all of Endeavour’s systems following a lightening strike within the Pad-A perimeter the previous day.

Launch was rescheduled for July 12 but was scrubbed at the T-9 minute and holding mark due to unacceptable weather around the Kennedy Space Center. The launch was further scrubbed on July 13 – again at the T-9 minute and holding mark – due to adverse weather.

NASA stood down on July 14 to replace the Tyvek covers on Endeavour’s Reaction Control System jets and retargeted launch for July 15. The countdown on July 15 was uneventful and at 18:03:10 EDT (6:03:10p.m.) Endeavour lifted off from Pad 39A – on the third Shuttle mission of the year – one day shy of the 40th anniversary of the Apollo 11 launch from the same pad.

In all, STS-127 was the longest Shuttle flight of 2009 lasting nearly 16-days. During the course of the mission, Chris Cassidy became the 500th person to fly into space, a record 13 people lived and worked on the ISS during Endeavour’s docked mission (thanks to the increase of the permanent ISS crew from three people to six people at the end of May 2009), five EVAs (spacewalks) were performed, the Japanese experiment exposure facility was installed to the Japanese Kibo module, and six P6 truss batteries were R&R on the ISS.

Endeavour and her seven member international crew landing safely at the Kennedy Space Center at 10:48a.m. EDT on July 31st on the mission’s first landing opportunity, completing a 15day 16hour 44minute 58second flight.

STS-128 – ET Foam Loss Investigation and PV-12 Fill and Drain Valve Discussion:

With the successful completion of STS-127, attention turned to the next Shuttle mission: the STS-128 logistics flight of Discovery scheduled for late-August.

STS-128′s ground processing flow proved to be extremely interesting, with engineers working through issues with a Solid Rocket Booster Check Valve Filter Assembly, an ET Ice Frost Ramp foam void indication, a Main Bus Controller anomaly, and an Ordnance Cable issue on the ET Vent Arm System.

However, it was the numerous foam liberations from the Intertank region on Endeavour’s External Tank during her July 15 launch that kick started an investigation into why the foam liberated – an investigation that once again highlighted NASA’s strict standards of safety when it comes to the Space Shuttle fleet.

While plug pull tests on Intertank foam from Discovery’s ET confirmed the integrity of the foam bond to that tank, NASA managers demanded that they have all the information possible before clearing Discovery for flight.

In fact, the standard one day Space Operations Mission Director (SOMD) Flight Readiness Review (FRR) at the Kennedy Space Center – the FRR that formally approves each mission for launch – required an additional half day to complete all the necessary discussions.

As such, the possible root cause scenarios for the foam loss coupled with the extremely positive results from over 100 plug pull tests on the backside of the Intertank region on Discovery’s ET gave NASA managers the confidence needed to proceed with launch.

In the end, Discovery was approved for liftoff on August 25 at 1:36a.m. EDT. The countdown was uneventful from a technical perspective; however, heavy rains and lightening over the launch pad and in the KSC area resulted in a scrub of the August 25 attempt at the T-9minute and holding mark.

Launch was reset for the following day. Nonetheless, during fueling operations of the External Tank, the inboard LH2 PV-12 fill and drain valve on Discovery did not close when it was commanded to do so.

Launch Director Pete Nickolenko followed the Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) to the letter, calling a scrub and ordering the draining of Discovery’s ET.

For a stuck “open” fill and drain valve, LCC prevent launch personnel from attempting to cycle the valve under cryogenic conditions (meaning in the presence of Liquid Hydrogen or Oxygen). The theory behind this LCC is that – if there is a serious problem with the fill and drain valve – the launch team does not want to put themselves into a situation where they cycle the fill and drain valve closed and then cannot get it open again.

While the launch team followed these procedures to the letter, there were indications from sensors – both upstream and downstream of the PV-12 fill and drain valve – that the valve had indeed closed when commanded, and that the “open” indication was a sensor error in the valve itself.

As such, engineers conducted multiple ambient (meaning without the presense of Liquid Hydrogen) cycles of the valve. During these tests, the valve performed nominally.

This allowed Shuttle mangers to approve a third launch attempt for Discovery 22-minutes after midnight on Friday, August 28 while they reviewed a potential revision to the current LCC document (actually a reversion to a previous LCC rule) that would allow them to cycle the PV-12 valve under cryogenic conditions should they receive a sensor indication that the valve failed to close on the Friday morning attempt.

Nonetheless, extensive engineering conversations took place in regard to this LCC change and the possible scenarios that could occur if they launched with a PV-12 valve that was only partially closed or a valve the became stuck “closed.”

“Based on a concern with galling failure mode within the valve driver mechanism, the previous LCC was amended to preclude valve cycling under cryo conditions,” noted a NASA processing report on the engineering analyses.

“Previous LCC allowed for a repeat valve cycle attempt given the following conditions were met: No Sustained reg-out demand occurs. No sustained increase in Aft Haz Gas helium concentration. Initial move time <5.0 seconds. All the above parameters were satisfied.”

In the end, NASA managers decided they needed additional time to review all the information and complete closeout paperwork on the PV-12 valve issue. To this end, launch of STS-128 was postponed 24-hours to 23:59 EDT (11:59p.m.) on Friday, August 28 – the second launch opportunity of the calendar day but technically a 24-hour delay to the launch.

The final countdown on August 28 was uneventful and the PV-12 valve “closed” when it was commanded to do so.

In fact, the countdown went exactly as expected and at 11:59:37p.m. on August 28 Space Shuttle Discovery lit up the midnight sky of Central Florida, becoming the only manned mission to launch on one calendar day and reach orbit on the next.

Two days later, Discovery docked to the International Space Station 25 years to the day after the launch of her maiden voyage: STS-41D. That day, Nicole Stott – who launched on Discovery – officially transferred to the ISS crew, becoming the final person to rotate up to the ISS on the Space Shuttle.

During the course of the docked mission, Discovery’s crew delivered a second treadmill to the ISS as well as numerous new science experiments and new science racks via the Multi-Purpose Logistic Module Leonardo.

After a highly successful mission, Discovery and her crew undocked from the ISS and received final Thermal Protection System clearance for landing. The first two landing attempts on September 10 were waved off due to bad weather at the Kennedy Space Center.

Discovery was ultimately cleared for landing on September 11 and performed the second Boundary Layer Transition DTO (Detailed Test Objective) during her reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere.

Discovery and her seven member crew landed safety at Edwards Air Force Base, CA at 20:53 EDT (8:53p.m.) on September 11, completing a 13day 20hour 54minute 55second mission.

Ares I-X – Proving Concepts for the Future of Manned Space Exploration:

It was a mission nearly 4-years in the making. The Vision of Space Exploration, set forth by President George W. Bush in January 2004, committed NASA to returning men to the moon and continuing on to Mars – an endeavor that required a new launch architecture system.

Unlike the Space Shuttle, which underwent its first integrated test flight with a crew onboard, NASA’s new Ares I crew transportation rocket was designed to have multiple test flights before launching a crew into orbit.

The first of these test flights was dubbed Ares I-X.

The rocket, a virtually identical model of the Ares I vehicle, was designed to test the avionics and control systems of the Ares rocket during the first stage of flight – a two minute propulsion period powered only by a single Solid Rocket Booster (SRB).

As the Ares I design evolved, the SRB grew from a four-segment SRB (as used on the Space Shuttle) to a five-segment SRB. The addition of a fifth segment to the SRB required changes to the SRB’s nozzle, changes that could not be implemented into the design of the Ares I-X test rocket in time for all the data the test flight was meant to gain to be useful to Ares I engineers.

Since the Ares I-X test was meant to demonstrate the ability and performance of the Ares I design, not simulate a full up 5-segment SRB thrust test – a fifth segment simulator was added to Ares I-X to give the rocket the appropriate height and to accurately simulate the airflow over the entire length of the vehicle during the 2-minute powered portion of the flight.

Receiving and integration of the Ares I-X’s Upper Stage Simulator began in early 2009 on the floor of VAB High Bay 4, with full up stacking of the vehicle (SRB and all) beginning in July in High Bay 3 – directly across from High Bay 4.

After stacking of the vehicle was complete in mid-August, nearly two months of integration testing and sensor diagnostics took place, ensuring that over 700 sensors and the avionics and control assemblies of the Ares I-X vehicle were working perfectly.

Then, one week after Shuttle Atlantis/STS-129 was rolled out to Pad-A, the Ares I-X vehicle emerged from the VAB in the early morning hours of October 20 – marking the first time since 1975 that a vehicle other than the Space Shuttle was rolled out of the VAB.

One week of launch pad operations and processing followed for Ares I-X – a timeframe that was increased from the original four day pad flow to accommodate the dual pad flow nature of I-X processing with the ongoing processing of Space Shuttle Atlantis on nearby Pad-A.

In fact, Ares I-X shared many of the pad workers who were also busy processing Shuttle Atlantis for STS-129 in November. As a result, these workers undertook the second dual pad flow of 2009 – accomplishing both flows in time for Ares I-X’s and Atlantis’ respective launch windows.

With the countdown beginning at 1a.m. on October 27 for a launch window of 8a.m. through 12p.m., the Ares I-X launch team configured the vehicle and, after waiting out the weather and a cargo ship in the SRB recovery zone, gave the go to resume the countdown and launch Ares I-X.

The countdown resumed from the T-4 minute and holding mark and counted down to T-2minutes 39-seconds – at which point Ares I-X weather officer Kathy Winters ordered a hold due to a violation of the triboelectrification weather rule.

The resulting hold mandated a recycle of the countdown to the T-4 minute and holding mark, a milestone that was accomplished in a timely manner. The launch team then waited on the weather, before eventually scrubbing the October 27 launch attempt and announcing that a second launch attempt would be made on October 28.

On the morning of October 28, the countdown once again began at 1.a.m. EDT for an 8a.m. through 12-noon launch window. During the course of the morning, the T0 time was continuously realigned to reflect changing weather conditions.

Finally, a go was given by the launch team to proceed with launch at 11:30a.m. EDT – in the center of a patch of good weather.

The countdown resumed at 11:26a.m. and proceeded without issue. At 11:30a.m. on the nose, the Ares I-X’s SRB ignited, propelling the vehicle off of Launch Pad 39B and off onto a due east trajectory from the Kennedy Space Center.

Two minutes later, the SRB burned out and successfully separated from the Upper Stage Simulator, parachuting into the Atlantic Ocean 130 nautical miles east of KSC.

Ares I-X managers and NASA hailed the test flight a smashing success. All five the flight’s primary test objectives were accomplished, giving NASA invaluable data on the performance of a single SRB first stage powered launch vehicle.

Despite the uncertain nature of the Ares I rocket’s role in whatever the future of NASA’s manned space endeavors becomes, the test flight of Ares I-X proved the concept of the Ares I first stage design and provided the engineering community with copious amounts of scientific data that can be used in the development of future U.S. launch vehicles.

Water on the Moon! – LRO and LCROSS’s Enormous Discovery:

On October 9, the LCROSS satellite and its Centaur Upper Stage impacted the moon’s south pole in the Cabeus crater. Their mission was to expose the unseen material beneath the surface of the Cabeus crater – looking for signs of water, of the past presence of water, beneath the moon’s surface.

Trailing its Centaur upper stage by four minutes, the LCROSS conducted hundreds of scientific observations of the ejecta plume created by Centaur’s impact before it too impacted the Cabeus crater, creating a second ejecta plume of denser material for analysis by the Hubble Space Telescope and Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter.

On November 13, the preliminary results of the impacts were released by NASA, and the answer to the age old question of whether water currently exists on other bodies in our solar system was finally put to rest.

The answer was a resounding yes. Water exists in the permanently shadowed crater Cabeus on the moon’s southern pole.

“We’re unlocking the mysteries of our nearest neighbor and by extension the solar system. It turns out the moon harbors many secrets, and LCROSS has added a new layer to our understanding,” said Michael Wargo, chief lunar scientist at NASA Headquarters in Washington D.C.

In fact, the LCROSS results have shed light on the mystery surrounding the large concentrations of hydrogen observed on the moon in the past decade. Given the current evidence, NASA suspects that water may be far more prevalent and exist in much larger quantities on the moon than originally theorized.

But just how much water is on the moon is still unknown. “Multiple lines of evidence show water was present in both the high angle vapor plume and the ejecta curtain created by the LCROSS Centaur impact,” stated Anthony Colaprete, LCROSS project scientist and principal investigator at NASA’s Ames Research Center in Moffett Field, California. “The concentration and distribution of water and other substances requires further analysis, but it is safe to say Cabeus holds water.”

The results of the LCROSS experiment hold significant implications for the current NASA plan to establish a permanent, manned colony near one of the moon’s poles. If water is present in large quantities beneath the moon’s surface, future inhabitants of a lunar colony could make use of that water, providing valuable lessons on how to use natural materials/substances around the colony – lessons that could be applied to future manned missions into the solar system.

STS-129 – Stockpiling the Space Station:

Continuing on the theme of preparing for the future, 2009 came to a close for NASA with the highly successful flight of Space Shuttle Atlantis on the STS-129 mission.

After initial worries and conversations about range conflicts with an Atlas V and Delta IV rockets, both vehicles encountered launch delays – giving Atlantis the full duration of her short launch window in mid-November, a launch window that was constrained by a Solar Beta Angle Cutout from November 20 – December 5.

Officially approved for a launch on November 16, Atlantis’ processing teams saw double work with the dual pad flow of Atlantis and Ares I-X. After the successful launch of Ares I-X, work proceeded in earnest on Atlantis with installation of the Express Logistics Carriers (ELCs) -1 & -2 into Atlantis’ payload bay as Program engineers and managers worked through a Main Engine Ignition (MEI) overpressure issue.

The issue, relating to the acoustic environment present at the aft of the vehicle during SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engine) ignition was brought to the attention of Program managers when it was discovered that bolts used to attach the aft stinger pods to the OMS Pods might not be sufficient to counter the acoustic environment.

Through an aggressive engineering review of all information pertaining to the MEI acoustic environment and the stinger pod bolts, Program managers were able to clear Atlantis for flight after installation of several new sensors on Atlantis and the Mobile Launch Platform to obtain as much data as possible during the vehicle’s launch.

With launch officially approved, Atlantis’ countdown began on Friday, November 13 at 13:00 EST (1p.m. EST) for a targeted 14:28 EST (2:28p.m.) liftoff on November 16.

Atlantis’ countdown was uneventful and – with the lowest number of PRs (Problem Reports) in the history of the Shuttle Program – STS-129 lifted off at 14:28:09 EST November 16 on its first launch attempt, making Atlantis the only Orbiter to launch on her first attempt for both of her 2009 missions.

After docking with the ISS, Atlantis’ six member crew installed both ELCs onto the Integrated Truss Structure of the Space Station – thereby delivering nearly 30,000 lbs of spare parts that will enable the ISS to remain operational well into the next decade.

Three EVAs were also performed on STS-129 and Nicolle Stott transferred to the Atlantis crew before orbiter undocked from the ISS the day before the Thanksgiving holiday in the U.S.

After performing the customary late inspection of their vehicle’s Thermal Protection System (TPS), Atlantis’ crew enjoyed Thanksgiving on orbit before receiving final TPS clearance to land.

On Friday, November 27, Atlantis and her now seven member crew glided to a perfect landing at the Kennedy Space Center at 9:44:22a.m. EST, completing a 4.4 million mile mission in 10days 19hours 16minutes and 13seconds.

In all 2009 was a year of tremendous accomplishments for NASA and its dedicated workforce.

As Mike Moses, KSC Launch Integration Manager, stated “this was really about the teams and their ability to go above and beyond what we asked of them. When you think about the fact that we worked through the Flow Control Valve issue, the hydrogen leaks, and many more things and still flew five successful Shuttle missions, had two dual pad flows (three if you count the first STS-125/STS-400 flow last year), launched an experimental rocket, and mated Endeavour for STS-130 next year – all within one calendar year – that’s pretty amazing.

“It really shows the level of dedication of the teams out here and their ability to remain flexible.”

For a video review of NASA outstanding year, see Max-Q Entertainment’s Year In Review video click here

For NASA, 2010 begins with preparations and Flight Readiness Reviews for Space Shuttle Endeavour’s STS-130 mission, currently targeted to launch at 4:39a.m. on February 7.

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Solid Rocket Booster Review:

During this standard evaluation, all aspects of Atlantis and the STS-129 vehicle’s performance were reviewed, with special attention given to any abnormal or off-nominal signatures of the vehicle’s multiple system.

Between the SRBs and SSMEs, only one IFA has been declared, an “aft skirt trailing edge foam crack” on one of the SRBs.

In all, the SRBs on STS-129 performed exceptionally well, with only fourteen squawks (one of those also classed as an IFA) being reported during the post-flight IFA review.

“One IFA declared to date: IFA STS-129-B-001 – Aft Skirt Trailing Edge Foam Cracked,” notes the SRB IFA review – available for download on L2.

“Fourteen SRB squawks to date. All squawks evaluated against IFA applicability as defined in NSTS (National Space Transportation System) 08126.”

For the one IFA, the presentation notes that launch imagery revealed a “crack in froth-pak foam” of the Right Hand (RH) SRB during liftoff of Atlantis.

The foam was confirmed to be “intact” through 66-seconds Mission Elapsed Time (MET), at which point imagery resolution declined and could no longer be used to verify the integrity of the cracked foam.

“Review of processing paper [including verification of clearances] found no initial issues,” notes the IFA presentation.

An IFA was declared for this issue when the standard imagery review revealed that a portion of the foam was “stuck on a purge line after lift-off.” An investigation into this IFA is still ongoing.

The remaining 13 SRB issues identified from in-flight video, post-flight video review, and post-flight SRB inspections did not meet the NSTS definition of an IFA and are thus categorized as “squawks” – while still being included in the SRB IFA review.

The first of these squawks to gain mention in the IFA review presentation relates to a loss of parachute video.

“Tape jam occurred at ~ L+394 seconds (or ~6.54 minutes after liftoff).” This time index corresponds to roughly the same time the Left Hand (LH) SRB impacted the Atlantic Ocean. The current plan is to return the VCR to its vendor for repair.

The next noted squawk pertained to an Experiment Dedicated Application Software (EDAS) Accelerometer Data offset that was “noted during the first 5-seconds and 30- to 70-seconds” of flight.

A second set of accelerometer data was did not suffer from the same offset condition and provided acceptable data throughout SRB flight.

The “offset is associated with accelerometer sensitivity to high Max Q structural response” and has been reproduced in an electrical lab. This offset is classed as an “understood condition” that is “part of the known signal design,” notes the IFA presentation.

The thrust oscillation data was unaffected by the data offset and all measurements in the “3 – 100 Hz range at the end of flight in [the primary] area of interest” were obtained.

The forth item noted in the SRB IFA review was a missing piece of TPS (Thermal Protection System) material on the aft Integrated Electronics Assembly (IEA) covers for both the LH and RH SRBs.

“Two areas missing ~0.5 inches in diameter of Cork/Hypalon on LH IEA covers,” notes the presentation. “Four areas, ~0.5 inches in diameter, blistered Cork/Hypalon on RH IEA cover.”

A Materials and Processing (M&P) analysis determined that these liberations occurred during the SRBs’ descent toward the Atlantic Ocean after their separation from Atlantis’ External Tank.

Thus, this missing TPS is not a concern for flight safety.

Next on the squawk list was an area of “missing TPS/Impact on the LH aft skirt and single BSM (Booster Separation Motor).”

For this squawk, seven areas of interest between 330 degrees and 60 degrees on the circumference of the LH aft skirt were identified. These areas contained TPS liberations and one possible debris impact area ranging in size from “0.375 x 0.125 inches to 1.5 inches in diameter x 0.125 inches in depth.”

A M&P analysis, as well as visual observations of the liberation/damage locations, indicate that these liberations/damages occurred during SRB descent. Furthermore, hardware performance was not affected by these liberations/damages.

The sixth SRB squawk related to the loss of foam on the External Tank Attach (ETA) Ring of the RH SRB.

“Two areas with non-uniform heating on surface,” notes the presentation. The first area (dubbed Area A) was located at the 255 degrees mark on the circumference of the SRB. Area A was ~3.5 inches in diameter x 1 inch in depth.

Significant heating effects were noted on one side of the ETA ring foam and large voids between the various foam layers were also identified on Area A.

An investigation is ongoing at this time. It was not indicated in the IFA presentation whether or not this heating effect occurred during ascent or descent of the RH SRB.

In contrast, Area B was ~2.5 inches in diameter x 0.5 inches in depth. Area B was located at 150º on the circumference and saw “less heat effect than adjacent areas.” A M&P analysis of this location has concluded that this foam loss occurred during SRB descent and was thus not a safety of flight issue.

The next squawk noted was a missing cotter pin on the RH Forward Skirt Deck Fitting.

This pin did not detach during flight but rather during post-flight retrieval operations. “Discovered during slip operations. Imagery revealed cotter pin present during retrieval operations. Time of occurrence believed to be retrieval, tow-back or slip operations.”

As such, this was not a flight performance issue.

The eighth noted squawk for the SRBs related to foreign material, which was discovered during igniter Safe & Arm disconnects inspection, on the RH SRB IEA Code Plug coupling nuts.

“Observed late in post-flight. Special Interest Item (SII) taken to evaluate time of occurrence as initial inspection during safing operations noted no discoloration,” remarks the presentation.

A similar occurrence was seen on the STS-119 and STS-128 SRBs in March and August 2009, respectively.

STS-129 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-129/

A M&P analysis is ongoing; however, this foreign material did not affect the hardware’s performance.

Next, was a removal of a PC retainer for a NASA Standard Initiator (NSI). The removal of this component usually requires a wrench “due to adhesive buildup in threads.” However, the PC retainer was removed completely by hand during post-flight inspections.

Technicians have confirmed that the adhesive was applied during SRB buildup operations and that the adhesive was still present when the retainer was removed by hand.

Similar occurrences have been seen on STS-127 and STS-128 (July and August 2009, respectively). Currently, the SRB post-flight manual is being updated to include the ability to remove the retainer by had as an “acceptable” condition.

Furthermore, a tear in the Frustum Aft Bay Curtain was noted in the IFA report.

“Large tear (~ 8 inches) through spectra cloth with smaller tear through remaining felt layers,” notes the presentation.

The tear, located at 30 degrees on the circumference of the SRB, apparently projects into the foam behind the curtain and was not discovered during “build-up, retrieval, and slip operations.”

Upon further investigation, “gashes in the structure were noticed in line with tear.” And investigation is ongoing to determine the cause of this tear.

The eleventh noted squawk pertained to the intrusion of grease into the Range Safety System (RSS) Linear Shaped Charge (LSC) on the LH SRB.

“Nickel end-seal has evidence of grease intrusion. First time observation.”

The grease is used during the installation process of the LSC but should not transfer on the nickel end-seal. The SRB manual will be updated as a result of this intrusion – which likely occurred during the time of assembly.

Next on the IFA list was corrosion on the Aft Tunnel Cable coupling nut on the RH SRB.

Having previously occurred on STS-128, the corrosion was “noted on outside surface of coupling nut for P2 connector” with “no corrosion on interior of connector.”

The cable was not listed on the “STS-129 Materials Review Board ‘use as is’ problem report for suspect wrong coupling nut material.”

Technicians are currently checking to ensure that no other cables were missed in the documentation process. The corrosion had no affect on the functionality of the cable.

The second-to-last listed squawk was a piece of FOD (Foreign Object Debris) in the form of NASA Integrity Seals.

In all, four integrity seal remnants were discovered during post-flight operations on the housing cover sidewalls of the Forward Feed Thru. This was not a debris concern as the seals were located inside the tunnel cover.

Finally, the 14th squawk pertained to damage on the APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) Tilt Gearbox Quick Disconnect Cap O-rings.

“LH Tilt Vent and Fill O-rings torn and RH Tilt Vent and Drain O-rings torn.”

This is similar to previous O-ring damage. The investigation is ongoing as is the evaluation of the heat effects to the O-rings.

Space Shuttle Main Engine Performance:

During STS-129, the Atlantis’ three Space Shuttle Main Engines performed exceptionally well. In all, no IFAs were declared for the SSMEs and “all SSME observations are encompassed by previous flight and/or test experience and identified as no impact,” notes the SSME IFA report, available for download on L2.

Furthermore, initial indications for the performance of Main Engine #1 (ME-1) and ME-2 indicate nominal leaks from the engine nozzles.

“Preliminary post STS-129 leak checks within experience.” In all, ME-1 is estimated to have 12 leaks while ME-2 is estimated to have roughly 180+ leaks. No information on the ME-3 was provided in the IFA review presentation.

Additionally, the redesign of the Joint F5 Liquid Air Insulation Boot on one of Atlantis’ SSMEs appears to have worked as designed.

“Pressure & temperature measurements showed no indication of cryopumping.” The standard post-flight inspection of the boot will take place following SSME removal from Atlantis – which occurred on December 10 and 11.

Finally, the relocation of an accelerometer from “G6 to Gimbal Bearing” did not affect the performance of the accelerometer.

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size

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STS-129 RSRM Review:

ATK, the manufacturer of the Reusable Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs), recently built the final motor segment that is scheduled to fly with the shuttle, at least based on the current plan that provides for five missions – and one specific LON (Launch On Need) mission that is being evaluated as STS-135.

RSRM Motor Set “RSRM-108″ flew with Atlantis during her highly successful STS-129 mission – the fifth and final launch of 2009 – powering the vehicle and her six crew during the first stage of ascent.

“All RSRM countdown parameters were within LCC (Launch Commit Criteria)/OMRS (Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications) limits and within family. Overall performance of both RSRM motors and all ATK BSMs excellent and well within limits. No (full) IFAs declared at this time,” noted the ATK IFA Review of STS-129 – one of 12 presentations available on L2.

Only six minor IFAs – or Squawks as they are known in the world of boosters – were listed on the presentation, as engineers progress through milestones that include a L+45 day report “project goal” for potential refurbishment tasks.

“Overall performance of both STS-129 (RSRM-108) motors and ATK BSMs (Booster Separation Motors) were excellent. Postflight evaluation is still in work,” added the presentation. “Six Squawks have been written and are being reviewed. No (full) IFAs declared at this time but additional postflight disassembly and evaluations are still in work.”

STS-129 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-129/

The Squawks are items that are out of family observations, found by engineers after the boosters were towed back from the ocean and placed under assessment, once pulled out of the water in Port.

While the process relates to the next flight’s FRR – with IFA notes always providing a baseline status during departmental, Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and the final Agency level FRRs – the lessons learned add to the experience base that will be priceless for flights even after the shuttle is retired – with the Ares program also utilizing the motors.

Even if that program is cancelled, it is highly likely NASA will move to a vehicle that will use these motors, as they aim to protect against further job losses from the shuttle-related contractor workforces that are being decimated by the retirement of the shuttle program.

Their safety record also makes them highly attractive to alternative vehicle configurations, such as Jupiter Launch Vehicle family and the Heavy Lift Vehicle (HLV) alternatives.

All six Squawks are listed on the ATK presentation for the RSRM’s performance during STS-129, all of which shows the amount of detail the engineers go to when reviewing the hardware post flight.

“Unknown yellow material was observed in four out of eight forward BSMs from RSRM-108. Yellow material was observed on igniter to case joints from both the RH (Right Hand) and LH (Left Hand) motors,” listed the first Squawk.

“The material was observed in multiple areas, including on an O-ring and in the O-ring grooves. Lab results indicate that the material is yellow chromate primer.”

Brown stains on painted cork surface were also observed on the center Field Joint Protection System (FJPS), which included seawater materials – showing the engineers also have to work out the difference between issues created from when the boosters are in the air, and those caused by their interaction with the ocean after splashdown.

“Numerous brown stains were identified on the center cork run of the center Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) at approximately 331 degrees (in-board). Each stain is centered around a small paint blister and darker in appearance than typical cork stains on Acrymaxpaint. Stains determined to be deposit on the paint; mix of organic material and seawater components.”

Past flight experience also came into play with a Fractured Actuator Bracket on right hand motor, which was caused by the booster’s impact at splashdown. Such observations have been seen on previous flights.

“Fractured tilt actuator bracket on the RSRM-108 RH AEC assembly. Actuator bracket damage at splashdown is an expected condition and bounded by previous occurrence and testing,” noted the presentation. “Squawk was written to document fracture condition and has been closed.”

A plugged BSM Igniter Cap Hole also made the list. The Booster Separation Motors – as their name suggests – push the boosters clear of the stack during staging, and are also the cause of the bright flash that is observed on the flight deck at separation.

“One igniter cap hole on BSM S/N 107 (RH booster) was plugged with combustion by-products and corrosion,” added the presentation. “The erosion from firing is visible, indicating that the hole was not plugged during igniter operation. The lab has verified erosion and composition.”

Missing foam (Thermal Protection System) on left hand forward stiffener ring was the first issue to be noted on the booster, as it was observed via the left hand ET (External Tank) umbilical well footage.

All ascent footage is reviewed shortly after launch by the Damage Assessment Team (DAT) and in this case was immediately cleared as a concern due to the lack of mass of the liberated foam – which would come into play in the unlikely event the debris may have impacted on the orbiter. Regardless, it is understood no impact occurred.

“During Orbiter onboard film review, SRB/RSRM Postflight Assessment was notified that a small piece of foam was liberated from the forward stiffener ring on the LH motor at around 300 degrees,” the presentation noted.

“Loss is significantly less than risk assessment mass for the stiffener ring foam. Cause is not fully determined but expected to be due to processing condition; same basis for risk assessment mass.”

The final Squawk related to a suspect flashing on right hand Igniter Outer Gasket Seals located near the top of the motor. This was note deemed as no concern for flight, as ATK noted the flashing did not violate the seal footprint. However, this is the “highest” rated Squawk on the list and will kick-start corrective actions.

“During detailed gasket assessment, suspect flashing was observed on the primary and secondary seal surfaces of the RH outer gasket,” the presentation noted.

“The suspect flashing did not extend onto the gasket crown and did not violate the seal footprint. The suspect flashing was observed on the downstream side of the primary seal and both the upstream and downstream sides of the secondary seal. The suspect flashing was localized at approximately 80 degrees.

“A report was written to document a similar condition for DM-1 (Development Motor) and elevated to a (higher level of reporting). DM-1 used a V1288 gasket while STS-129 (RSRM-108) used a V1944 gasket.

“Flashing is not material specific and is seen after the molding process of both gasket configurations. Cause and corrective action for V1288 gaskets will be directly applicable to V1944 gaskets. Corrective actions will be worked through existing motors.”

The excellent performance of the motors matches most of the shuttle elements, per IFA review at the December 10 Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) meeting. Further articles will follow on other hardware reviews, such as the more-eventful External Tank review.

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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Shuttle Lifeline Status:

While extending shuttle was deemed as viable – per the recent Augustine Commission review into Human Space Flight – from a multi-option standpoint that associated such a move with the development of a Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (SD HLLV) as the follow-on vehicle, the need to make a decision to support extension is at the mercy of NASA’s budget.

President Obama is soon to outline his preference for NASA’s future, centralized around the findings of the Augustine Commission, although any action won’t be forthcoming until the standard government approach of approving future funding for the Agency at the political level.

This leaves a gap, between focusing on the preferred option outlined by the Augustine panel, and funding to carry that option out.

“Still waiting on word on the passback and the budget; there is no guidance right now. There will be no idea where SSP will be from a budget-standpoint until the February timeframe,” noted SSP manager John Shannon, whilst addressing his workforce via the Shuttle Standup/Integration report (L2). “It will be worked out between the HQ folks, OMB (Office of Management and Budget), and OSTP (Office of Science and Technology Policy).”

A deadline for a decision to extend the shuttle program doesn’t really exist, though the longer it takes for a decision to be made, the more expensive an extension would be, along with the growing threat of a gap within the extension itself – especially in the scenario of adding numerous flights for a 2015 extension to the manifest.

An extension that adds two to three flights in 2011/early 2012 is deemed the most viable scenario, avoding the unknown quanity of recertification, age-life hardware issues, and would utilize External Tank ET-122 for STS-135 – as opposed to its current role as STS-335 (Launch On Need) for STS-133, currently the final flight of the manifest.

STS-136 and STS-137 would require two part built tanks to be completed (now classed as ET-139 and ET-140), both of which – sources say – would be ready within nine months of the decision being made. LON for STS-137 could potentially be carried out via a Soyuz ferry plan.

Additional “brand new, from scratch” tanks have a lead time of two to three years, which means the 2015 extension scenario is already becoming unviable – regardless of the issues of workforce reduction and other hardware assets that would need to produce additional items – such as boosters etc.

The shuttle has its detractors, even within NASA, citing safety and cost. However, the five flights of 2009 have showed the world just how capable the vehicle is, when cared for by good management and experienced engineering.

“This has been a heck of a year. We have a chance to catch a bit of a breather. The team did an amazing job, and set us up for 2010 extremely well. Here is exactly where we want to be to enter 2010 in great shape,” added Mr Shannon, via the Standup report.

“The decisions (Mission Management Team (MMT) chair) Mike (Moses) made at the Noon Board to get the vehicle configured within the VAB (Endeavour, STS-130 flow), and give the team a little bit of a break over the holidays was important to us. We should all take a lesson there, try and get a little bit of a break here. It has been a heck of a year.”

2010 will be the final year of the shuttle unless a decision to extend is made, and made soon. Currently, the only ‘expected’ hope relates to funding that will allow SSP a full 2010 to complete the final five flights on the manifest.

“Next year will be just as busy,” added Mr Shannon. “We are going to face problems next year, and we need to be ready to go. Take a lot of pride in what you have done over this last year. Let us take a little bit of a break and come back at the start of next year and really finish 2010 the right way.”

Reference: Previous *main* Shuttle Extension articles by NASASpaceflight.com:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/09/ssp-fight-back-asap-augustine-claim-risk/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/07/major-shuttle-and-iss-extension-drive-augustine-commission/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/05/nasa-present-two-shuttle-extension-options-to-lawmakers/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/03/aresorion-slipping-18-months-shuttle-extension-upper-hand/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/02/extra-nasa-funds-initial-step-towards-gap-reduction/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/09/senate-pass-nasa-bill-for-extra-funding/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/10/shuttle-extension-white-paper/
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2008/09/nasas-dream-scenario-of-a-13-flight-extension-for-shuttle/

STS-129 Post Flight:

Atlantis’ flawless performance on STS-129 rounded off a great year for the vehicle and SSP, as she adds the final Hubble Servicing Mission (STS-125) and a vital logistics run to the International Space Station (ISS) under her belt. She has now begun turnaround processing for what is currently her final mission – STS-132.

“Let me thank the team. This is the broader team of the ops people, the engineering teams, everybody across the country that worked so hard over the last two weeks on STS-129,” added Mr Shannon. “At this point in the Space Program when there is so much uncertainty, it is so important for us to execute as well as we did the last two weeks.

“I know folks gave up Thanksgiving, and I really appreciate it. It was just an outstanding mission; right off on time, got lucky with the weather. The vehicle could not have performed any better, no issues at all. Landed right on time, beautiful weather. This is the way that mission ought to go.

“The ISS team is extremely happy. This was a huge mission for those people. Taking up two gigantic pallets of spare hardware that will keep them in business for the next decade was super important.”

Turning Atlantis towards her STS-132 flow began on Monday, following her tow off the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), and return to the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF-1).

STS-129 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-129/

“The post landing and OPF1 Tow-In operations occurred nominally. Atlantis was spotted in OPF-1 at 1650L. T-0 mates occurred 1914L and Fuel Cells were powered down at 2355L. On Saturday the Cryos were drained and PRSD system secured,” noted NASA Test Director processing information (L2). “On Monday morning the orbiter began OPF turnaround with V1103 Power Up.

“Post flight inspections continue. Orbiter manual power up and power system validation were successfully completed. Payload bay door opening and latch verification were completed. KU band functional and OMS/RCS static air checks were completed. Nose Landing Gear Strut thruster electrical disconnects being worked.

Engineers also started work on the small issues noted during the countdown – relating to the noise on Fuel Cell 2′s H2 pump, and on orbit – relating to the Waste Tank plumbing that was blocked during a dump near the end of the mission.

“Orbiter: On OV-104 (Atlantis), were able to do some troubleshooting on that fuel cell noisy motor signature seen prelaunch,” noted the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) on the Standup report. “Were able to reproduce a very similar signature, but not in the believed prelaunch configuration.”

“IPR (Interim Problem Report) 0001 Update: Ran troubleshooting on the noisy FC2 H2 Pump Motor Noise,” added the NTD report. “The circuit dimmers were operated per plan and some line noise was able to be created using different lighting configurations of the Numeric OS lighting of the Aft Station. Further evaluation will be required.

“New IPR 0003: Documenting a reduced drain rate of the Waste Tank. Engineering will perform some additional data review prior to troubleshooting for a suspect blockage within the urine filter (MER (Mission Evaluation Room issue)-10).

As if not to feel left out, Atlantis appears to have suffered from the nozzle leaks on her Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), though less than that observed on her sisters, Discovery and Endeavour, after their STS-127 and STS-128 missions.

While a new corrosion inhibitor is set to debut on STS-130, flight rationale was built around additional mitigation procedures for STS-129′s engines - which includes the cycling of reconditioned air into the nozzles during Atlantis’ pad flow. This appears to have reduced the amount of tiny pinpoint holes in the nozzle – which are of no concern for their performance during ascent.

“On Sunday, were able to do a preliminary nozzle tube leak check on Engines 1 and 2. Engine 1 had ~12 leaks. Engine 2 had ~180+ leaks, which is what was seen on the prior two flights for the worse case leak assessment,” added the SSME section of the Standup report.

“On Engine 3, the preliminary leak check assessment was not done because it was never exposed to the chlorides from the sponge (Nozzle 5011). Will need to look at nozzle allocations and see what can be done to best allocate these nozzles.

“This was the flight for which the drying purge was kept on the nozzles at the pad, so kept a dry environment on them all the way up to launch.”

With the removal of the use of sponges for the application of the corrosion inhibitor for the remainder of the shuttle program, engineers will have eliminated source of high chlorides on the nozzles by the time Endeavour flies in February.

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

No related posts.

STS-129 EOM (End Of Mission):

With perfect weather on the Florida Space Coast, Atlantis was always likely to complete a mission that launched at the first attempt and landed on the opening opportunity. Consumables onboard would have allowed for the orbiter to remain in space until Monday – had it been required – with LiOH (Lithium hydroxide) canisters the limiting factor.

“Planned EOM is Friday, November 27. Consumables support through EOM+3 (End Of Mission plus three days, Monday, Nov. 30,” noted the final Mission Management Team (MMT) summary presentation (L2) for a nominal EOM.

“LiOH supports EOM+3 and is the limiting consumable. Supply Water supports eight opportunities over four days. Cryo can support 17 hours over EOM+3. OMS/RCS (Orbital Maneuvering System/Reaction Control System) margin over 3-3-3-3 is: 40 lbs FRCS, 1200 lbs ARCS/OMS. Protects PTC (Passive Thermal Control) for EOM+2 and EOM+3. Group B powerdown nominally planned for wave-off days. N2 supports well beyond EOM+3.”

Atlantis had two opportunities to land on Friday, with two more on Saturday – all targeting KSC, before all three CONUS (US) landing sites – KSC, Edwards and White Sands – would have been opened for Sunday, with Monday reserved for a systems wave off day.

“Landing strategy: KSC only for EOM and EOM+1. Orbit Adjust required after EOM waveoff to pick up 2nd opportunity to KSC on EOM+1. EOM+2 (Sunday, November 29) will be pick-em day.”

Shortly after landing, Atlantis will be safed and prepared for a tow back to the vacant Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF-1) for deservicing work that will be carried out over the weekend and into next week. This will mark the start of a six month OPF flow towards her final “scheduled” mission – STS-132.

STS-132 – currently scheduled to launch on May 14, 2010 – will be the 132nd flight of the Shuttle Program and the 34th shuttle flight dedicated to construction and outfitting of the International Space Station. The 11+1+2 day flight of Atlantis will utilize External Tank 136, Reusable Solid Rocket Motor set 111, Solid Rocket Booster BI set 143, and operational software OI-34.

The primary payload for the mission remains the Russian Mini-Research Module 1 (MRM-1) and Integrated Cargo Carrier – Vertical Lightweight Deployable (ICC-VLD) pallet. The MRM-1 will be mounted toward the aft of the payload bay while the ICC-VLD will be berthed in the center for both launch and reentry.

Following the conclusion to STS-132, Atlantis will still undergo another OPF flow, due to her role as the LON (Launch On Need) orbiter for supporting the final mission on the current shuttle manifest – STS-133.

Atlantis will be processed for a mid 2011 launch date as the STS-335 vehicle and will carry a MPLM (Multi-Purpose Logistics Module) to replenish the Station for hosting the STS-133 crew for several months, if launched.

Should the US Government green light a shuttle extension, STS-335 would likely to be the first mission to change call signs – to STS-135.

Atlantis’ performance:

Atlantis is well on her way to marking her place in the history books for some superb performances during her twilight years. With the final Hubble Servicing Mission/STS-125 under her belt, before finishing up with the transportation of the Russian MRM-1, records may overlook the achievements of STS-129.

STS-129 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-129/

However, this mission has proved to be one of the cleanest on record, with only four minor cosmetic areas of damage suffered to her Thermal Protection System (TPS) – per early inspections, and a Mission Evaluation Room (MER) “funny” (minor issues) list that is incredibly short when taking into account the complexity of the vehicle.

This has also followed on from the lowest number of IPRs (Interim Problem Reports) on record for an orbiter during her pre-launch processing and pad flow.

The only new issue over the last few days related to the blocked plumbing on the Waste Water System, although the issue was only seen after half of the tank had been emptied – meaning any maintenance onboard Atlantis would only be required if Atlantis had failed to land Friday.

“During FD10 waste dump, saw low flow through the line; nozzle temps looked good. Tried a bakeout during dump paused and resumed; only dumped to quantity of 48 percent (vs. planned 5 percent) from total quantity of 75.4 percent,” noted MMT materials on the problem. “Increased nozzle temps to 300 deg vs. normal 250 deg as part of terminate. Nozzle viewed during late inspection and no ice was visible.

“Plan forward: IFM (In Flight Maintenance) being finalized to bypass blocked urine solids filter; blockage seen here on previous flight (see diagram).

“Current waste tank quantity and expected rates support post waveoff IFM. Assumes condensate collection and stowage of condensate CWC for landing. Post wave-off IFM, avoids unnecessary work on board.”

The other “issue” on Flight Day 11 related to the stowage of a “Heritage Panel” that is being returned from Station, following its replacement. The panel required video footage of how it has been stowed on the middeck, in order to ensure it wasn’t interfering with other stowage items or hardware.

“ISS Node 1 Heritage Panel Stowage: Procedure uplinked for stowage on middeck based on ground evaluation. Downlinked photos and video for evaluation of current configuration and area targeted for stowage based on ground assessment,” added the MMT materials.

“Ground teams are assessing the imagery. Current config is behind planned 5 ML bag stowage and secured to the middeck wall. Time available for MS2 to perform any final stowage actions required for this panel at approx.”

All other MER items either relate to non mechanical issues with the orbiter – such as communication and video equipment – leading to some of the MER attention being focused on reviewing the noise heard on Fuel Cell 2′s H2 pump motor during the countdown for launch.

“During STS-129 pre-launch activity, FC 2, s/n 125, H2 Pump Motor Condition (PMC) was noisy with no associated activity on AC Bus 2. KSC took IPR 129V-0057 to document the condition,” added post launch review materials for the MMT.

“IPR 129V-0057 (132V-0001) was deferred because the signature did not indicate increased pump load from initial stages of FC ‘Flooding’, bearing failure, or phase loss. At about 320:17:44 GMT, the noise decreased with corresponding changes in the AC 2 bus current. FC 2, s/n 125, H2 PMC on-orbit indications have been in family with expected indications so no impacts to vehicle/mission or crew are expected.”

Engineers believe the most probable cause is an AC phase imbalance or noise caused by crew lighting adjustments that were not detected at KSC. Another possible cause could be degradation of components in the PMC circuitry.

During the countdown, this condition was threatening a scrub – due to a breach of Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) rules. However, with the noise decreasing during monitoring, the controllers made the right call to launch, and the Fuel Cell has performed without issue during the mission.

“The FC 2, s/n 125, FC H2 PMC has been responding as expected to corresponding AC Bus activity on-orbit. No on-orbit trouble-shooting is was or is currently planned.”

Late Inspections also backed up the Flight Day 2 and Flight Day 3 TPS inspection results – which showed Atlantis suffered no damage to her heatshield. Late Inspections allow for a final check of the RCC panels and Lower surfaces on the Wing Leading Edge (WLE) know as LESS.

This is important, due to the potential of MMOD damage during the docked phase, and post undocking flight. With no notable triggers to the WLEIDS (Impact Detection System), no worrying damage was expected, or found – as per Damage Assessment Team (DAT) results.

The only new item of interest related to three marks on the 5L panel on the port wing of Atlantis. However, that has been cleared as no issue to the orbiter’s re-entry.

“LESS/RCC team cleared all late inspection regions of interest. Level 1 and IDC completed at 6:00 pm (Wednesday), Level 2 completed at 3:45 am (19.5 hrs) on Thursday, and final PRT (Peer Review) disposition at 6:30 am Thursday morning. No ROI (Regions Of Interest) exhibited any distinct damage characteristics,” noted the DAT to the MMT.

“From all of the late inspection LDRI imagery, the LESS PRT is GO for entry.”

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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Atlantis Status:

Atlantis continues to perform without major issue as her penultimate mission draws to a close.

Today, the crew (while celebrating the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday) will spend a great deal of time preparing Atlantis for reentry.

Waking up at 1:28a.m. EST this morning to Frank Sinatra’s “Fly me to the moon”, Atlantis’ crew got right to work, beginning final cabin stow operations for landing just after 4:30a.m. EST.

Checkout of the Flight Control System is scheduled for 5:48a.m. followed less than an hour later by a test firing of Atlantis’ Reaction Control System thrusters – thrusters that will be used during the initial phases of Atlantis’ reentry Friday morning. All checkouts showed nominal results.

Later this afternoon, at 1:28p.m., Nicole Stott’s recumbent seat will be installed into Atlantis’ middeck. Stott, who launched on Space Shuttle Discovery during the STS-128 mission in August, is returning home after two and half months on the International Space Station.

Finally, Atlantis’ Ku Band antenna is scheduled to be stowed for landing at 2:28p.m. today.

STS-129 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-129/

Earlier in the day, the crew carried out the SEITE burn – which is an 18 foot per second dual OMS burn. The burn was radial down (nose to the Earth) such that the burn plume will be observed by the orbiting C/NOFS satellite. Later, he SIMPLEX burn – also an 18 foot per second dual OMS burn, will be conducted, with the burn plume observed by the Arecibo ground station.

Atlantis’ crew is scheduled to bed down for the night at 5:28p.m. ahead of the mission’s opening landing attempts tomorrow.

The first of these attempts will result in a closure of Atlantis’ Payload Bay Doors at 5:57a.m. EST Friday morning. If all conditions are acceptable, Atlantis will perform her deorbit burn maneuver on Orbit 171 at 8:37a.m. before orienting herself into the proper entry attitude.

For this first landing opportunity, Atlantis will cross into Florida air-space around the Fort Myers/Naples area and jog just west of Lake Okeechobee before making a north-easterly turn toward the Kennedy Space Center.

Atlantis will then perform an approximately 290-degree right overhead turn to align with Runway 33 at KSC, before touching down at 9:44a.m. Should the first landing opportunity be unavailable, Atlantis and her crew have a second opportunity on Friday morning.

This opportunity would see Atlantis cross into Florida air-space over the city of Tampa, before passing just south of Orlando en route to the Kennedy Space Center.

Atlantis would then perform an approximately 270-degree right overhead turn to align with Runway 33 for a touchdown at 11:19a.m.

EOM +1 and EOM +2 Passive Thermal Control Limitations:

As with all Space Shuttle missions, the orbiter must be thermally conditioned prior to reentry to Earth’s atmosphere.

Depending on the time of year of the mission (specifically, times when the beta angle between the sun and orbiter on a given date is too large), the ability to maintain certain temperature limits on various parts of the orbiter can prove difficult through standard thermal conditioning processes – namely, orienting the orbiter’s underbelly away from the sun.

Specifically, this thermal control becomes a concern when the beta angle exceeds 60-degrees.

To counter this issue, the Space Shuttle Program has – for some time – operated under a Flight Rule which mandates Passive Thermal Control for 10-hours prior to reentry when the beta angle exceeds 60-degrees.

“Flight Rule A2-110C states Passive Thermal Control (PTC) should be flown for 10 hrs if beta 60 degrees at the start of the EOM (End of Mission) thermal conditioning period,” notes an STS-129 End of Mission Thermal Control presentation, available for download on L2.

Currently, the beta angle for Atlantis is below 60 degrees and will remain so through Saturday.

Therefore, should Atlantis land on Friday or Saturday (known in flight terms as End Of Mission (EOM) and EOM+1, respectively), this particular concern will not manifest.

“For STS-129, a nominal EOM and EOM+1, there is no requirement for flying PTC.”

However, should Atlantis, for whatever reason, remain on orbit after Saturday, the beta angle for EOM+2 and EOM+3 does exceed 60 degrees.

“For EOM+2 (Sunday), beta angle reaches -62.4 degrees 10 hours prior to deorbit prep. For EOM+3 (Monday), beta angle reaches -66.7 degrees 10 hours prior to deorbit prep.”

However, any change to the pre-mission baselined attitudes of Atlantis will have an effect on the overall risk posed to the vehicle from MMOD (Micro-Meteoroid Orbiting Debris).

To this end, part of the Thermal Control System division’s options for thermal control included calculations for the updated risk numbers for Atlantis.

In all, there were three options for EOM+2 and EOM+3 thermal control. The first such option would see Atlantis fly 10 hours of a -ZLV -XVV orientation on EOM+2 and 10 hours of PTC on EOM+3. This option would only increase the overall mission MMOD risk by 8 percent to 1 in 276.

The second option would see Atlantis fly 5 hours of PTC and 5 hours of -ZLV +YVV on EOM+2 and 10 hours of PTC on EOM+3. This option increases the MMOD risk by 14 percent to 1 in 262.

The final option would see Atlantis fly 10 hours of PTC on both EOM+2 and EOM+3. This option carries the highest risk and increases the MMOD risk by 16 percent to 1 in 257.

After final analyses were complete, the decision was made that, should Atlantis remain on orbit past Saturday, Option 3 would be preferred based on its “high performance in terms of stress, loads, and dynamics.”

While this option does carry the greatest MMOD risk increase, the increase is still well within the 1 in 200 guideline set by the Space Shuttle Program and is thus acceptable for implementation on STS-129.

Currently, should Atlantis remain on orbit into Sunday, the Mission Operations Directorate has planned 11 hrs of PTC on EOM+2 and EOM+3 – one hour greater than the Flight Rule mandates due to crew sleep timing constraints.

Nevertheless, due to temperature considerations for the Reaction Control System thrusters, the Nose Landing Gear hydraulic return lines, and minimum Thermal Protection System blanket and tile temperatures, the Thermal Control System division is recommending that only 10 hours PTC be performed per the currently Flight Rule.

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STS-129:

Atlantis’ undocking at 4:53am Central time was followed by a stunning one lap flyaround of the Station, allowing for photography to be taken of the exterior of the orbital outpost. Once the flyaround was completed, Atlantis performed separation burns to increase the distance between herself and the ISS.

Late Inspections will be completed before the distance between Atlantis and the ISS are too great, allowing for the orbiter to return to the ISS in the event of serious damage being found during the final check of the Thermal Protection System (TPS).

This procedure, utilizing the Laser Dynamic Range Imager (LDRI) and sensor suite package on the end of the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS), will be similar to Flight Day 2′s opening inspections – which provided a roadmap for engineers to compare data gained later today.

This is required in case Atlantis suffered a MMOD (Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris) hit whilst docked. While serious damage is highly unlikely, due to the protection provided by the ISS when docked, orbiters can still be susceptible to hits, especially on their windows and radiators – as seen on previous missions.

The critical area of the RCC (Reinforced Carbon Carbon) Wing Leading Edges (WLE) also have the ability to ‘feel’ impacts on their panels, via the WLE Impact Detection System (IDS). Presentations on the WLE IDS have noted no “triggers” of concern during the mission so far.

The only areas of interest relate to blocked Waste Dump plumbing – which is not the cause of ice at the nozzle, per inspections. A couple of potential MMOD strikes may have also impacted one of the radiators – though this has yet to be confirmed at this time. Should that be the case, the lack of an issue with the freon loop cooling lines would suggest any damage would only be cosmetic.

TPS Summary:

In all, there were only four areas of Atlantis’ TPS that gained mentioned in the TPS DAT summary – available for download on L2 – providing confidence Atlantis had suffered no notable damage during the powered ascent phase of her mission.

Via the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) inspection, the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) Pod digital camera survey by the Flight Crew, and the R-bar Pitch Maneuver (RPM), all areas of Atlantis were photographed per the pre-mission plan.

All tile structure margins are within limits and the two External Tank umbilical well doors on Atlantis’ underbelly have been verified closed.

The first area of TPS damage noted by the TPS DAT presentation relates to damage observed on Atlantis’ starboard chine.

This damage area is insignificant, as reflected by the lack of comments from the DAT on this damage site. In fact, the DAT presentation only lists the location, dimension, and thickness of the damaged tile.

The tile in question, tile V070-391034-477, has a “1.94 inch long x 0.9 inch wide” damage site. The tile’s overall thickness is 1.570 inches. No other comments were present on the DAT presentation, less the fact that the chine damage location was cleared for entry by P-DAT.

The second TPS damage location is near one of the forward windows (Window #4).

“Two separate damages on tile V070-391020-215. Damages measure 1.08 inches x 0.73 inch and 0.72 inch x 0.63 inch,” notes the presentation. Both damage locations are “within On-Orbit Inspection criteria surface area (< 1 sq in).”

These damage locations were cleared by the DAT via equivalent area analyses and baselines.

Third on the DAT list was the Port Inboard Elevon damage site.

“Elevon tile damage was assessed with depth provided by photogrammetry,” notes the presentation. “Photogrammetry determined depth is 0.17 inches +/- 0.05 inches.”

The area of damage is located on tile V070-193001-097 and is 5.18 inches long x 1.38 inches wide.

Based on the location site and size of the Port Elevon TPS damage, a parametric Thermal/Stress analysis was performed. “Results using bounding depth of 0.3 inches high margins maintained on TPS and Structure,” notes the DAT.

The results of the analysis show that the maximum structural temperature the area of Atlantis’ skin under this damage site will experience during reentry will be 178 degrees F –well within the structural margins of the Orbiter.

The final area of TPS damage noted by the DAT was a frayed gap filler on the Starboard OMS Pod.

“Gap filler remains bonded and there is limited outer sleeving damage.”

As such, all four TPS damage locations have been unanimously cleared for reentry.

Starboard External Tank Door Closure Verification:

Since the STS-114 Return To Flight mission, part of the photographic purpose of the R-bar Pitch Maneuver (RPM) has been to obtain evidence that both External Tank (ET) umbilical doors have closed properly to form a protective thermal seal over the fuel line umbilicals.

While both ET doors have been verified closed on Atlantis, the normal photographic evidence for the closure of the starboard ET door was not obtained during the RPM Wednesday morning due to poor lighting conditions.

“Issue: Normal process using 800mm imagery to verify ET door closure using paint stripe indications had unacceptable lighting/angles on the Starboard Door.”

All ET door motor run times and latch indications were nominal and some 400mm photography of the starboard ET door had acceptable lighting conditions.

Through these photographs, DAT members did not detect any visible paint stripe (a paint stripe that, if visible, would show that the ET door was not properly closed). However, the resolution of the 400mm photos is “right at the limit to detect a paint stripe.”

Further evidence indicating the proper closure of the Starboard ET door is the fact that “oblique RPM photos identified no visible step across door interface,” notes a Starboard ET door DAT presentation – available for download on L2.

“3-D Photogrammetry tools (were) used to bolster confidence” that the ET door is actually closed.

These measurements, which were generated by using the waterproofing hole marks across the ET Door/Orbiter underbelly interface, show a maximum door offset of only 0.11 inches, +/- 0.04 inches.

“The high contrast waterproofing marks were used as tie points between images, and tiles were used as effective scale bars. Seven points were measured around the perimeter of the door and fit to a plane to define the local vertical axis,” notes the ET door presentation.

This step measurement is well within limits. Thus, the DAT considers the Starboard ET door closed for entry. There were no dissenting opinions to this conclusion.

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

No related posts.

STS-129 Latest:

Atlantis has one new issue, according to the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) – relating to a light bulb that appears to have failed in her payload bay. That’s a sign of a healthy orbiter, as Atlantis behaves impeccably on orbit, with just hours remaining until undocking on Wednesday morning.

With one of the final transfers relating to the handover of around 1,400lbs of water from Atlantis to the ISS, the Station has benefited greatly from the STS-129 mission, from a logistical, spares and consumable standpoint.

Farewells have been taking place between the shuttle and Station crews during the day – following the morning reboost of the Shuttle/Station stack by Atlantis - including a first-of-its-kind command handover during a shuttle mission on the ISS. The Atlantis crew are set to close the hatches between Atlantis and the ISS near the end of today.

Once on Atlantis, the crew will carry out rendezvous tools checkouts on the orbiter, followed by leak checks on the Orbiter Docking System (ODS), prior to spending the night on the superstar vehicle.

STS-129 Specific Articles: http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/tag/sts-129/

Undocking early on Flight Day 10, the crew will then conduct a Late Inspection of Atlantis’ Thermal Protection System (TPS) via the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS), prior to the clearance for re-entry by the Damage Assessment Team (DAT) on the ground. A review of the DAT findings to date will be provided in an article on Wednesday.

UPA DA Return:

The orbital outpost has a primary task of conducting vital and unique science on orbit, yet the challenges of maintaining the vast array of hardware – that allows its crewmembers to carry out their roles on Station – is in itself a huge learning curve for human aspirations to conduct long duration space flight.

While spares and well trained astronauts and cosmonauts can bridge certain hardware-related issues, equipment will ultimately fail at time to time. This is the case with the UPA, which is a useful element of supplying consumables to the crew, but also a new technology that has life-saving potential back on Earth.

Thrown in at the deep end of performing in space, the UPA has suffered a number of failures since arriving on Station earlier this year. In-house repairs have worked on several occasions, but now the hardware – specifically the DA – is deemed to have failed beyond the repair capabilities of the ISS’ crewmembers.

Thankfully, the United States hasn’t yet thrown away the un-rivalled downmass capability of the space shuttle, allowing for the DA to be returned – at short notice – on Atlantis, in order for engineers on the ground to examine the exact reason for its failures, while a replacement is prepared to fly up with Endeavour on STS-130 early next year.

However, firstly the DA has to be safely returned on Atlantis, which required several days of evaluations on both the packaging of the hardware, and its safe location on the middeck.

“Purpose: Gain acceptance of increase in risk of returning UPA DA in the Orbiter Middeck with reduced containment levels for leak path components for a TOX 2 substance. This briefing serves as a Safety Issues Briefing for an increase in risk for ORBI-044, Cause E,” noted Mission Management Team presentations – available on L2.

“Issue: Three levels of containment required for external connections cannot be achieved. End plate QD (Quick Disconnect) feed-throughs use a dual seal design. QD connection has internal seal and seal in external cap.

“(Program) requests return of Urine Processing Assembly (UPA) Distillation Assembly (DA) – requires two fault tolerance for all catastrophic hazards, requires that toxic or hazardous chemicals/materials shall have failure tolerant containment appropriate with the hazard level or be contained in an approved pressure vessel as defined in Fracture Control Requirements for Space Station (documentation).

“Rationale for Use of Dual Seals in the UPA for a Tox Level 2 Fluid was approved by the ISS Program manager.”

Risk assessments into ensuring the safety of Atlantis and her crew were created, in the event of the DA leaking whilst in the middeck. While the chances of the DA leaking are small, the crew would be in no danger regardless.

“Risk of external leakage is considered low. Two levels of containment: End plate QD feed-throughs use a dual seal design. QD connections have internal seals and seal in external cap. The DA is at vacuum so a leak would be internal to the DA. Minimal (if any) amount of fluids located in the lines that are exposed externally,” added the presentations.

“Stationary bowl considered fracture critical and is designed an inspected per SSP (Space Shuttle Program) safety documentation. Lines have been proof tested Per SSP safety documentation.”

A plan was also drawn up on how to package the DA safely, with padding used to protect the exposed external lines. It has also been located in an area of the middeck where it will avoid any potential “bumping” with other hardware during landing.

“Return packaging will protect exposed lines per Stowage Plan. Plan calls for careful handling. Installed in correct orientation with padding to protect external lines. DA is strapped and stowed in low traffic area once transferred to Orbiter.”

As a result of the evaluations, no increased risk was confirmed and entered into the documentation that covers “Unknown Gaseous Contamination Levels in the Cabin Causing Crew Illness/Incapacitation” safety requirements – known as ORBI 044.

“Approve transfer and return stowage of UPA DA to Orbiter Middeck: Residual risk of leakage is low. Two certified levels of containment (QD’s and QD Caps). DA at vacuum (internal leakage only). Packed per approved stowage plan. Accept residual increase in risk for STS-129. ORBI 044 Cause E does not require update for single mission effectively.”

The return of the DA to Earth will be another feather in the cap for Atlantis and her crew, marking yet another achievement on a mission that has surpassed all of its pre-planned tasks.

The question for the future will revolve around replacement solutions for not only the vast amount of upmass the shuttle can provide, but also the downmass ability to return hardware for evaluation and repair once the orbiters have been retired – especially if the Station is extended to 2020, without the support of the orbiters.

L2 members: Documentation – from which the above article has quoted snippets – is available in full in the related L2 sections, now over 4000 gbs in size.

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